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FOREWORD
Standard difficulties exist regarding the treatment of Russian 
history, and the approach adopted in this paper requires a short 
explanation. The Julian calendar, which was abandoned only in 1918, 
was thirteen days behind the western one in 1917* Since the Russians 
themselves prefer to use the old style calendar in their works on the 
revolution, that system of dating will be used consistently within the 
text. But citations from western sources, such as the New York Times, 
will remain in conformity with the Gregorian calendar.
The system of transliteration will follow System II, cited in 
J. Thomas Shaver, The Transliteration of Modern Russian for English 
Language Publications (University of Wisconsin, 1967)* Exceptions 
will be made in the cases of well-known political figures, such as 
Leon Trotsky and Alexander Kerensky, whose names have become 
standardized in western usage.
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W P  Vestnik Vrenennogo Pravitel'stva
ABSTRACT
An investigation of Alexander F. Kerensky’s political activities 
is of vital importance, for his public career affected perhaps the most 
crucial period in modern Russian history; the years that spanned the 
enfeeblement and collapse of tsarism, the February revolution of 1917* 
and the Bolshevik seizure of power. As a radical deputy in the State 
Duma and then as a minister in the various provisional regimes that 
attempted to guide the revolutionary state in 1917, he exercised an 
increasing degree of influence upon political events. Because of his 
offices, personal inclination, and initial prestige, Kerensky managed 
to dominate the Russian Provisional Government and, through it, to 
determine state policy.
While Kerensky was a populist and a revolutionary, he was also a 
fervent nationalist. Because of his nationalism, he became the primary 
advocate of political moderation as a means of preserving national 
interests in the midst of war and still bringing to his country a demo­
cratic, egalitarian order based on agrarian socialist principles. In 
pursuit of those aims, he distorted the interplay of political parties 
and the course of the revolution. His refusal to adopt a partisan 
posture when the internal and external pressures upon the country de­
manded such a stance contributed significantly to the Bolshevik victory
in October of 1917.-
Kerensky failed to recognize the dangers inherent in his 
mediative policy because he underestimated the power of class interests 
and overestimated the self-discipline of the population. His populist 
belief in the virtues of the people and his fiery patriotism combined 
to blind him to the true depths of popular discontent. Because he 
expected too much of the revolution, and too much of the Russian 
people, he relied upon his undoubted talent as a political tactician 
to solve problems through the creation of coalition regimes; confusing 
appearance with reality, he thought that parliamentary devices would 
assure the effective cooperation of socialists and non-socialists.
He succeeded only in isolating the government from the populace and 
antagonizing the parties on the Right and the Left. Ultimately, the 
results were political turmoil, attempted counterrevolution» the 
disintegration of the army, spreading anarchy, and the seizure of the 
state by an extreme leftist party, the Bolsheviks. By October, 
Kerensky's moderate policies were in such disrepute that his presence 
within the government actually hindered efforts at resisting the 
Bolshevik insurrection of October
vii
INTRODUCTION
The political and social conflicts of the Russian revolution 
have been the subject of intensive historical scrutiny. But despite 
the attention devoted to the liberal and socialist forces that 
struggled for mastery of the Russian state in 1917» the subject has 
not been thoroughly covered. The focus has generally been upon the 
decisions and reactions of distinct political parties, such as the 
Bolsheviks, Socialist Revolutionaries, and Cadets, or popular revo­
lutionary institutions such as the Petrograd Soviet and the All- 
Russian Congress of Soviets.1 To often, Alexander Kerensky and the 
other moderate politicians who attempted to direct the state through 
the mechanism of the Provisional Government have suffered neglect. 
Their activities and goals have either been treated piecemeal or as 
part of the general context in which specific groups operated. As a 
result, a certain distortion in emphasis has affected historical 
treatments of the period. That neglect is not justified, for the
iFor examples, see: E. H. Carr, The Bolshevik Revolution. 
1917-1923 (New York, 1951-53); 0. H. Radkey, The Agrarian Foes of 
Bolshevism (New York, 1953) and the sequel, The Sickle under the 
Hammer (New York, 1963); A. M. Andreev, Soyety rabochikh i soldatskikh 
deputatov nakanune Oktiabria (Moscow, 196?); W. G. Rosenberg, Liberals 
in the Russian Revolution (Princeton, 197*0; B. M. Morozov, Partiia i 
sovety v Oktiabr’skoi revoliutsii (Moscow, 1966); P. I. Sobeleva, 
Oktiabr1skaia revoliutsii i krakh sotsial-soglashatelei (Moscow, 1968); 
P. Volubuev, Proletariat i burzhuaziia Rossii v 1917 godu (Moscow,
1964).
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leaders of the Provisional Government adopted concrete policies that 
directly affected the course of the February revolution. In the 
process, they either created or aggravated many of the conditions 
which the Bolsheviks successfully exploited.
The intention of this paper is to alleviate the present unsatis­
factory situation by examining the political career of Alexander F. 
Kerensky, initially the most influential figure within the new revo­
lutionary state. Because of the special circumstances of the February
revolution Kerensky, a radical deputy in the Fourth State Duma, rose 
to a position of exceptional prominence ami authority. As Minister of 
Justice, Minister of War, and finally Minister-President of successive 
cabinets, he was at the center of events from February to October of
1917. By virtue of his offices, personal inclination, and prestige,
Kerensky won a position of dominance within the Provisional Government; 
its membership and policies increasingly reflected his desires, and he 
eventually became the primary determinant of its responses to revo­
lutionary necessities. Thus, an examination of his ministerial 
activities provides sustained insight, at the cabinet level, of the 
multifarious problems of provisional rule and the decisions taken to 
meet those problems.
While Kerensky's ministerial role was significant in itself, his 
relationship with the major socialist and liberal parties had an even 
greater impact upon the outcome of the February revolution. A skilled 
political manipulator in unstable conditions and an ardent champion of 
interclass cooperation for the realization of nationalistic goals, he 
attempted to divert the revolution into channels compatible with the 
extension of Russian power. He was not alone in that effort; many
3
Mensheviks and Socialist Revolutionaries and all Cadets, to varying 
degrees, wished to pursue traditional state objectives in spite of the 
revolution. But Kerenslqr's chosen methods, which forced the Left and 
the Right into a closer political association than they desired, had a 
deleterious effect upon attempts to reconstruct the state. The 
resultant coalition cabinets, given the superficial appearance of 
enhanced authority, were lured into aggressive policies that increased 
class tensions and magnified the difficulties of waging war in a 
revolutionary environments At the same time, the interparty cooper­
ation that Kerensky fostered had a tactical, qualified nature that was 
inimical to the continuity of moderate programs. His persistent 
revival of non-party tactics after their manifest bankruptcy was 
directly related to the radical upsurge in September and October of 
1917, for it both antagonized those party politicians associated with 
his efforts and compromised them in the eyes of the impatient populace.
Since Kerensky had such a pervasive effect on the political life 
of the nation, a study of his activities offers a new perspective on 
the interactions of the political forces that, in uneasy alliance, 
vainly sought to impose their wills upon the revolution. It also 
contributes to a fuller understanding of the manner of their failure 
and the resultant anarchic conditions that facilitated the Bolshevik 
seizure of power.
Kerensky was so closely identified with the unfortunate outcome 
of the February revolution that his role in its events provoked extra­
ordinarily sharp reactions. After all, the incapacity of the 
Provisional Government to restrain radicalism had severe consequences; 
as the former Minister-President noted in 1922, the establishment of
a communist regime in Russia carried enormous implications for the 
future of his country and for the world at large.^ The failure of 
political compromise became his personal failure, for he had been its 
main advocate and had attempted to implement its techniques long after 
Russia plunged into an environment of class warfare. While eval­
uations of Kerensky's leadership qualities and political decisions 
have been almost uniformly unfavorable, the specific criticisms differ 
according to the perspectives adopted. To a great extent, KerensIgr 
was judged as the Provisional Government was judged.
As could be expected, the communist attitude toward Kerensky is 
one of implacable hostility. V. I. Lenin set the tone for later 
soviet approaches. Identifying Kerensky as one of the "heroes of 
falseness," Lenin noted that he was a "Right wing, so-called 
socialist" whose policies did not "differ substantially from the 
Cadets in anything." While "maintaining democratic appearances," he 
was a Bonapartist pursuing reactionary policies "behind the backs of 
the people."3 Joseph Stalin agreed that Kerensky provided a cover for 
counterrevolution. While deluding the masses, Stalin claimed, he was 
"standing guard over the interests of the landlords and capitalists, 
resolutely protecting the latter against attacks by workers and 
peasants. Trotsky's assaults were more virulent than those of 
Stalin. Kerensky, the former Red army leader asserted, "had no
2A. Kerenskii, "Fevral* i Oktiabr'," SZ, IX (1922), 292.
3v. I. Lenin, Polnoe sobranie sochinenii, 55 vols. (Moscow, 
1960-65), XXXIV, 248.
*hJ. Stalin, The October Revolution; a Collection of Articles 
and Speeches (New York, 1934), p. 12.
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theoretical preparation, no political schooling, no ability to think,
no political will."5 Moreover, his policies lacked the "force of
Bonapartism" while retaining "all its v i c e s . Soviet historians have
been careful to remain within that doctrinal framework, for their
writings on the period routinely identify Kerensky as a "socialist
compromiser" and a "disguised, counterrevolutionary" who led the
"agents of reaction" against the revolutionary masses.?
While those who defeated Kerensky had a vested interest in
destroying his reputation, the non-communist Left was scarcely more
charitable. Victor Chernov, the leader of the Socialist Revolutionary
Party, admitted that Kerensky welcomed the revolution with "genuine
enthusiasm." But the veteran populist maintained that Kerensky was an
"overrated personality" whose obsession with compromise undermined the
social basis of provisional rule.® Nikolai Sukhanov, a Left Menshevik,
offered a variant of Chernov's evaluation:
Kerensky was a sincere democrat. He believed in the truth and 
the correctness of his line and hoped that his actions would 
lead the country to the triumph of democracy. He was terribly 
mistaken. A feeble politician, without schooling or the wisdom 
of a statesman, he strayed into anti-democratic policies and, 
as far as his influence was effective, buried himself and the 
revolution.9
The political Right was even more vindictive than the Left.
5l . Trotsky, The History of the Russian Revolution, trans. Max 
Eastman, 3 vols. (New York, 1932), II, 183.
^Trotsky, II, 157-
?Morozov, 86; Soboleva, 92.
8v. Chernov, Pered burei, vospominaniia (New Yor’', 1953). P* 338. 
9n . N. Sukhanov, Zapiski o revoliutsii. 7 vols. (Berlin, 1922),
I, 68.
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Vladimir Nabokov, a Right Cadet and one of Kerensky's colleagues in
the Provisional Government, dismissed him as a "fortuitous little man"
who suffered from the "mania of g r e a t n e s s . S .  I. Shidlovskii, a
prominent Octobrist and the leader of the Progressive Bloc of the
State Duma, claimed that Kerensky was an "adventurer utterly unfit for
a large role in politics. Perhaps the harshest evaluation was that
of the eminent Russian historian P. N. Miliukov, the head of the Cadet
Party. Comparing Kerensky with Boris Godunov, whose policies led to
the Time of Troubles in the early seventeenth century, Miliukov
claimed that his political skills consisted of "thrusting himself
forward at the right moment."^ The former Minister-President,
Miliukov continued, "could never make a clear choice" and was paralysed
by "interminable hesitations between the Right and the Left."13
Western historians have tended to accept the verdict of
Kerensky's non-communist contemporaries. The standard chronicler of
the Russian revolution, William H. Chamberlin, maintained:
Just as some of Kerensky's traits predestined him for leadership 
in the early phase of the Revolution, other qualities, inability 
to think coldly and realistically outside of the haze of his own 
glowing phrases, sentimentality that occasionally verged on 
hysteria and led to alternations between extreme optimism and 
extreme pessimism, capacity for self-hypnotism, marked him out
IGv. Nabokov, "Vremennoe Pravitel'stvo," ARR. I (1922), 35-36.
llS. I. Shidlovskii, Vospominaniia, 2 vols. (Berlin, 1923),
II, 128.
12p. Miliukov, Vospominaniia. 1859-1917. 2 vols. (New York,
1955), II. 262, 327.
13P. Miliukov, C. Seignobos, and L. Eisenmann, Histoire de 
Russie; reforms, reaction, revolution, 3 vols. (Paris, 1933J, III, 
12797*
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for disastrous failure when the romantic illusions of national 
unity were shattered on the hard facts of class antagonism.^
Donald W. Treadgold, a noted student of modern Russia, echoed 
Chamberlin. Kerensky-s weakness, he observed, was that "oratory 
became a substitute for action."^5 T. H. Von Laue offered a slight 
shift in emphasis; Kerensky, he felt, was the "first of the great 
orators of revolutionary mass politics in the modern age." Neverthe­
less, Von Laue added, the "exalted quality" of his appeal was "devoid 
of political realism.Perhaps the most severe criticism of the 
former head of state was advanced by 0. H. Radkey, the leading American 
historian of the Socialist Revolutionary Party. Kerensky failed,
Radkey asserted, because:
He was neither a socialist nor a revolutionary but a nineteenth- 
or early twentieth-century radical of the French, or perhaps 
even more, the British type, a St. Petersburg attorney who 
consorted with the Left without accepting its ultimate 
objectives. 1?
That opinion, advanced thirty-six years after the revolution, was 
surprisingly reminiscent of the one held by V. M. Purishkevich, a 
monarchist, in July of 1917. Kerensky, Purishkevich argued, was a 
"crystal pure man" who was "removed from the daily life of his own 
land and did not realize it."-*-®
1**W. H. Chamberlin, The Russian Revolution. 1917-1921, 2 vols. 
(New York, 1965), I, 150.
15d. Treadgold, Twentieth Century Russia (Chicago, 196*0, p. 35.
16t . H. Von Laue, Why Lenin? Why Stalin? A Reappraisal of the 
Russian Revolution. 1900-1930 (New York, 196*0, p. 118.
l?Radkey, Agrarian Foes, p. 463•
l®Speech of Purishkevich before a meeting of the State Duma, 
cited in Izvestiia, July 20, 1917, p. 3*
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Those strongly negative views have not gone unchallenged.
Kerensky has vigorously defended his conduct; while conceding a lack
of "personal strength and ability," he claimed that the "main lines"
of his policy were "correctly traced." Only through a policy of class
cooperation, he insisted, could Russia have avoided "civil war and a
separate peace. "19 Robert P. Browder, who has worked extensively with
Kerensky, has come to his defense. While admitting that the former
Russian statesman was unable to meet the challenges that were
presented to him, Browder argued:
Kerensky failed, not because he was weak-willed, emotional, or 
politically inept. He was a moderate at a time aid place where 
moderation was inappropriate. Kerensky displayed considerable 
skill as a political raaneuverer and demonstrated an ability to 
manipulate and compromise which, in normal circumstances, might 
have been successful over a considerable period of time. But 
he had to operate in abnormal times.20
None of these interpretations are entirely satisfactory. While 
Western historians have duly recorded Kerensky's activities, they have 
consistently underestimated his actual impact upon the course and 
outcome of the February revolution. The primary cause of that attitude 
is the undeniable fact that Kerensky's policies failed to meet the 
needs of the country. But as a result, there has been an unfortunate 
tendency to assume that the Provisional Government, paralysed by 
Kerensky's commitment to unrealistic political ideals, was unable to 
have a direct influence upon revolutionary developments. Accordingly,
^9a . Kerenskii, "Politika Vremennogo Pravitel'stva," SZ,
L (1932), 423.
2Or . Browder, "Kerenskji Revisited," Russian Thought and 
Politics, ed. H. McLean, et al. ("Harvard Slavic Studies;" Harvard, 
1957), IV, 433.
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historians have been disposed to acoept the corollary that in the main 
the real political straggle proceeded independently of Russia's formal 
leadership.21 In view of those misleading propensities, a reassessment 
of Kerensky's role in the events of 1917 should proceed carefully and 
comprehensively. A logical point of departure would be an inquiry 
into his pre-revolutionary career, where indications of his later 
behavior might be found,
21por example, see the implied evaluations ©f the effectiveness 
of the Provisional Government in: L. Schapiro, "The Political Thought 
of the First Provisional Government," Revolutionary Russia: a Symposium, 
ed. Richard Pipes (New York, 1969), p. 137; Carr, p. 103.
CHAPTER I
ALEXANDER KERENSKY'S PRE-REVOLUTIONARY CAREER
Alexander Kerensky was deeply influenced by his social origins, 
and to a considerable extent his family position was a result of 
changing conditions in Russia during the latter part of the nineteenth 
century. Kerensky's parents were commoners and would have remained in 
relative obscurity in the Russia of Nicholas I. But while the Great 
Reforms of Alexander II did not abolish privilege, they did provide 
increased opportunities for greater portions of the population.
Taking advantage of loosened political restrictions, the Kerensky 
family obtained status equivalent to that of the gentry* Their route 
to prominence was service in the state bureaucracy. Through it, they 
acquired a social position somewhat comparable to the Noblesse de Robe 
in old regime France.
Fyodor Mikhailovich Kerensky, Alexander's father, was primarily 
responsible for that success. He had been born in 18k2 into the large 
and impoverished family of a district (uezd) priest in Penza Province 
(Gubemiia) As the son of a clergyman, Fyodor was assured access to 
a basic education. But his attendance at the Theological Seminary at
lAlexander F. Kerensky Archives, the Humanities Research Center, 
University of Texas, Austin, Texas, folio 75*
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Penza and his later graduation from the University of Kazan were 
achieved only through considerable effort; while noble birth was no
longer a requirement for entrance into a university, he had experienced 
difficulty in financing his course of study.2 After acquiring a degree 
in classical philology, Fyodor advanced rapidly. Physically imposing 
and exceptionally able, he held a succession of increasingly 
responsible posts in the tsarist educational system.3
Early in his teaching career, Fyodor contracted an advantageous 
marriage to Nadezhda Adler, a former student of his at the Radionov 
Institute at Kazan. An attractive and graceful woman, Nadezhda felt 
at ease in her husband5s professional and social circles. Her back­
ground lent the necessary assurance; Nadezhda1 s father, an army major, 
directed the Topographical Division at the headquarters of the Kazan 
Military District, and her maternal grandfather had been a wealthy 
Moscow merchant.^
By the time of Alexander Kerensky's birth, on April 22, 1881, 
his parents were prosperous and respected. Fyodor Kerensky directed 
two gymnasiums in Simbirsk and was firmly accepted into provincial 
upper society.3 The family success continued, for in 1899 Fyodor 
became the Director of Education in Turkestan, a position he held for
2Ibid.
3a. Naumov, Iz utsielievskikh vospominanii. 1868-1917. 2 vols. 
(New York, 195^-5577 I. 36-38.
^Kerensky Archives, folio 75.
5lbid.
12
over twenty years.** At times, Alexander was to regret hi® prominent 
origins; when later attempting to enter radical political circles in 
St. Petersburg, he felt hampered fey his "bureaucratic descent. ”7
As could be expected of a political emigre. a certain wistfulness 
accompanies Alexander Kerensky's childhood remembrances. Nonetheless, 
there can be little doubt that his early years in Simbirsk and 
Tashkent were happy ones. The Kerensky family enjoyed superior 
governmen-Uprovided housing and could afford governesses, servants, 
and nurses.® Daily life possessed a stable core of routine amply 
supplemented by excursions and social events;9 by his own account, 
Alexander was surrounded by demonstrations of attention and affection.
Evidently, Fyodor Kerensky exercised a stabilising and bene­
ficial influence upon his son. Although Fyodor held traditional 
attitudes and was conservative in outlook,11 he was intellectually 
curious, catholic in his reading tastes, and impatient with bureau­
cratic abuse. As the Kerensky household combined a basic condiment 
to the Imperial status quo with a somewhat sympathetic attitude 
regarding reformist movements, Alexander's personal development 
proceeded smoothly in a conventional but non-repressive atmosphere.
^A, Kerensky, The Crucifixion of Liberty, trans, G. Kerensky 
(New York, 193*0. p. 62.
^Crucifixion, p. 119.
®Crucifixion, p. 56. Alexander had two sisters, Anna and 
Yelina, and a brother, Fedya.
9lbdd.
lOKerensky Archives, folio 75.
llKerensky, Crucifixion, p. 58.
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His father's background and interests assured educational progress. 
Alexander had access to a wide rang® of political reading materials, 
and Fyodor took an active interest in his scholastic work. A 
particular encouragement of proficiency in debate and composition was 
rewarded; Alexander's oratorical ability later became a striking 
political asset.12
Fyodor's attempts to provide security and stimulation were 
remarkably successful, for Alexander could recall only one childhood 
episode when he felt strongly that something was seriously wrong with 
his country. This was occasioned by his parent's discussion of Leo 
Tolstoy's opposition to the Franco-Russian Alliance of 1892; signifi­
cantly, Fyodor's partial agreement with Tolstoy's criticism of 
autocracy was not knowingly expressed in his son's presence.13
Alexander Kerensky's early years left a clear imprint upon his 
character. Of course, many of his beliefs were later altered. Support 
of monarchism, respect for the rites and ceremonies of the Russian 
Orthodox Church, the acceptance of Russification, the acknowledgement 
of social distinctions— these attitudes, to which Kerensky was exposed 
automatically by reason of birth, were left behind. While the form of 
his beliefs changed, however, important elements remained.
Certainly, nationalism was one of Kerensky's enduring traits.
It was constantly on or near the surface and was easily recognized, 
regardless of the socialist or internationalist vocabulary which he 
sometimes adopted. Iraki G. Tsereteli, a Menshevik leader and close
l^Kerensky Archives, folio 75*
13Kerensky, Crucifixion, p. 60.
associate in 1917, maintained that an "ecstatic nationalism" was 
Kerensky's outstanding characteristic.1^ Victor M. Chernov, the head 
of the Socialist Revolutionary (SR) Party, noted the force of that 
quality and observed that it was tinged with a kind of "hysterical- 
stilted inspiration."15 Sir George Buchanan, the British ambassador 
to Russia during the revolution, frequently commented on that attribute 
and suspected that Kerensky's strong personal magnetism was linked to 
his "patriotic fervour."16 Kerensky's speeches and writings revealed 
a strong emotional commitment to his country, for he considered Russia 
a "living body"17 created by the "blood and sweat of generations."1® 
Political exile in 1918 did not alter his attitude. During the Russian 
Civil War, he urged the Western Allies to respect the "entire 
territorial integrity of Russia" and advocated their "complete dis­
interest" in Russian internal affairs.19 His patriotism also survived 
the Bolshevik victory; when Germany invaded the Soviet Union in 1941, 
he supported national resistance in a telegram to Joseph Stalin.
14i. g . Tsereteli, Vospominaniia o fevral'skoi revoliutsii.
2 vols. (Paris, 1963), I, 122.
15v. Chernov, Pered burei, vospominaniia (New York, 1953)/ P* 338.
I6sir George Buchanan, My Mission to Russia and Other Diplomatic 
Memories. 2 vols. (New York, 1923), II, 109.
17a . Kerensky, Russia and History's Turning Point (New York,
1965), p. 15.
IQgd, session 2 , special meeting, July 26, 1914, cols. 18-19*
l9Telegram addressed by Alexander Kerensky to Moscow by the Quai 
d'Orsay. The V. A. Maklakov Archive of the Russian Embassy in Paris, 
1917-1924, 4 boxes, Collection of the Hoover Institute at Stanford 
University, box 1, accession no. 26003-937*
20Kerensky Archives, folio 149.
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An essentially religious outlook was another lasting quality. 
Although Kerensky opposed bureaucratic formalism in the Russian 
Orthodox Church, calling it "soulless officialism,"21 he remained 
strongly drawn to certain native religious currents. He has implied 
that his belief in personal sacrifices for the people originated in 
the Russian kenotic tradition,22 and he was so impressed by Vladimir 
Soloviev's mystical writings that they later found secularized 
reflection in his political statements.23
There were other legacies from Kerensky's early years. Qualified 
confidence in the effectiveness of legal opposition to tsarism, 
reliance upon moral exhortation and example, acceptance of service 
obligations to the state, and confidence in a personal capacity for 
leadership were natural outgrowths of his family's prominence and 
administrative background.
In view of his fundamental orientation, it is easy to understand 
how Kerensky so quickly accepted the tenets of political radicalism 
when he entered the University of St. Petersburg. They did not involve 
a serious break with old beliefs; Kerensky adapted them, shifted their 
emphasis, and used them as a bridge to pass into new activities and 
alliances. Thus, a basis existed for his claim of being a revolutionary 
while still in Tashkent.2**
2^Kerensky, Crucifixion, p. 58.
22ibid. Kenoticism referred to a voluntary yielding of needs or 
an "emptying" of personal qualities for the salvation of others.
23Kerensky, Russia, p. Jk. For example, see Kerensky's discourse 
on truth in GD, session 2, meeting 4, October 23, 1913. col. 2^5*
2**Kerensky, Crucifixion, p. 56.
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While Kerensky's radical political education dated from his 
entrance into the law faculty at the University of St. Petersburg in 
1899, he refrained, to a remarkable degree, from direct political 
activity.25 Opportunities for such involvement existed, for student 
disturbances continued from 1899 to 1904-, although at a diminished 
rate compared with previous years.26 But he refused to associate with 
specific political groups and remained a "rank and file" member of 
disruptive student activities.27 Kerensky took an active part in only 
one demonstration. In the spring of 1901, at a gathering in support 
of student rights, he condemned narrow personal goals and called for 
union with the !ation in the struggle for political liberation.28 
That first impulsive experiment did not turn out well. He was 
temporarily suspended from the university and released to the custody 
of his father.29 Fyodor Kerensky was not pleased with his son's 
behavior. He told Alexander that he was still inexperienced and 
immature and, while he could do as he wished later, he should concen­
trate upon his studies until graduation.30
Alexander found his father's conditions easy to accept, for
25crucifixion, p. 77.
26fj. Cherevanin, "Dvizlienie intslligentsii do epoki 'doveriia' 
kn. 3viatipolka-Mirskago," Obshchestvennoe dvizhenie v Rossi v nachale 
XX-go veka, L. Martov, ed., 4 vols. (St. Petersburg, 1909), I, 262.
27Kerensky, Crucifixion, p. 77.




there were other outlets for his energies and a number of ways to
t
satisfy his present needs. He claimed to have often felt an "inner 
loneliness,"31 and he sought relief in an active social life. Kerensky 
rented a dormitory roon^-rather than an apartment away from campus— in 
order to meet more people, attended theatrical productions with 
friends, and enthusiastically joined literary discussion groups.32
Although successful in gathering a reliable circle of friends 
and acquaintances, which included his future wife, Olga Baranovskii,33 
Kerensky was not completely comfortable in his new environment. 
Offended, as provincials often were, by the doctrinaire rigidity and 
apparent conceit of Europeanized Russian students, he purposely empha­
sized his Asiatic heritage.34 Kerensky asserted that he felt most at 
ease in a Turkestani fraternity, and he became prominent in that 
organization's activities.35
Kerensky also found solace in a carefully chosen curriculum, 
enrolling in courses that supported his intuitive attitudes.3^ Nicolas 
Losskii's idealistic philosophy and legalist Lev Pehazhitskii1s 
emphasis on an innate sense of duty reinforced his system of values
3lRussja, p. 16.
32k . Breshkovskaia, Hidden Springs of the Russian Revolution; 
Personal Memoirs of Katerina Breshkovskaia. ed. L. Hutchinson 
(Stanford, 193l), p- 350.
33These included Olga's brother, Vladimir, a member of the Guards 
Artillery, and her cousin Sergeii Vasil'ev, a fellow student.
3^N. Sukhanov, Zapiski o revoliutsii. 7 vols. (St. Petersburg- 
Berlin, 1919), I, 47.
35Kerensky, Russia, p. 23.
36Russia. p. 29.
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and provided him with specific arguments against materialist doctrines, 
and exposure to historians S. F. Platonov and Tadeus Zelinskii 
encouraged his sympathy with democracy.37 By his graduation in 1904, 
Kerensky had acquired a defeasible set of political views. They found 
expression in his acceptance of the populist (narodnik) ideology, which 
provided a suitable vehicle for his belief in the positive role of the 
human will, his aversion to a pronounced class orientation, and his 
commitment to democracy and political freedom. He was also strongly 
attracted to populism’s native roots and sympathy with the peasantry.3®
Personal motives prevented an immediate translation of Kerensky’s 
populist beliefs into radical political action. He had married 
immediately upon graduation, and while his new wife, the former Olga 
L'vovna Baranovskii, shared his political viewpoints,39 he recognized 
new obligations and inhibitions. Nevertheless, Kerensky did not 
completely accommodate himself to tsarism. He spurned an overly 
close relationship with the autocracy by rejecting state service, and 
he considered graduate woric in criminal law, which at least would have 
permitted some obstruction of repressive tsarist policies. But a 
clash with an influential law professor put an end to even that limited 
oppositionist course. Lacking alternatives, Kerensky decided to enter 
private legal practice.40
3?Russia, pp. 30-34.
38Kerensky, Crucifixion. p. 104.
39she also shared his social eminence. Olga's father was a 
colonel attached to the Russian General Staff (Stavka), and her 
oaternal grandfather was V. P. Vasil*ev, a well-known Chinese scholar. 
Kerensky Archives, folio 78.
40Kerensky, Crucifixion, p. 104.
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In the fall of 1904, Kerensky applied for membership in the 
St. Petersburg Bar Association. He found it to be an instructive 
experience. Rebuffed because of his association with "higher bureau­
cratic circles," he gained admission as a Junior Barrister only when 
vouched for by lawyers holding appropriately anti-governmental views.^ 
According to his own testimony, Kerensky’s determination to acquire a 
radical political reputation dates from that initial rejection.
Ashamed of his privileged past, he wished to atone for it by becoming 
a "political lawyer" specialising in politically sensitive cases. 
Unconditional acceptance by established radical lawyers was quite 
difficult; as a step toward that end, he became active in the konsul- 
tatsiia. a legal aid organisation. That decision required some courage 
and endurance. Kerensky deliberately ignored potentially profitable 
family contacts and served a hard and obscure apprenticeship which 
involved tedious work for small remuneration. ̂2
As it was largely prompted by embarrassment, Kerensky's initial 
political activity was of questionable duration. But the events of 
January 9, 1905, in which he witnessed the Imperial Guards firing upon 
a peaceful demonstration, made him an irreconcilable foe of tsarism. 
"The part of an onlooker," he said later, "became quite unbearable 
after the Red Sunday. n/+3 While he was in no position to lead, or even 
significantly to shape, events during the 1905 revolution, Kerensky 
still took an active part in protest work. He joined a Bar Council
^Kerensky, Russia, p. 44.
^Kerensky, Crucifixion, p. 107.
^Crucifixion, p. 107.
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committee formed to assist the victims of Bloody Sunday, and in the 
October general strike he aided the Barrister's Union in disrupting 
proceedings in the State Senate.^ Kerensky also took individual 
action, breaking off relations with acquaintances in privileged circles 
and seeking outlets for propagandistic w o r k .^5 jn November of 1905, 
he associated with the Organisation of Armed Rebellion, headed by a 
Socialist Revolutionary, N. D. Mironov. Actually, that action was 
less daring than it might seem; despite its grandiloquent title, 
Mironov's group was rather harmless and confined itself to publishing 
an illegal newspaper, Burevestnik (Stormy Petrel). Through that 
medium, Kerensky attacked the autocracy and supported the projected 
State Duma as a potentially disruptive influence upon the government.^
Apparently, Kerensky's hostility to tsarism had become so intense 
that he attempted to enter the terroristic Battle Organization of 
the SR Party; having previously dismissed terrorism as revolutionary 
romanticism, he now wished to take part in the assassination of 
Nicholas II. In his latest memoirs, Kerensky asserted that his 
contacts with the Battle Organization, Boris Moisenko and Boris 
Savinkov, were willing to consider his application, and he was rejected 
only through the direct intervention of the group's leader, Evgenii 
Azev. While Azev's motives were suspect— he was later exposed as an 
agent of the tsarist secret police— he apparently advanced the quite 
reasonable objection that Kerensky was inexperienced and therefore
^Crucifixion, p. 108.




Kerensky's oppositional activity came to the attention of the 
Okhrana (the state security police), and he was arrested when found 
possessing manifestos of the Organization of Armed Rebellion. Although 
he successfully conducted a week-long hunger strike in protest against 
procedural irregularities,**® Kerensky found imprisonment at Kresty 
(the Cross) frustrating and pointless and possible conviction on 
charges of treason frightening. He was particularly resentful that 
the Okhrana raid on his apartment had not been directed specifically 
at his activities but had been part of a general search for an escaped
terrorist.^9
Outside events intervened in Kerensky's favor. His imprisonment 
coincided with the meeting of the First State Duma and, as part of a 
limited and informal amnesty program, he was sentenced to several 
years' banishment from major cities.50 Once out of prison, Kerensky 
improved the conditions of his release. Utilizing once-despised
4?Russia, p. 61. Neither Boris Nicolaevskii, Azev's biographer, 
nor Boris Savinkov mention Kerensky's attempt to enter the Battle 
Organization, although Nicolaevskii indicates that Azev often inter­
vened in the screening of new applicants. V. M. Zenzinov, a close 
friend of Kerensky's implies that Kerensky was known to the Battle 
organization, but does not go into detail. See B. Nikolajewsky,
Azef the Spy: Russian Terrorist and Police Stool (New York, 1934). 
p. 71; Boris Savinkov, Memoirs of a Terrorist, trans. Joseph Shaplen 
(New York, 1931); V. M. Zenzinov, Perezhitoe (New York, 1953)» P* 114.
**®Kerensky, Crucifixion, p. 118.
**9Kerensky, Russia, p. 68; Padenie tsarskogo rezhima; steno- 
graficheskie otcheti, doprosov Jl pokazanii. dannikh v 1917 £• v 
chrez vychainoi sledstvennoi komissli Vremennogo Pravitel'stva. ed.
P. E. Shchegoleva, 7 vols. (Moscow-Leningrad„ 1924-27), VII, 353*
50Padenie; M. Visniak, Dan* Proshlomu (New York, 1954), p. 127.
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aristocratic connections, he obtained from Senator Zvolianskii, the 
director of the police department, an annulment of his sentence. That 
was accomplished with the understanding that he would avoid future 
association with revolutionary groups and spend son® time with his 
father in Tashkent.51
The consequences of Kerensky's prison experiences were tangible 
and far-reaching. He assumed a realistic attitude toward political 
possibilities are! ended, experimentation with revolutionary illegality. 
Convinced that the government had stabilized and consolidated its 
position, he felt that work aimed at educating the Russian people and 
solidifying their hostility to autocracy was the only remaining 
alternative.52 The means to that end were now available, for imprison­
ment had erased the taint of his privileged past ami he was accepted
into the fellowship of the political lawyers.
Kerensky received his first important political case shortly 
after his return to St. Petersburg. In October, 1906, a legal group 
headed by N. D. Sokolov requested that he replace them in the defense 
of peasants accused of pillaging an estate near Reval (Tallin).53 
While he had only a few days to acquaint himself with the relevant 
documents, Kerensky had no difficulty in adopting a mode of defense.
In the tradition of the political lawyer, he gained the acquital of 
most of the accused by attacking the brutal methods of retribution 
applied by local authorities.5^ The successful outcome of the Reval
5lKerensky, Russia, p. 72; Padenie, VII, 353-
52Kerensky, Russia, p. 68.
53Russkie Vedomosti, August 26, 1906, p. 3*
5̂ -Kerensky, Russia, pp. 7^-75*
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trial launched Kerensky on an outstanding legal career and revealed 
the exceptional oratorical ability that he would subsequently put to 
vigorous use.
The Reval case also established a pattern which Kerensky followed 
with great consistency until his entrance into the State Duma in 1912. 
He specialized in controversial eases, travelling throughout the 
Russian Empire at the standard fee of ten rubles a day and the price 
of a second-class round-trip railway ticket.55 That course offered 
several advantages. It increased his familiarity with conditions in 
many parts of the country, afforded opportunities for the gathering of 
anti-governmental material, and enhanced his reputation as a defender 
of liberty. Furthermore, he m s  able to focus attention upon short­
comings in Russian society in an effective, if theatrical, w a y . 56 
Kerensky's chosen path revealed a considerable degree of political 
maturity, for through it he was able to attack social evils in a 
strictly legal manner and to expose them through vivid and telling 
examples.
By 1910 Kerensky was sufficiently well-known to attract the 
favorable attention of L. M. Bramson and S. Znamenskii, leaders of a 
populist party, the Trudoviks (Toilers).57 Numerically small, the 
group was primarily composed of intellectuals dissatisfied with the 
ideological rigidity of the SR's and the Constitutional Democrats
55Russla, p. 76.
56sir Bernard Pares, A Wandering Student: the Story of a Purpose 
(New York, 19^8), p. 2*4-3.
57Kerensky, Russia, pp. 83-8*4-.
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(Cadets).5® The Trudovik Party had compiled an impressively radical 
record in previous D u m a s 5 9  hut was not of the extreme Left. It 
apparently consisted of men holding basically moderate views who, at 
the same time, harbored easily-aroused sympathies with revolutionary 
action.60 That essential duality made categorization difficult; it 
was not certain whether the Trudoviks were a splinter from the Right 
SR's or the Left Cadets.63-
While the Trudoviks never realized their potential (they had 
only ten members in the Fourth State Duma), they did represent an 
alternative to the major political parties. They emulated the SR’s in 
advocating land nationalization and considered themselves populist in 
orientation.62 But at the same time, they courted industrial workers 
and had a noticeable influence in some urban areas.63 Their affinity 
with liberalism was also evident. They valued constitutionally 
protected political rights such as freedom of speech and assembly, 
seeing in these guarantees a way to further political reform, and were 
willing to embark upon parliamentary maneuvers aimed at creating an
58For an evaluation of Russian political parties, see the 
Maklakov Archive, Box 1, accession no. 26003-937. number 24.
59p. Maslov, "Narodnicheskie partii," Obshchestvennoe dvizhenie. 
Ill, 121.
60s. I. Shidlevskii, Vospominaniia, 2 vols. (Berlin, 1923). II,
127.
63-Tsereteli, I, 217; V. A. Maklakov, The First State Duma; 
Contemporary Reminiscenses, trans. Mary Belkin (Bloomington, 1964), 
p. 120; Maklakov Archive, Box 1, accession no. 26003-937, number 24.
62y. Maklakov, Iz vospominanii (New York, 1954), p. 365.
63Maslov, "Narodnicheskie partii," p. 147.
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effective coalition of progressive and radical parties in the Duma.6^
The Trudovik's political elasticity appealed to Kerensky. He 
had previously identified with the SR's, but had teen disappointed in 
that party's decision to boycott the elections to the State Duma and 
had found its leadership overly doctrinaire.65 He did not feel so 
confined within the Trudovik Party* for its membership shared hip pro­
fessional background ami attitudes ami was susceptible to his leader­
ship.^ Finally (this, to Kerensky's mind, was probably the Trudovik's 
greatest attraction), they afforded him an opportunity to gain entrance 
into the State Duma. Liberals saw that institution as a path to the 
creation of a limited monarchy on the English model and placed great 
stress on numerical majorities ami party platforms; Kerensky viewed it 
as a podium from which to attack the government and, perhaps, as an 
eventual focal point of r e v o lution.67 He readily accepted an offer to 
stand as a candidate in the upcoming Fourth State Duma, and in the fall 
of 1912 won election as an unopposed delegate from Volsk, a district 
capital of Saratov Province.68
6^A. Martinov, "Konstitutsionno-demokraticheskie partiia," 
Obshchestvennoe dvizhenie. Ill, 48.
65v. Chernov, Rozhdenie revoliutsionnoi Rossii; fevral♦skoi 
revoliutsiia (New York, 1934), p. 212.
^^Shidlovskii, II, 12?; Maklakov Archive, Box 1, accession no. 
26003-937, number 24. Miliukov observed that the Trudoviks "waited 
for their leader— a vacancy later filled by A. F. Kerensky, who did 
whatever he wished." P. Miliukov, Vospominaniia, 1859-1917, 2 vols.
(New York, 1955), II, 14.
67g d . session 1, meeting 6, December 3, 1912, cols. 182-184.
68q d. session 1, meeting 3, November 23, 1912, col. 29. At this 
time, Kerensky also entered the masonic movement. While conclusions 
must be tentative, it appears that Russian Masonry had a pronounced 
political complexion. Representatives from a wide political spectrum
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A badly mishandled miners' demonstration provided Kerensky with 
a unique opportunity to participate in the State Duma's activities 
before his election to that body. On April 4, 1912, local authorities 
at the Lena gold fields in Irkutsk panicked in the face of mass unrest 
and allowed troops to fire upon assembled workers; as a result, the 
incident was transformed into a massacre which claimed 340 victims. *>9 
The central government compounded the error, for in response to Duma 
demands for an explanation?0 the Minister of the Interior, N. A. 
Maklakov, supported the use of force. "The crowd," Maklakov insisted, 
"lost self-control and moved toward the troops. There was no choice 
but to fire." In an inflammatory conclusion, Maklakov provocatively 
added, "This is how it was in the past, and how it will be in the 
future."?■*■ Because of the Interior Minister's performance, the Duma 
ignored a governmental investigation into the matter and appointed 
Kerensky to head its own commission of inquiry.
Kerensky accepted the appointment with obvious enthusiasm.?3 
His investigation, unexpectedly aided by officials in the provincial
were members, indicating that the organization provided a medium 
through which opponents of tsarism could work together. See Miliukov, 
Vospominaniia, II, 332-333; Kerensky, Russia, p. 88.
n . Kokovtsov, Iz moego proshlogo; vospominaniia, 1903-1919 
£g., 2 vols. (Paris, 193377 11757.---- ------- ------------ ------
7Opor an example, see Alexander Guchkov's speech in GD, session 
5, meeting 99, April 9, 1912, cols. 1674-1675*
7lGD, session 5, meeting 102, April 11, 1912, col. 1953*
72a . Kerensky, "Russia on the Eve of World War One," Russian 




administration, 7**- revealed flagrant exploitation by mine owners and 
incompetence on the part of the local army commander. The government, 
embarrassed and unable to defend itself adequately against the accusa­
tory material compiled by Kerensky,75 moved to rectify conditions.
The company's monopoly was abolished, the administration was re­
organised, and the miners were provided with better food, housing, and 
working c o n d i t i o n s . 76 The Lena goldmining case occurred at a timely 
moment. Kerensky's able performance, which attracted nationwide 
attention, allowed him to enter the Duma with an enhanced political 
reputation.77
Almost from its convocation in November 1912, deputy Kerensky 
was a fractious influence in the Fourth State Duma. His first speech 
was violently critical of Duma politics, for Kerensky accused the 
deputies to his Right of trying to "worm their way into power" and 
observed that success would result only in the replacement of one form 
of privilege with another.^ As would frequently occur in the future, 
his maiden speech was cut short after degenerating into an acrimonous 
exchange with the conservative Duma President, M. V. R o d z i a n k o . 7 9
7̂ *Sir Bernard Pares, The Fall of the Russian Monarchy: a Study 
of the Evidence (New York, 1939), p* 155*
75Kokovtsov, II, 57; Shidlovskii, II, 126.
76Kerensky, Russia, p. 82.
7?Padenie, VII, 353; Pares, Fall, p. 155•
78q d, session 1, meeting 6, December 3, 1912, cols. 182-184.
79lbid.; the editors of Russkie Vedomosti observed that Kerensky 
frequently displayed a "mutinous disposition." Russkie Vedomosti.
June 10, 1914, p. 2.
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Thus, Kerensky established his position at the very outset of his Duma 
career. He refused to tolerate compromise if it was directed toward 
partisan ends; the nation, not specific parties, should be the 
beneficiary of political action.
In pursuit of that goal, Kerensky willingly took part in dis­
ruptive activities in the Duma. An example of that tactic occurred in 
April, 1914, when deputy Nicholai Chkheidze, a leading Menshevik, 
created a sensation hy predicting the imminent arrival of a republic.®® 
In a strong reaction, the Right wing of the Duma introduced a "freedom 
of speech" bill aimed at restricting opposition deputies. An attempt 
hy moderates on April 22 to evade conflict by advancing discussion of 
the current budget failed, for the maneuver provoked a disorderly Left 
demonstration in which Kerensky played a leading role. Chants of 
"freedom of speech" paralysed proceedings, and order was imposed only 
through the ejection of thirty Left deputies, including Kerensky, and 
their suspension from the Duma for fifteen meetings.The return of 
the barred deputies on May 7 was almost as tumultuous as their 
eviction. Amid great disorder, Kerensky read a prepared statement 
which condemned expulsion and praised the explosive revolutionary power 
of 1905. 82
Kerensky's impatience with the Duma majority stemmed from a 
conviction that it was unrepresentative and reactionary. Accordingly, 
he refused to take an active part in legislative activity and used his
8%ovoe Vremia, April 18, 1914, p. 2.
81GD. session 2, meeting 62, April 22, 1914, cols. 792-798.
82GD. session 2, meeting 77, May 7, 1914, cols. 114-118.
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position mainly to influence public opinion through inquiries.®3 A 
pale, slender young man— he was only 31 years old when he entered the 
Duma— with great aplomb and a compelling manner,^ Kerensky gained a 
deserved reputation for being direct and fearless in debate.®5 His 
intensity won involuntary respect from all sections of the Duma and in 
a subtle way set him apart from prominent Left deputies such as N. S. 
Chkheidze and Matvei I. Skobel e v . I n part, Kerensky's distinction 
was due to an unnerving eloquence; he was a powerful and imaginative 
speaker, and when inspired reached a passionate fury that threatened 
to sweep everything before it.®?
While Kerensky's talents were generally recognized, he exercised 
a continuous influence only upon those holding liberal or radical 
views. Even then, he looked beyond the framework of the State Duma.
The Octobrist deputy S. I. Shidlovskii correctly observed that the 
Left-Center was always making new interparty agreements with Kerensky, 
but Shidlovskii revealed a severe parliamentary bias in a further 
comment that these efforts were of no significance.®® Uninterested 
in establishing limited and temporary working compromises, Kerensky 
attempted to transcend ideological barriers, forge the narodnik 
parties and their allies into a great populist movement, and prepare
®3shidlovskii, II, 12?.
®^"Scott Diary," June 17, 1917, Hugh L. Scott Papers, Division 
of Manuscripts, Library of Congress, Washington D. C., Box 71.
Spares, Fall, p. 154.
^Shidlovskii, II, 12?.
8?Chemov, Rozhdenie, p. 335; Visniak, p. 229.
^Shidlovskii, II, 127.
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for the revolution. He adhered to that non-partisan policy in the 
face of great temptation. In 1914, Kerensky refused a request from 
the Central Committee of the SR Party that he act as their spokesman 
in the Duma because acceptance would hinder his attempts at political
unification.
Kerensky continued his organizational work in frequent and 
rapid trips throughout the country. His provocative speeches before 
cooperatives, trade unions, and labor clubs attracted the attention 
of the Okhrana. and their reports noted the regularity with which he 
met politically unreliable individuals and groups.90 Association 
with the energetic radical deputy could prove dangerous; in the summer 
of 1914 a meeting of primary school teachers in Ekaterinburg 
(Sverdlovsk), at which he spoke, was raided. Kerensky found protection 
in his Duma status, but 150 others in attendance were arrested.91
Kerensky's confidence in parliamentary immunity was justified, 
for it had survived severe testing during the famed Beilis trial of 
1913. That case, in which a Jewish youth, Menakhil-Mendel Tev'ev 
Beilis, was accused of the ritual murder of a Christian child, aroused 
great controversy within Russia and abroad. The government exposed 
itself to charges of anti-semitism and distortion of evidence, and 
Kerensky actively exploited the i s s u e .92 While not officially engaged 
in the trial, he assisted in the successful defense of Beilis through
89Kerensky, Crucifixion, p. I63.
9QAssorted Okhrana reports, Kerensky Archives, folio 81.
9lRusskie Vedomosti. July 3* 1914, p. 4.
92Evidence of A. B. Liadov, Padenie, VII, 271; GD, session 2, 
meeting 4, October 23, 1913, col. 245.
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advice and legal work.93 Beilis1 acquittal represented only one stage 
of the conflict, for on October 23, 1913. Kerensky moved a resolution, 
adopted by the St. Petersburg Bar Association, which protested against 
the propagation of racial hatred. 9**- The government, infuriated by its 
defeat and humiliation, brought charges of slander against the signers 
of the Bar petition. As mover of the resolution, Kerensky was 
sentenced to eight months1 imprisonment and denied the right to seek 
of f i c e .95 Fortunately, a prolonged public outcry altered the verdict; 
the sentence was suspended and Kerensky retained his Duma seat.̂
When war was declared in 1914, Kerensky suspended harassment of 
the autocracy. He was susceptible to patriotic enthusiasm, but his
altered tactics also resulted from a reassessment of political chances.
Unable to anticipate the future incompetence and reactionary nature 
of the government, Kerensky felt that military strains would force 
fundamental democratic r e f o r m s .97 His shift toward a pro-war liberal 
position did not lead automatically to the inter-party cooperation that 
he expected. The liberal groups had also veered to the Right in 
insisting on unconditional support of tsarist e n d e a v o r s ,98 and Kerensky 
remained as isolated as before.
Accordingly, delicate phrasing was required for an acceptable 
declaration at the Duma special meeting of July 26, 1914, called to
^5RUSskie Vedomosti. June 4, 1914, pp. 2-3*
94Russkie Vedomosti, June 7, 1914, p. 3»
95padenie, VII, 353-
96Russkie Vedomosti. June 10, 1914, pp. 2-3.
97Kerensky, Crucifixion, p. 214.
98gD, session 2, special meeting, July 26, 1914, cols. 24-25.
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deal with the outbreak of war. Kerensky wished to retain links with 
the Left and, at the same time, open possibilities for cooperation 
with the liberal parties. Plans for a unified Left statement, which 
he was to read, proved incompatible with his desires; he was willing 
to condemn the origins of the war, but he refused to countenance 
serious reservations regarding national defense.99 Kerensky's July 26 
address, delivered solely in the name of the Trudovik Party, was a 
skillful blending of radical phraseology and nationalistic sentiments. 
Observing that there were "no enemies in the laboring classes," he 
blamed the outbreak of war upon an alliance between Europe's privileged 
groups and the governments that represented them. "The war would not 
have occurred," he continued, "if democracy, liberty, equality, and 
fraternity" had been real forces in the community of nations. None­
theless, aggression must be opposed, and he expressed confidence that 
the "great elemental force of Russian democracy would offer a 
determined and successful resistance to the enemy. . . . "  Signifi­
cantly, Kerensky refused to identify the government with the nation. 
Defense of the country, he maintained, would win release from its 
"terrible shackles."100 His attitude toward financing of the war 
revealed a similar mixture of doctrine and patriotism. He refused to 
vote for war credits,1°1 stating that the working classes were forced 
to bear the brunt of taxation.102 But he acted in the certain
99Kerensky, Crucifixion, p. 211.
IOOg d , session 2, special meeting, July 26, 191̂ -, cols. 18-19.
lo:Lrsereteli, I, 217.
102g d, session 2, special meeting, July 26, 191^, cols. 18-19.
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knowledge that the requested credits would be approval and later 
revealed that his position reflected the Trudovik attitude rather than 
his own.l°3
Kerensky was soon disappointed in his hopes that the State Duma 
would become an effective agent of democratic reform. When the 
government cited the exigencies of war in intensifying reactionary 
policies, the parties to Kerensky’s right refrained from protest and 
adhered to a policy of "sacred union" with the Crown. 1°** The passivity 
of Duma liberals became unmistakable following the arrest of the 
Bolshevik faction in the State Duma in November 191*4-. Paul Miliukov, 
the noted Cadet leader, and I. N. Efremov, an influential Progressist, 
were willing to join Kerensky and Chkheidze in an informal inquiry in 
Rodzianko's of f i c e .^05 Nevertheless, Kerensky failed to provoke debate 
on the issue in the next Duma session. In direct response to 
Kerensky's fervent declaration that he "could not stand by uncriti­
cally, "106 Miliukov stated that the Cadets would not join struggles 
against the government.1®?
Continued governmental incompetence forced the Duma liberals to 
abandon their position of non-interference. Gradually accumulating
1Q3GD, session 3, meeting 2, January 28, 1915, col. 151.
lO^iliukov, Vospominaniia. II, 190; P. Vinogradov, The Russian
Problem (London, 191*0, p. 37~
105A. E. Badaev, Bol1sheviki v Gosudarstvennoi Dume (Leningrad, 
1930), p. 349.
106g d , session 3, meeting 1, January 2?, 1915, cols. 44-45.
10?GD, session 3, meeting 1, January 27, 1915, col. 50.
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evidence of serious mismanagement in transport and munitions was 
dramatically confirmed toy military disasters in Galicia in the spring 
of 1915, 1<3® and the Cadets responded with demands for reform and 
reorganization.109 Moderates and some conservatives followed the Cadet 
lead; in August 1915 the Progressive Bloc, containing two-thirds of 
the Duma membership, m s  formed. 13-0 The Bloc's platform, which 
included creation of a ministry enjoying public confidence, adminis­
trative respect for legality, religious and political amnesty, freedom 
for trade unions, and increased rights for national minorities,111 
closely resembled proposals Kerensky had advanced at the outbreak of 
the war.112
But Kerensky was no longer satisfied with reformist tactics.
The events that revived political criticism in others caused him to 
resume a radical posture. Of course, he welcomed the appearance of 
the Progressive Bloc and promised cooperation, but he remained outside 
it.113 An unexpected prorogation of the State Duma on September 3. 
1915, provided an excellent opportunity for his return to pre-war 
methods. While indignation at the Ukase of Prorogation was general,
lOfiEvidence of A. I. Shingarev, Padenie, VII, 21-23; Evidence 
of Miliukov, Padenie. VI, 309-310*
109N. Lapin, "Kadety v dni galitsiikogo razgroma," KA, LIX 
(1933). 120-123.
H°N. Papin, "Progressivnyi blok v 1915-1917 gg.," KA, L (1932),
117.
UlMiliukov, Vospominaniia. II, 219-220.
112Kerensky, Russia, p. 129.
113Shidlovskii, II, 44.
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Bloc deputies agreed to moderate their expressions of resentment. 
Kerensky, though, took part in a very disorderly Left demonstration.
He attempted to obtain a refusal of submission to the prorogation and, 
in an access of zeal, even demanded that the Duma declare itself a 
Constituent Assembly. As could be expected, his proposals generated 
great excitement and it was some time before the proceedings could be 
brought to a decorous c l o s e .
Kerensky's return to the forefront of the Duma Left was brief, 
for illness at the end of 1915 caused his temporary withdrawal from 
active politics. He had rarely been in vigorous health, but a serious 
operation forced him into seven months of convalescence at the Grankula 
Sanitorium near Helsingfors (Helsinki), Finland.H ?  His recovery 
coincided with a major Muslim uprising in Turkestan, and his investi­
gation of that occurrence delayed his return to St. Petersburg until 
late September, 1916.-^®
Upon his arrival at the capital, Kerensky found a drastically 
changed political atmosphere. During his absence support of the 
Imperial family and the government had seriously eroded, and various 
proposals for a coup d'etat were beginning to circulate in the Duma
H^Evidence of Rodzianko, Padenie. VII, 153 •
115GD, session *«-, meeting 16, September 3, 1915, col. 1208;
M. N. Rodzianko, The Reign of Rasputin; an Empire's Collapse, trans. 
Catherine Zvegintzov (London, 1927), p. 15A; Evidence of Rodzianko, 
Padenie. VII, 153»
116g d , session A, meeting 16, September 3, 1915, col. 1208.
117Testimony of Fromkin, Kerensky Archives, folio 68.
118m . N. Pokrovskii, "Politicheskoe polozhenie Rossii nakanune 
fevral'skoi revoliutsii v zhandarmskom osveshchenii," KA, XVII 
(1926), 29.
and the army commando ̂ 9  While his radical reputation kept him at the 
fringes of such conspiracies, h® m s  occasionally approached for
10 f )expressions of general support. w Kerensky was not opposed to a 
palace coup, and made preparations to influence public opinion in that 
event,121 but he had little faith in concrete results.122 He looked 
beyond the privileged groups to the nation, preserving confidence in 
"powerful forces that would not remain passive. I,123
The waning months of the Tsarist Empire were filled with his 
attempts to awaken those "powerful forces." He multiplied clandestine 
contacts with workers groups and, through his wife's cousin, Sergei 
Vasil'ev, gained influence with young officers in the St. Petersburg 
garrison.121*- Kerensky supplemented these covert activities with major 
anti-governmental assaults in the State Duma. On November 1, 1916, he 
expressed opposition to the inclusion of B. V. Sturmer and A. D. 
Protopopov in a reconstructed ministry by instigating a Left protest 
which prevented Council President V. F. Trepov1s reading of the cabinet 
declaration.^5 At the same session, he preceded Miliukov's famous 
"treason or stupidity" speech with one even more violent, during which
119Evidence of Rodsianko, Padenie. VII, 152.
120Evidence of S. I. Beletskii, Padenie. IV, 490; Kerensky, 
Russia, p. 147.
i21 ,̂ Kerenskii, "Korotkaia pamiat," Izdaleka, sbomik state! 
(Paris, 1922), p. 165.
122p0krovskii, p. 30.
IZJgd, session 5, meeting 20, February 15, 1917, col. 1359*
124Evidence of Beletskii, Padenie. V, 241.
125Evidence of Miliukov, Padenie. VI, 3^9»
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he labeled the new ministers "cowards" and "betrayers."12® His 
strenuous opposition, which included an investigation into Grigorii 
Rasputin's i n f l u e n c e ,127 alarmed the government. By December, 
Protopopov, the Minister of the Interior, had decided to "really get 
Kerensky," and was prevented only by Nicholas II9s refusal to approve 
an order of arrest.12®
Protopopov88 hostility was justified, for in mid-December 
Kerensky openly began to advocate revolution. On the thirteenth of 
that month, in defiance of government wishes, he publicised suppressed 
motions of the Moscow Congresses of the Zemstvo Union and the Union of 
Towns which called for a change of cabinet and the formation of a 
ministry responsible to the Duma. While adding that adoption of these 
motions would contribute to the "salvation of the country," he urged 
a more drastic solution.129 Kerensky returned to the same theme 
three days later. Citing the example of an unwilling French revo­
lutionary, Count Honors Mirabeau, he suggested that events were 
forcing the Duma toward revolutionary activity.13®
The State Duma went into recess on December 17, 1916. By the 
time of its reconvention on February 14-, 1917, conditions seemed to 
have reached their "last limits."131 Rasputin's assassination on
126q d, session 5, meeting 1, November 1, 1916, cols. 29-34.
127Evidence of Beletskii, Padenie. IV, 419.
128Evidence of Beletskii, Padenie. V, 249.
129GD, session 5, meeting 15, December 13, 1916, cols. 1095-98.
13QGD, session 5, meeting 18, December 16, 1916, col. 1222.
131GD, session 5, meeting 20, February 15, 1917, col. 1345.
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December 19 had only intensified governmental repression; labor groups 
were disbanded and their members arrested,^32 and in an ominous move 
the Petrograd Military District was separated from the Northern front 
and its commander. General S. S, Khabalov, was granted extraordinary 
authority.!33 Industrial strikes were increasing, and a serious food 
shortage afflicted the army and major c i t i e s . T h e  Duma itself was 
acutely threatened, for Nicholas II, particularly antagonized by 
Kerensky's December performances, was actively considering an order of 
dissolution.135
These disturbing developments provoked Kerensky, on February 15, 
into the most dramatic and violent speech of his political career. In 
an emotional appearance before the uneasy Dun©, deputies, he charged 
that the futility of Rasputin's assassination had proven the "forces of 
darkness" to be an illusion. The blame for Russia's present 
catastrophe did not lie with the government, for its membership came 
and went "like shadows." The true source of Russia's ills, the "root 
of evil," was "personal rule." The Duma, Kerensky continued, must 
abolish the "medieval regime immediately, at all costs," or events 
would pass into the hands of more "energetic forces." "Look upward," 
he cried. "See the lightning, here and there, beginning to lace the 
skies of the Russian EmpireJ"136 In a passage prudently stricken from
132chemov, Rozhdenie, p. 17^.
133Miliukov, Vospominaniia, II, 285.
13^GD, session 5, meeting 20, February 15, 1917, cols. 13*0-^5.
135Evidence of Beletskii, Padenie. IV, ^91*
136g d, session 5, meeting 20, February 15, 1917, cols. 1353-59*
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the official records by Rodzianko, Kerensky concluded with a reference 
to Brutus in a thinly-disguised plea for the Tsar's assassination.-*-37 
Kerensky was unable to move the Duma into a revolutionary 
position; as Shidlovskii, the Chairman of the Progressive Bloc, had 
predicted, it preferred even a discredited monarchy to the dangers of 
revolutionary upheaval. ̂-38 on February 23, when riots were already 
beginning in the capital, Kerensky declared himself at "the very limits 
of patience." The Duma, he stated angrily, was "exclusively 
preoccupied with its own troubles" and was indifferent to the "tragedy
in the streets."^39
Ironically, Kerensky contributed to the Duma's preoccupation.
His February 15 address infuriated the Court and the cabinet, and an 
attempt was made to obtain verbatim transcripts of his recent speeches. 
The government was frustrated by the obduracy of Rodzianko, who 
provided Prince N. D. Golitsyn, Trepov's successor, with altered copies 
of the requested speeches. The bulky, irascible Duma President also 
denied the occurrence of obvious changes and omissions and refused to 
rescind Kerensky's parliamentary immunity.^0 The government, which 
had intended banishment or trial for treason, contented itself with a 
refusal to allow Kerensky's speeches in the newspapers.l^l
While Kerensky's dramatically defiant gestures exposed him to
13?Evidence of Prince N. D. Golitsyn, Padenie, II, 261. 
138pokrovskii, p. 29.
139gd, session 5, meeting 23, February 23, 1917, cols. 1649-58. 
l^Evidence of Prince Golitsyn, Padenie. II, 162. 
l^lEvidence of V. A. Apushkii, Padenie. II, 220-221.
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obvious danger, they were undertaken with judicious calculation. He 
fully realized that the Duma could neither initiate nor survive 
revolution, 14-2 but he also felt that outside forces could prod it 
into constructive action. To his mind, the Duma contained elements 
indispensable to the composition of a future government; political 
organization and administrative expertise were concentrated in it, and 
at least the illusion of continuity and legitimacy—  important to the 
popular acknowledgement of authority— could be fostered through it. 
Also, Kerensky believed that compromise and mutual adjustment, so 
essential in an unsettled period, could be expected from parties in 
the parliamentary tradition. *43 in a characteristically theatrical 
manner, he attempted to rivet the nation's attention on the Duma and 
to force recognition of its potential. In that way, he hoped to 
preserve its possibilities as the nucleus of a new order.
In important respects, Kerensky's revolutionary actions were 
logical extensions of his Duma policies. He consistently pursued 
nationalistic and democratic aims and— while this was frequently 
obscured during his ideological struggles with the autocracy— attempted 
to achieve them through unification and conciliation. -*-44 Kerensky 
always cherished the vision of an alliance of liberal and socialist 
forces dedicated to the reconstruction of Russia, and he tried to 
dissolve doctrinal barriers by stirring appeals to national interests.
142p0jCrovskii, p. 30.
143A. Kerensky, The Catastrophe; Kerensky's Own Story of the 
Russian Revolution (New York, 1927;, pp. 3-4.
144y„ b . Stankevich, Vospominaniia, 1914-1919 (Berlin, 1920),
p. 19.
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His criticism, in May of 1915, of Miliukov's opposition to the 
formation of special councils to facilitate military organization was 
typical: he accused the Cidets of taking theoretical considerations 
(in this case, cooperation with discredited ministers) as their 
starting point, repudiating useful things not in accord with their 
assumptions.1^5 His intolerance of doctrinal rigidity seemed greater 
following the collapse ©f tsarism, but that was a response to 
broadened opportunities rather than a change in methods or convictions.
Misconceptions regarding Kerensky's values and goals hindered 
awareness of this basic continuity and encouraged misunderstandings. 
Most of the revolutionary leadership had, since the turn of the 
century, engaged in unceasing interparty struggles and had, in the 
process, evolved rigid and mutually exclusive positions. While willing 
to take part in tactical accommodations, these party veterans extended 
their conflicts into the revolutionary period in attempts to impose 
their particular wills upon the new situation. Since it was assumed 
that Kerensky would do the same, his shift from mutinous obstructionism 
to non-partisan compromise baffled and ultimately alienated potential 
allies. Miliukov sought an explanation in "self-glorifying 
obtrusion, Tsereteli suggested "giddiness with popularity, "-^7 
and Chernov saw the sudden embracing of a "mission."1^8
These evaluations were inadequate. Tsarism had nourished and
■^^Rodzianko, Reign, pp. 134-135*
^^^Miliukov, Vospominaniia, II, 327.
l^Tsereteli, I, 121.
1^8Chemov, Pered burei. p. 338.
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sharpened Kerensky's polemical intransigence; the collapse of Imperial
Russia ended it and stripped away the radical patina that had coated
his behavior. A somewhat more accurate interpretation was advanced by
Nikolai N. Sukhanov, a close acquaintance and eventual Menshevik, who
felt that Kerensky was the "consummate middle-class radical. "^9
Indirect support for Sukhanov's view came fro® Pitirim Sorokin, an
eminent sociologist and Kerensky's personal secretary in the Second1
Coalition, who exclaimed in 1917: "Who are we, but Russian 
Girondists.'"1^
Yet neither "Girondist" nor "middle-class radical" sufficiently 
described Kerensky's political orientation. As his Duma career
adequately demonstrated, he was a nationalist, a populist, and a demo­
crat. While those beliefs were not mutually exclusive, and while he 
certainly tried to promote all of them, circumstances determined which 
one predominated at any specific time. Under the imperatives of the 
First World War, Kerensky's nationalism became his salient character­
istic and he tended to subordinate other concerns to the realization 
of national goals. In practice, the result was a provisional commit­
ment to political moderation and class cooperation as the best means 
of simultaneously protecting the country and the revolution. To the 
extent that his Duma theatrics obscured those attitudes, Kerensky 
entered the Russian revolution under false pretenses.
^Sukhanov, 51-
^Op. Sorokin, Leaves from a Russian Diary (New York, 1924),
P. 93-
CHAPTER II
KERENSKY AND THE FEBRUARY REVOLUTION
When the Russian monarchy collapsed in February of 1917, the 
forces that had undermined it survived in aggravated forms. While 
a violent revolution could normally be expected to eliminate those 
issues that provoked its outbreak, the special circumstances of 
Imperial defeat produced a different result. Force had been present, 
but it had been neither well-coordinated nor decisive; the Romanovs 
had been dethroned only because vital segments of the state apparatus, 
the military, and society refused to rally in support. The February 
Days represented little more than the sudden crumbling of a feeble 
and despised regime in an outward direction from an unsupported 
center. Shorn of defenders, tsarism discredited only itself by its 
fall; there were few victims and no claimants with a clear title to 
power. There was also no consensus regarding future policies.
The coincidence of war with revolution assured that the Tsar's 
successors would inherit a welter of obstinate problems, and the 
particularly inconclusive nature of the revolution, which left 
competitive groups intact and motives clouded, increased the burden of 
that legacy. Simplification was impossible as long as politically 
viable groups opposed each other on vital issues such as the recon­
stitution of authority, war, or foreign policy. It was obvious that
kh
Russia faced a difficult transitionary period, for revolutionary goals 
awaited definition and the strength of hostile forces was still 
untested.
The locus of that gathering conflict was the Tauride Palace, 
whose wings housed the State Duma and its ©merging rival, the Petrograd 
Soviet. But there was great confusion within that new center of power, 
for the revolution disconcerted its first inheritors and produced in 
them an initial inability to master events. Hesitation was most 
apparent among moderates and liberals, who had anticipated an orderly 
ascension to state power and observed outbreaks in the streets and 
military barracks with dismay. Unable to identify fully with rebellion 
and fearing the consequences of either failure or success, the Duma 
seemed incapable of independent action.^ Socialists, of course, 
welcomed the revolution, but they were also hindered by various 
considerations. They suffered from the absence of exiled party leaders 
and, as doctrine forbade the immediate exercise of formal authority, 
were uncertain of the precise attitude to assume toward the Duma. 
Furthermore, their necessary alliance with privileged groups was 
extremely fragile, and they feared the disruptive effects of provo­
cative unilateral decisions.̂  The composite result was a temporary 
extension of the political vacuum created by the disappearance of the 
state. Sudden inheritance of responsibility under the pressure of an 
external enemy, the latent threat of civil strife, and prevailing
•*M. V. Rodzianko, "Gosudarstvennaia dumi i fevral ' skaia 
revoliutsiia 1917 goda," ARR, VI (1922), 57.
Sukhanov, Zapiski o revoliutsli, 7 vols. (Berlin, 1922-23),
I, 95-
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confusion combined to check the momentum of the revolution.
That condition of partial arrest m s  perpetuated and eventually 
institutionalized by a series of maneuvers and political coups executed 
by Alexander Kerensky. Possessed of a rare freedom of action derived 
from popular acclaim and strongly held convictions, he manipulated the 
Duma and the Petrograd Soviet, asserted control over centrifugal social 
forces, and struck a political balance which inhibited conflict. Yet 
the resulting situation was artificial, for it required constant 
adjustment and a dampening or deflection, rather than a resolution, of 
antagonisms. Kerensky's policies were often disingenuous and 
ultimately unsuccessful, but as long as they endured, liberals and 
socialists held to a relationship which possessed some resiliency and 
allowed a measure of interim government.
While Kerensky was unable to foresee either the future 
complications of the revolution or his prominent role within it, he 
had expected the eventful developments that occurred in Petrograd 
toward the end of February. On the evening of February 22, he had been 
informed of the impending strikes by a deputation of workers from the 
Putilov Works which visited him at the editorial office of Sevemye 
Zapiski (Northern Notes). Addressing Kerensky as "citizen deputy," 
the Putilov delegates stressed the exclusively political nature of the 
movement they were about to initiate.3 As discontent was endemic in 
the Vyborg district, Kerensky knew that a new round of strikes would 
not, in itself, be unusually significant. But ebbing support in the
3V. Zenzinov, "Fevral'skie dni," NZ, XXXIV (1953), 196-197. 
Zenzinov, an influential Socialist Revolutionary, arranged the 
interview between the Putilov delegation and Kerensky.
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army command, the Duma, court circles, and the Petrograd garrison had 
so weakened the government that a recrudescence of internal pressure 
clearly contained revolutionary potential.
A significant broadening of popular unrest required the con­
currence of military units stationed in Petrograd, and Kerensky was 
increasingly optimistic that their cooperation would be forthcoming. 
While representatives from all the major parties had established links 
with the garrison,^ none seemed to have enjoyed success comparable to 
his in acquiring information or in maintaining an effective conspira­
torial network.5 Through his contacts, which included popular officers 
such as V. B. Stankevich, M. N. Petrov, and Sergei Vasil'ev, Kerensky 
was able to minitor and to influence the political radicalization 
occurring in the barracks. The results were encouraging. In his 
opinion the garrison, no longer politically reliable, was likely to 
sympathize with mass demonstrations and was capable of being directed 
toward at least an abridgement of autocratic rule. Accordingly, his 
practical activities were aimed at ways to organize and to guide the 
soldiery in the event of insurrection.6
While Kerensky retained confidence in the imminence of revo­
lution, he seriously underestimated the importance of the February 23 
movement. In part, he discounted it because intervention by the
^Sukhanov, I, 83*
^Evidence of S. P. Beletskii, Padenie tsarskogo rezhima; steno- 
graficheskie otcheti, doprosov i pokazanii. dannikh v 1917 £• v 
chrezvychainoi sledstvennoi komissii Vremennogo Pravitel'stva. ed.
P. E. Shchegoleva, 7 vols. (Moscow-Leningrad, 1924-27), V, 241.
6v. B. Stankevich, Vospominaniia, 1914-1919 (Berlin, 1920), 
pp. 64-65-
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Petrograd garrison appeared unnecessary. The industrial strikes that 
had been predicted materialised, hut their significance was obscured 
by a nearly simultaneous demonstration over food shortages.? As the 
scarcity was more artificial than real (the result of a temporary 
breakdown in transportation and distribution), a restoration of order 
was expected through routine police and administrative procedures.® 
Three days of uncontrolled riots, increasing fraternization between 
soldiers and civilians, and an abortive mutiny by the Pavlovskii 
regiment were required for Kerensky to recognize the gravity of the 
situation.9 Even then, the full implications of the disorders escaped 
him, for he considered only the possibility of limited concessions 
from the monarchy in the shape of a reorganized ministry or, at most, 
the transformation of the Duma into a true parliament.-*-®
There was a simple explanation for Kerensky’s passivity through 
February 25; along with other Left politicians, he had been discouraged 
by the anarchic temper of the crowds. The demonstrations were 
disorganized, lacked clear purpose, and resisted discipline.-*-*■ He 
later admitted that the "moment of collision" had appeared sooner than 
anticipated,I2 and others were more explicit. Vladimir Zenzinov,
^Evidence of General S. S. Khabalov, Padenie, I, 183*
®Novoe Vremia. February 24, 1917, p. 5*
9b. G., ed., "Fevral1skie revoliutsii i okhrannoe otdelenie," 
Byloe, no. 1 (29), January, 1918, 168-170.
l®Sukhanov, I, 31 •
llEvidence of Khabalov, Padenie, I, 195*
12a . Kerensky, The Catastrophe; Kerensky's Own Story of the 
Russian Revolution (New York, 1927), p. 105.
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a Socialist Revolutionary, observed that "an organized political force 
did not exist in Petrograd at that time,"*3 and the radical journalist 
Sukhanov, who remained in constant touch with major socialist organ­
izations , felt "unable to influence events in any w a y .  "24 In the 
absence of leadership, little more could be expected than minor govern­
mental concessions followed by a dissipation of revolutionary energy.
It was not until February 26 that Kerensky became convinced that 
Petrograd was indeed on the verge of revolution. He had spent a 
frustrating morning in the Tauride Palace, vainly attempting to 
persuade the Duma to abandon its loyalist stance,2-5 when Stankevich 
arrived with an urgent message: the Preobrazhenskii regiment (which 
had quelled the Pavlovskii mutiny of the previous day) was preparing 
to revolt, and its officers appeared willing to accept the authority 
of the State D u m a . 26 Such an occurrence would entirely transform the 
situation, and Kerensky, at a gathering of Left representatives at 
his apartment that evening, felt justified in asserting that the "wave 
was rising" and that they should expect "decisive events."27
The meeting ended unsatisfactorily, for several of the partici­
pants were convinced that Kerensky's optimism was unfounded. There 
were, in fact, valid grounds for pessimism since Petrograd had 
temporarily reverted to governmental control. February 26 had been a
23Zenzinov, "Fevral'skie dni," p. 208.
24sukhanov, I, 46.
15Evidence of D. N. Dubenskii, Padenie, VI, 394.
I6stankevich, p. 65-
27Zenzinov, "Fevral'skie dni," p. 210.
9̂
Sunday, and the factories in the Vyborg district, the principal 
industrial area, were closed and unavailable as gathering places for 
demonstrations . Furthermore, Nicholas II had finally directed General 
Khabalov to suppress disorder by all available means,and crowds 
that did form were dispersed by gunfire from the Imperial Guards and 
from special gendarme units armed with automatic weapons. ̂  Under 
those conditions, it was not surprising that K. K. lurenev, a Bolshevik 
sympathizer who claimed to be in close touch with worker sentiment, 
called Kerensky's conclusions "exaggerations" and dismissed his desire 
to force events as "hysterics."20
Kerensky was quickly vindicated. On the following day,
February 27, the Petrograd garrison mutinied and joined the street 
crowds. Begun by the training detachment of the Volinskii regiment, 
which was immediately joined by the Preobrazhenskii, Litovskii and 
Moscow regiments, the rebellion either encompassed or immobilized 
almost every military unit stationed in the capital.21 By the early 
afternoon arsenals, prisons, and the Fortress of Peter and Paul were 
in the hands of the insurgents, and loyalist forces were confined to 
the vicinity of the Winter Palace and the Admiralty building.^2 a 
revolutionary situation now prevailed and it required only a directing 
center to become self-sustaining.
^Evidence of Khabalov, Padenie, I, 190.
19Evidence of Rodzianko, Padenie, VII, 159*
20zenzinov, "Fevral'skie dni," p. 210.
21v. Victoroff-Toporoff, ed., La premiere annee de la 
revolution russe (Berne, 1919), p* 33*
22Evidence of Khabalov, Padenie, I, 203.
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Kerensky was determined that the State Duma exercise such a 
function, and he was singularly qualified to accomplish that task. 
Possessed of an impeccable radical reputation and great popularity, 
Kerensky was the most influential political figure in the capital.^3 
The revolution had provided him with an intense sense of release and 
a concommitant ability to act;2** within the emotional context of the 
February Days, that combination of passionate enthusiasm and personal 
fame was overwhelmingly effective. By articulating, and thereby 
representing, a particularly nationalistic and idealistic interpre­
tation of the revolution, he was able to mold the still inchoate 
aspirations of the population and to transmit to them "tremendous 
shocks of moral electricity."25 Kerensky directed these considerable 
talents toward the Duma in order to adapt it to the needs of revolution 
and to force its assumption of state responsibility.
The Duma complied reluctantly and only under constraint. When 
Kerensky arrived at the Tauride Palace on the morning of February 27, 
he found the deputies prepared to obey a governmental ukase of 
prorogation,26 and despite support from N. V. Nekrasov, I. N. Efremov, 
and Chkheidze, his arguments against submission were unavailing.2? 
Kerensky bitterly resented the Duma’s acquiescence to prorogation,
23v. Chernov, Pered Burei, vospominaniia (New York, 1953).
P» 330.
2^1. G. Tsereteli, Vospominaniia o Fevral'skoi revoliutsii,
2 vols. (Paris, 1963), I, 121.
25v. Chernov, Rozhdenie revoliutsionnoi Rossii; fevral'skoi 
revoliutsiia (New York, 193*0, p. 333*
26Evidence of Rodzianko, Padenie, VII, 160.
27Evidence of Dubenskii, Padenie, VI, 39̂ -
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considering its decision "tantamount to . . . political suicide at 
the very moment when its authority was at its height."28
Yet a passive stance m s  understandable, for to the majority of 
the Duma deputies there were no satisfactory alternatives. Active 
support of the government was impossible on ideological and practical 
grounds, while adherence to the revolution raised great dangers. The 
deputies hesitated to support a movement over which they had no 
control and which, if defeated, would embrace them in its ruin. Under 
the circumstances, delay "until the character of the disturbances 
became clarified" was an attractive option.29 Admittedly, the Duma's 
submission was not unqualified; Rodzianko protested the prorogation 
vigorously to Nicholas II by telegram,30 and the Council of Elders 
(composed of the various Duma party leaders) agreed to call an 
informal, unofficial session in an adjoining hall.31 Still, those 
tactics were unsatisfactory; if they guaranteed the continued existence 
of the Duma as a functional political body, the fact remained that it 
was reduced in status to a gathering of private citizens. But the 
deputies were not allowed to temporize. During the course of the day 
several developments, most of which Kerensky contrived, set them upon 
an irreversibly revolutionary course.
28a . Kerensky, Russia and History8c Turning Point (New York, 
1965), p. 196.
29p. Miliukov, Vospominaniia, 1859-1917. 2 vols. (New York,
1955), II, 292.
3(>Evidence of Dubenskii, Padenie. VI, UOk; "Fevral'skaia 
revoliutsiia 1917 goda," KA, XXI (1927), 6.
31s. I. Shidlovskii, Vospominaniia, 2 vols. (Berlin, 1923), II,
52.
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The first of those events was the appearance before the Tauride 
Palace, at about 2:00 p.m., of large detachments of soldiers from the 
Preobrazhenskii regiment. Kerensky had attempted to move troops in the 
direction of the Duma since the early morning,32 and upon their tardy 
arrival he charged them with its defense.33 The presence of mutinous 
troops on the grounds of the Tauride Palace did not immediately have 
a decisive effect, for the Council of Elders continued to resist 
demands of solidarity with the revolution. Indeed, Kerensky1s 
arbitrary decision to summon the garrison provoked substantial alarm 
and resentment; N. V. Savieh, an Octobrist, responded typically in 
protesting that a wmob cannot hand us authority,”3^ and Vasilii 
Shul'gin, a Progressive Nationalist, expressed an earnest wish to 
address the intruders with the "flaming tongues of machine guns. 
Nevertheless, the now compromised deputies were imbued with an 
increased sense of urgency. Rodzianko regretfully abandoned his ex­
clusively loyal position and agreed to the creation of a special 
committee which, if required, could assume governmental power.36
That need soon arose, for Kerensky so entangled the Duma with 
the revolution that participation in it proved unavoidable. A striking 
example was the seizure and confinement in the Ministerial Pavilion of
32y. Zenzinov, Iz zhizni revoliutsionera (Paris, 1919), p. 8?; 
Kerensky, Catastrophe, pp. 1-2.
33V. Shul'gin, Dni (Belgrade, 1925), p. 162.
31*Minutes of an unofficial meeting of the Duma, R. Browder and 
A. Kerensky, eds., The Russian Provisional Government. 1917; Documents, 
3 vols. (Stanford, 1961), 1, 46.
35Shul'gin, p. 163.
36Evidence of Miliukov, Padenie. VI, 352.
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cabinet members and lesser functionaries of the tsarist regime. 
Kerensky organized the search for governmental officials,37 and when 
they were located he personally arrested them in the name of the State 
Duma "until the creation of the Duma's Provisional Committee."38 in 
doing so, he went against the expressed desires of many deputies; when 
I. G. Shcheglovitov, the President of the State Council, was brought 
in, Kerensky overrode attempts to treat him as a guest and insisted, 
against scandalized opposition, upon placing him under guard.39 a 
similar procedure was followed with A. D. Protopopov and V. A. Sukhom- 
linov, and Kerensky expanded his activities by confiscating funds and 
state documents.^9 Resentment among deputies continued to smolder: 
when the bewildered, hastily dressed ex-minister V. N. Kokovtsov 
appeared at the Duma in the custody of enthusiastic students, he was 
told to "leave all this nonsense alone and go home before Kerensky sees 
y o u . B u t  as the evening progressed, it became generally accepted 
that tsarist officials should be placed in Kerensky's keeping.^2
The de facto Minister of Justice acted primarily from expediency, 
for he later observed that the release of those arrested would have 
"given rise to a profound distrust of the Duma among the masses" and
37Evidence of M. A. Beliaev, Padenie, II, 226.
3%iliukov, Vospominaniia. II, 296.
39Rodzianko, "Gosudarstvennaia duma," p. 66.
^^Evidence of Protopopov, Padenie. IV, 55*
**iV. N. Kokovtsov, Iz moego proshlogo; vospominaniia. 1903-1919 
£g., 2 vols. (Paris, 1933TT IfP r t® : -------------------------------------------
^Evidence Beliaev, Padenie, II, 226.
therefore would have been "sheer madness."1̂  His measures won eventual 
approval, but for quite different reasons. Kerensky's fervent 
declaration that the "State Duma does not shed blood" caught the 
popular imagination,1*1*’ and it became widely felt that he had averted a 
serious outburst of excesses. David Francis, the American ambassador, 
was impressed by the relative lack of bloodshed during the February 
Days and declared: "Too much credit cannot be given Kerensky for his 
conduct" in the containment of violence.Vasilii Shul'gin, a fiery 
conservative who had always felt a strong antipathy for Kerensky, 
exclaimed that "He was magnificent, and Nikolai Makeev, a Socialist 
Revolutionary active in Zemstvo affairs, overheard assertions in Moscow 
that Kerensky's name would be "written in letters of gold on the 
tablets of history" for his rejection of vindictiveness
Kerensky also succeeded because of confusion and demoralization 
among his Duma associates. Most conservatives had absented themselves 
when the disorders began, and those that remained felt unable to 
oppose him. "We were powerless," Shul'gin recalled. "What did we 
understand?Stankevich, who was struck by the bafflement of Duma 
members as they tried to cope with the flood of workers and soldiers 
in the Tauride Palace, concluded that while the deputies "created the
^Kerensky. Catastrophe. p. 17.
^Shul'gin, p. 171.
1*5d . Francis, Russia from the American Embassy: April, 1916- 
November. 1918 (New York, 1921), p. 86.
^Shul'gin, p. 171.
^7N. Makeev and V. O'Hara, Russia (New York, 192$), p. 18*4-.
^SShul'gin, p. 168.
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atmosphere that called forth the explosion, they were completely 
unprepared for such an explosion."^9 Assured the obedience of the 
"pure public" and thus unaffected by the general paralysis within the 
Duma, Kerensky automatically acquired a dominant position within it.^O 
Accordingly, his ardently revolutionary speeches to the crowds before 
the Tauride Palace,51 his seizure of foreign office materials,52 and 
his independent decision to send revolutionary detachments against 
Okhrana offices53 provoked only helpless expressions of frustration 
and dismay. The anomalous character of the Duma had often been recog­
nized, but its feebleness had never been so manifest as when Kerensky 
forcibly associated it with the dissolution of the old order.
While Kerensky had included the Duma in the revolution, he had 
failed to move it into a position of active leadership. That was 
finally accomplished on the evening of February 2? by the creation of 
the Petrograd Soviet by revolutionary workers and soldiers. The 
implications were clear to every deputy: power had to be seized before 
it was usurped by "some scoundrels in the factories."^ The Council 
of Elders reacted to the threat by activating the previously proposed 
Provisional Committee of the Duma, and with the exceptions of Kerensky 




52Evidence of Protopopov, Padenie. IV, 55•
53Zenzinov, "Fevral'skie dni," p. 220.
5^Shul'gin, p. 179*
Progressive Bloc.55 Ostensibly, the powers of the Provisional 
Committee were limited to the restoration of order and the promotion 
of contacts with various public groups.56 gut that was only a cautious 
formula, designed to protect the Duma from retribution in the event of 
successful counterrevolution and to afford a degree of flexibility if 
the revolution prevailed. The real aims of the committee, as its 
members fully realized, were the assumption of state power and the 
corresponding diminution of Soviet authority.57
Despite the conviction that the Soviet's ascendency had to be 
forestalled, the Provisional Committee could not issue a direct 
challenge to that rival institution. As Kerensky observed, because 
the Soviet represented the first "primitive social and political molds 
into which the molten revolutionary lava began to flow and cool off," 
opposition to it would have been opposition to the revolution itself.
He could also have added that such a course would have been suicidal. 
Although its elections had been irregular, the Soviet was far more 
representative of the population than was the Fourth Duma, and its 
standing among the workers and soldiers in Petrograd was unassailable.
55l . Gaponenko, et al., eds., Velikaia oktiabr1skaia sotsialist- 
icheskaja revoliutsiia; khronika sobytii, 2 vols. (Moscow, 1957), I, 9» 
The composition of the Provisional Committee was as follows: M. V. 
Rodzianko, A. F. Kerensky, N. S. Chkheidze; V. V. Shul'gin; P. N. 
Miliukov; M. A. Karaulov; A. I. Konovalov; I. I. Dmitriukov; V. N. 
Rzhenskii; S. I. Shidlovskii; N. V. Nekrasov; V. N. L'vov; Colonel B. 
Engel'hardt.
56sbomik ukazov i postanovlenii Vremennago Pravitel'stva,
2 vols. (Petrograd, 1917), I,
57Miliukov, Vospominaniia, II, 293; A. V. Peshekhonov, Pervyia 
nedeli; iz vospominanii o revoliutsii (Riga, n.d.), p. 263.
58Kerensky, Catastrophe, p. 111.
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The conclusion was inescapable; in order to consolidate power, the 
Provisional Committee had to reach a suitable accommodation with its 
rival.59
A temporary adjustment of relations was possible, for the Petro­
grad Soviet's hostility to the middle classes was tempered by the 
imperatives of socialist theory. The classic Marxist attitude, which 
considered tsarist Russia an essentially feudal state and insisted 
that a socialist government could only replace a future bourgeois 
regime, turned the Soviet's leadership against an outright assumption 
of state responsibility. Tactical considerations also exerted an 
influence. The Soviet was convinced that it did not command sufficient 
strength tc maintain a purely socialistic government and feared that 
such an effort would drive the liberals into an alliance with tsarism. 
But if the liberal parties assumed formal power, a wedge would be 
driven between tsarism and its former allies and revolutionary gains 
would be preserved.There were other grounds for the Soviet's 
evasion of direct governmental responsibility: only the middle classes 
possessed the administrative expertise necessary to a well-ordered 
state; as a result of persecution, the socialist mentality was negative 
toward authority; and the spectre of directing a war government was an 
ideological nightmare.
The acknowledgement of such contradictory needs could produce 
the Soviet's sanction of a government drawn from the Progressive Bloc
59Evidence of Rodzianko, Padenie, VII, 159*
60v. I. Lenin, Sochineniia, 42 vols. (Moscow, 1949), XXIII, 
305-307.
61l . Trotsky, The Russian Revolution (New York, 1959), p. 165*
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of the Duma, but it could not guarantee stability. While the Soviet 
demanded a condition of "dual power," in which it could yield formal 
authority and still retain the ability to block actions detrimental to 
its interests,82 the Duma leadership was determined eventually to 
solidify its position at the expense of its rival.83 Both sides, then, 
considered the existing class truce to be partial and temporary. The 
socialist leadership tolerated liberalism as a historically .necessary, 
but transitory, political force to be exploited, and the Duma sought 
socialist cooperation only in order to "sheathe the Soviet knife."8^
If the events surrounding the October insurrection provide a reliable 
guide, the rigidity built into such an arrangement would surely have 
produced a rapid deepening of antagonisms and the eruption of civil 
war.
Kerensky was determined to prevent that result, and his per­
sistent attempts to eliminate dual power spanned the length of the 
February revolution. He proceeded from the assumption that the revo­
lution could be consolidated through a union of liberal and socialist 
forces, without class warfare, and by the utilization of parliamentary 
mechanisms. The State Duma, the primary source of leadership, would 
remain sensitive to national interests, and the Soviet would provide 
the medium through which popular support of the government could be 
organized and expressed. There were indispensable conditions to such 
an arrangement: the opposing centers of power had to face each other
8%inutes of the March 2 session of the Petrograd Soviet, 
Izvestiia, March J, 1917, p. 4.
83Miliukov, Vospominaniia, II, 321.
8i4'Evidence of Rodzianko, Padenie, VII, 159*
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from positions of equality, and the resulting government required a 
grip upon the Left in the form of socialist ministers.65 Under the 
circumstances, those ends could only be realized at the expense of the 
Soviet. Kerensky's methods were Machiavellian; as he had enmeshed a 
recalcitrant Duma in the revolution, he began to enmesh the Soviet, 
to its detriment, in a partnership with the Duma. Within a remarkably 
short interval, he twisted the relationships between the liberal and 
revolutionary forces into a tangled knot of interdependence.66
Kerensky's purposeful manipulations were evident in two minor, 
but suggestive, developments on February 27. The first of these was 
his success in physically associating the Soviet with the State Duma. 
Acting from a characteristic appreciation of symbolic effect,67 he 
arranged premises for the TsIK (Petrograd Soviet Central Executive 
Committee) in the Duma Budget Committee room.68 The Tauride Palace 
might still be divided into "right" and "left" wings, but proximity 
implied unity. It is significant that the later Provisional Govern­
ment moved to the Marinskii, and then Winter, palaces only after 
achieving a degree of independence from the "democracy." A second 
revealing incident was Kerensky's fusion, under Duma leadership, of
65a . Kerenskii, "Politika Vremennogo Pravitel'stva," SZ, L 
(1932), 419.
66chernov, Rozhdenie, p. 254.
6?V. A. Maklakov, The First State Duma; Contemporary 
Reminiscenses, trans. Mary Belkin (Bloomington, 1964), p. 174; see 
Kerensky's discussion of the value of symbols in: A. F. Kerenskii, 
"Patrioty svoego Korolia," Izdaleka, sbomik statei (Paris, 1922),
p. 103.
68a . Kerensky, The Crucifixion of Liberty, trans. G. Kerensky 
(New York, 1934), p. 244.
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the committee charged with the revolutionary defense of Petrograd. 
Among the first acts of the TsIK had been the hurried formation of a 
rudimentary military staff to organize the Petrograd garrison,^9 and 
the thoroughly alarmed Provisional Committee quickly followed suit.70 
Relying upon his personal influence, Kerensky managed to unite the 
two bodies into a new Military Commission of the State Duma, to win 
a place for himself within it, and successfully to promote the 
appointment of Colonel Boris A. Engel'hardt, a Duma deputy, as its 
chairman.While the Soviet brought superior resources into the 
union, Colonel Engel'hardt was able to subordinate the commission to 
the Provisional Committee. By March 1 the imbalance was so evident 
that the outmaneuvered Soviet, citing the "menacing" attitude of the 
Military Commission, urged an expansion of its membership to include 
representatives from the lower military r a n k s .72 Although the 
emergence of the Provisional Government on March 2 made the commission 
obsolete, it had, during a critical transition period, contributed to 
the authority and security of the liberal forces.
As the essentially anti-Soviet nature of Kerensky's measures 
escaped general notice in the turmoil of the revolution, he was able 
on February 28 to continue his political ascendancy with a timely 
change of membership from the minuscule Trudovik Party to the more
69»pevral'skaia revoliutsii v Petrograde," KA, XLI (1930).
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70Rodzianko, "Gosudarstvennaia duma," p. 64.
71Sukhanov, I, 88.
72Minutes of the March 1 session of the Petrograd Soviet, cited 
in Izvestiia, March 2, 1917, p. 1.
powerful SR Party.73 His action, aimed at acquiring increased leverage 
with revolutionary groups, resulted in his immediate election to the 
vice-chairmanship of the T s I K . 7 4  By February 28 Kerensky occupied a 
truly enviable position. As a member of the Soviet Presidium, the 
Provisional Committee of the State Duma, and the Duma Military Commis­
sion, and with the streets reverberating with demands for his appear­
ance, he was the most influential political figure in the revolution. 
Kerensky was aware of his unique status. "Everyone," he recalled, 
"seemed to treat me in a manner subtly changed, different, as though 
some special power were in my hands, some peculiar influence with the 
stormy masses."75
But regardless of his standing, and despite his assiduous 
efforts, Kerensky failed to reverse an increasing trend toward the 
formalization of dual power. Party doctrine could not be overcome, 
for by February 28 the TsIK had firmly decided to oppose direct 
socialist participation in the projected Provisional Government. Yet 
the situation was not entirely hopeless. Considerable wavering had 
occurred during the course of the floor debates, and some delegates 
had even tried to justify their attitudes by referring to the sudden 
appearance of an unwritten constitution in which the liberal parties 
provided a ministry responsible to the Soviet "legislature."76 While 
such arguments were too specious to merit consideration, they did
73Mark Vishniak, Dan proshlomu (New York, 1955). P* 284.
74oaponenko, I, 8.
75Kerensky, Crucifixion, p. 259*
76s. P. Mel'gunov, Martovskie dni 1917 goda (Paris, 1961), 
p. 401.
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indicate a certain confusion and elasticity in outlook of which some 
advantage could be taken.
Kerensky initially responded to the Soviet's decision with a 
renewed attempt to buttress the position of the political Right. 
Accordingly, he encouraged Rodzianko's February 28 proposal of an 
extraordinary convocation of all previous Dumas— since the first two 
had been selected by general franchise, he thought the resulting 
popular support might limit the Soviet's interference with an official 
government.77 But the Cadets spumed that approach, maintaining that 
the assembling of bodies with no present claim to power was a legal­
istic absurdity.78 Miliukov's party evidently refused to accept the 
implications of the revolution and persisted in acting as if parlia­
mentary modes and traditional state forms still retained validity. 
Justifiably dismayed by the "academic" attitudes of these "bookish 
men,"79 Kerensky became convinced that only unilateral action could 
break the impasse between the Duma and the Soviet.
The solution was obvious; Kerensky would have to defy the TsIK's 
injunction against socialist participation in the new government. He 
was in a position to do so, for along with Chkheidze he was assured 
the offer of a portfolio in the projected cabinet.80 He could accept 
that post and as a member of the Soviet Presidium demand a hearing 
before a plenary meeting, where opinion was more malleable and ideology
77sir Bernard Pares, The Fall of the Russian Monarchy; a Study 
of the Evidence (New York, 1939) > P» 448.
78^iliukov, Vospominaniia, II, 303.
79Kerensky, Crucifixion, p. 249.
80shul'gin, p. 168.
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more diluted than in the TsIK. The matter carried considerable 
personal risk, and Kerensky proceeded cautiously. On March 1 he 
avoided attending the desultory Soviet debates concerning coalition, 
for their outcome had already been determined and he would only have 
compromised himself by participating in them.81 Instead, he questioned 
several close friends about the advisability of entering the projected 
regime as a self-proclaimed representative of the socialistic parties. 
To his dismay, the responses were not wholly encouraging— Zenzinov was 
in favor, but Sukhanov and Stankevich expressed grave reservations 
about the wisdom and effectiveness of such a course.82 Kerensky was 
obviously vexed by the decision he was weighing; that night, at a 
conference between the delegates of the TsIK and the Provisional 
Committee called to determine the platform of the future government, 
he remained "sunk in sullen meditation" and refused to enter the 
discussions.83
As Kerensky anticipated, the position of Minister of Justice was 
offered to him on the morning of March 2. He accepted that afternoon 
and proceeded to a plenary session of the Soviet, determined to win 
its approval and to retain his vice-chairmanship within it. In a
8!chemov, Rozhdenie, p. 251.
82zenzinov, "Fevral'skie dni," p. 228; Stankevich, p. 70; N. N. 
Sukhanov, The Russian Revolution, 1917; Eyewitness Account, ed and 
trans. Joel Carmichael, 2 vols. (New York, 1962), I, 101.
83Sukhanov, Revolution, I, 118. Among the points agreed to were: 
the convocation of a Constituent Assembly which would determine the 
final form of government; freedom of speech, press, and assembly; 
abolition of all class, nationality, and religious restrictions; 
amnesty for political or religious crimes; the organization of the 
army on the basis of self-government; and the retention in Petrograd 
of those military units that took part in the revolution.
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brilliant and emotional speech, during which he declared himself the 
"spokesman of the democracy" to which other ministers had to be 
"particularly considerate," Kerensky gained the enthusiastic support 
of the majority of the delegates. The Soviet's confirmation had 
taken the form of an extended ovation and had not been reaffirmed by 
an official vote. But Kerensky's victory had been incontestable, and 
the TsIK accepted his action as a fait accompli even though its 
posture toward the new government had been seriously compromised.A 
Socialist Revolutionary party conference that followed the Soviet 
plenary session offered the new Minister of Justice the public endorse­
ment that the TsIK withheld. Describing him as the "defender of the 
people's interests and freedom," it welcomed his entrance into the
Q/rgovernment and "approved everything" that he had done.00
Although he emerged with a personal triumph, Kerensky's defiance 
of the TsIK had really been a desperate attempt at salvaging the 
remnants of his non-partisan (nadpartiinost') program.87 He had failed 
to establish institutional barriers against dual power, and as an 
alternative accepted the difficult position of mediator between the 
Soviet and the central power. Nevertheless, much had been rescued.
He was the conscience of the Provisional Government, the recognized 
"eye of the democracy" that would guarantee the preservation of the 
revolution until its final consolidation by the Constituent Assembly.
8̂ -Zenzinov, "Fevral'skie dni," p. 230.
S^Chernov, Rozhdenie, p. 252.
86lzvestiia, March 4, 1917, p. 1.
87stankevich, p. 70.
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As a bridge between the Right and the Left, he might yet lure liberals 
and socialists into political amalgamation or at least mitigate the 
worst effects of friction between them.
While Kerensky derived satisfaction from solidifying his "above 
party" role,®® he regarded his standing within the new government with 
even more assurance. He was confident of possessing a strong, perhaps 
decisive, voice in the cabinet; N. V. Nekrasov and M. 1. Tereshchenko, 
the ministers of Transportation and Finance, were reliable political 
friends,®9 and both A. I. Konovalov, the Minister of Trade and 
Industry, and Prince G. E. L'vov, the Minister-President and Minister 
of the Interior, were non-partisan in orientation and pronouncedly 
sympathetic to his views.90 Also, there was reason to believe that 
his influence within the government would increase with the passage of 
time. As the emissary of the democracy, his authority extended far 
beyond the limits of the Ministry of Justice, and he could anticipate 
even greater prominence if future events demonstrated the correctness 
of his nadpartiinost' line.
Unfortunately, the very strength of Kerensky's position blinded 
him to its weaknesses and enticed him into ultimately fatal policies. 
Ephemeral popularity was no substitute for a reliable political 
apparatus, and he could not expect continuously to duplicate his
®®Chemov, Pered burei, p. 338.
®9p. N. Miliukov, Istoriia vtoroi russkoi revoliutsii. 1 vol in 
3 parts (Sofia, 1921-23), part 1, p. 46.
90j(erensky, Crucifixion, p. 267; T. I. Polner, Prince L'vov's 
biographer, recalled that on most issues the Minister-President was 
"definitely disposed to Kerensky's point of view." See T. I. Polner, 
Zhiznennyi put' Kniazia Georgia Evgenievicha L 'vova (Paris, 1932), 
p. 251.
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victory of March 2. But Kerensky was not fully aware of the limits of 
a purely personal authority or the extent to which he was exposed to 
adversity. In retrospect, there is an ironic ring to his insistence 
at a March 7 meeting of the Moscow Soviet that it should undertake 
nothing without his advice.93-
While Kerensky overestimated his control over the soviets, he 
also overestimated the degree to which his inclusion in the Provisional 
Government increased its effectiveness. The population, predominantly 
agrarian and thoroughly war-weary, was unlikely to sympathize long with 
the strident patriotism and privileged orientation of a cabinet drawn 
mainly from the Progressive Bloc of the State Duma. An indicated 
compliance by the government with Kerensky’s will did not alter its 
unrepresentative composition and corresponding debility or blur the 
distinctions between liberalism and socialism. Yet, in part because 
he was included within it, Kerensky assumed that the government 
possessed a plenitude of power and could cope simultaneously with 
reform and the waging of war.92 xn fact, the Provisional Government 
possessed only limited authority and would find even the restoration 
of public order and preparations for the convocation of the Constituent 
Assembly considerable strains upon its resources.93 The advantages 
that the government did possess— a half-articulated desire for harmony 
in time of crisis, the support of the army command and the middle
9lRusskoe Slovo, March 8, 1917, p. 3*
92shidlovskii, II, 65.
93p. N. Miliukov, "The Third Anniversary of Soviet Rule, " The 
New Russia; a Weekly Review of Russian Politics. Ill (November 11,
1920), 328.
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classes, and a lingering toleration of rule by decree— could easily be 
swept away by a general reaction to the overambitious exercise of 
power. 94
Yet the precariousness of the new government's position was not 
immediately apparent, and there were rational grounds for tempered 
optimism. The Soviet's intransigence was dampened by Kerensky's 
presence within the cabinet, the negotiations between the Provisional 
Committee of the Duma and the TsIK had indicated that some common aims 
existed, and mob action in Petrograd appeared to be abating. Further­
more, it was expected that the irreconcilable differences that might 
arrise could be postponed for action by the future Constituent 
Assembly, which would theoretically be capable of combining forceful 
action with democratic methods. These hopes eventually proved 
illusory. Nevertheless, the new cabinet looked forward to internal 
stabilization and, with a truly blind belief that the revolution was 
an act of nationalistic revulsion against tsarist military ineptitude, 
to a continuance on an effective basis of Russia's participation in 
the war.
Those assumptions were shaken by a crisis concerning the 
liquidation of the monarchy. Were the matter entirely in the hands of 
the Duma and the Soviet, the tenuous unity which characterized their 
relations would have been shattered and the government would have 
fallen. But the course of events was also influenced by the army 
command, the British government, Kerensky, and the Imperial family.
9^. A. Maklakov, Iz vospominanii (New York, 1955), p. 377.
95shidlovskii, II, 65; A. Kerenskii, "Korotkaia pamiat,"
Izdaleka. p. 164.
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Under the impact of these various forces, a partial solution was found 
which allowed a continuation of the newly formed order.
The problem of the monarchy was considerably eased by the fact 
that the Tsar, after perfunctory resistance, decided against contesting 
the revolution. The attitude of the army leaders was decisive; deeply 
disenchanted with the previous conduct of the war, they deserted 
Nicholas II in the expectation that a new regime would revive the 
faltering war effort.96 Even before the March 2 arrival at Pskov of 
Alexander Guchkov and Vasilii Shul'gin, who had been sent by the Pro­
visional Committee in order to obtain an abdication in favor of the 
Tsarevich Alexis, Nicholas II had recognized his isolation and 
capitulated.9? But the two Duma deputies were startled by the form 
which Nicholas' acquiescence assumed. The Tsar, declaring that he 
could not bear to be parted from his hemophilic son, brushed aside 
Guchkov's proposals of a regency and abdicated in favor of his brother, 
the Grand Duke Michael Alexandrovich.98 While Nicholas' decision was 
an unexpected violation of the Imperial laws of succession, 99 it was 
fully acceptable. Guchkov's object was the preservation of the 
monarchy, and as Michael was popular with the army command and the 
middle classes, the question was opened in a favorable w a y . W 9
96For examples of the military pressure on the Tsar, see 
"Dokumenty k 1 vospominaniiam1 Gen. A. Lukomskago," ARR. Ill (1922),
251, 263.
97n. M. Tikhmenev, Iz vospominanii iposlednikh dniakh prelyvaniia 
imperatora Nikolaia II v stavke (Nice, 1925)', p. 18.
98Evidence of A. I. Guchkov, Padenie, VI, 265.
99Evidence of Dubenskii, Padenie, VI, 407.
lOOEvidence Qf Guchkov, Padenie, VI, 267*
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Although he was a member of the Provisional Committee, Kerensky 
had not been informed of the Guchkov-Shul'gin m i s s i o n . T h e  pro­
monarchist deputies® distrust of Kerensky did appear to be justified; 
his republicanism was well known, and since February 2? he had 
repeatedly warned the Duma that a reincarnated tsarism would never be 
accepted, regardless of its guise. But Nicholas® abdication under the 
auspices of the Provisional Committee would necessarily increase the 
prestige of liberal elements within the revolution, and for that reason 
alone Kerensky would have supported Guchkov's effort. Although it was 
not generally known, he had opposed the Soviet's interference with a 
similar attempt on March 1; when the TsIK had prevented Rodzianko from 
reaching the Tsar by withholding transportation, Kerensky staked his 
reputation upon his ability to block an accommodation with tsarism.
He strenuously insisted that he was sufficient guarantee against a pact 
with Nicholas, that the Provisional Committee be allowed to act freely, 
and that lack of confidence in his colleagues reflected adversely upon 
his personal integrity.102 The TsIK grudgingly gave way. While it was 
fearful of granting so much authority to Kerensky, it was reluctant to 
antagonize such a popular and tempestuous personage.103
The TsIK soon felt regret over the carte blanche it had been 
browbeaten into granting. After Miliukov's public advocacy of a 
constitutional monarchy on the morning of March 3. Kerensky was 
subjected to a hostile cross-examination by an aggrieved Petrograd
lOlShul'gin, p. 238.
102sukhanov, Revolution , I, 112.
103Chernov, Rozhdenie, p. 192.
Soviet. Forced into a defensive position, Kerensky asserted his 
innocence; he had not been consulted, the plan to establish a consti­
tutional monarchy would fail regardless of Miliukov's efforts, and he 
would resign from the government if that proved necessary. IQ** In fact, 
the Soviet's suspicions regarding Kerensky were unwarranted, for he 
had been aware of Miliukov and Guchkov!s intentions and had feverishly 
countered them. His tactics consisted of "pathos and t h r e a t s , a n d  
Rodzianko later conceded their effectiveness; because of Kerensky1s 
arguments, "it was quite obvious that the Grand Duke would have reigned 
only a few hours and that terrible bloodshed, marking the beginning of 
a general civil war, would have immediately started. . . By the
morning of March 3 Kerensky had garnered enough support in the cabinet 
and the Provisional Committee to request resolution of the issue 
through a conference with the Grand Duke.^®? Only Miliukov and Guchkov 
remained in opposition, and a draft of Michael's abdication had even 
been drawn up.-̂ 0^
But none of these measures guaranteed the Grand Duke's 
capitulation, and Kerensky entered the conference in an apparent state 
of nervousness. His behavior there left a painful impression. 
Completely determined to force the Grand Duke's abdication, he was 
frequently rude and threatening. He warned Michael that an acceptance
lO^Kerensky, Russia, pp. 208-209.
105Sukhanov, Zapiski, II, 42.
lO^Rodzianko, "Gosudarstvennaia duma," p. 61.
10?Evidence of Guchkov, Padenie, VI, 273; Kerensky, Russia,
p. 215.
lOfyliliukov, Istoriia, part 1, p. 53*
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of the crown would be physically d a n g e r o u s , attempted to prevent 
the full elaboration of Miliukov’s counter arguments that stability 
required a visible head of s t a t e , a n d  accused Guchkov, who arrived 
late and tried to second Miliukov's efforts, of willful and malicious 
disruption.m In a final maneuver that offended his colleagues but 
apparently amused the Grand Duke, Kerensky guarded the telephone after 
the conclusion of formal discussions, hoping in that way to exclude 
outside consultation on the question.Fortunately, Michael 
succumbed to the campaign Kerensky had mounted and agreed to resign 
his position. The problem of the monarchy was resolved, the newly 
formed Provisional Government began its legal existence, and Kerensky's 
debt to the Soviet was discharged. While ungraceful in execution, his 
new victory was as significant as the one of the previous day.
The question of Romanov power was settled, but the problem of 
the Romanov family remained. Kerensky had not exaggerated greatly in 
describing popular hostility to Nicholas, and the TsIK had responded 
to it on March 3 by calling for the arrest of the Imperial family.-^3 
But since the entire cabinet was opposed to such an action and the 
TsIK, uncertain of success, had expressed itself with unusual
109n . A. Basily, Nicolas de Basily. Diplomat of Imperial Russia, 
1903-1917. Memoirs (Stanford, 1973), p. 143.
llO^iiiukov, Vospoicdnaniia„ II, 316.
HlEvidence of Guchkov, Padenie, VI, 274. The exchange between 
Guchkov and Kerensky was apparently very sharp. At any rate, when 
Guchkov recalled the incident some months later, his resentment was 
still very evident.
H2gasily, p. 144.
H3lzvestiia, March 4, 1917, p. 1.
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restraint, the issue was allowed to smolder for several days.H^ The 
government moved toward a settlement on March 6. After consultations 
with General M. V. Alekseev, who represented Nicholas, and Sir George 
Buchanan, the British ambassador, the cabinet agreed to send the 
Romanov family abroad to England.H5 Correctly assuming that the 
potentially controversial cabinet decision would meet with a better 
reception outside of Petrograd, and probably hoping in that way to 
muffle criticism, Kerensky unveiled the British offer of asylum in a 
March 7 appearance before the Moscow Soviet. His speech was well 
received, and he drew almost uninterrupted applause when he declared 
that he would "never be the Marat of the Russian revolution" and that 
he would personally escort Nicholas to a suitable port.-^
But Moscow was not the center of the revolution, and Kerensky's 
tactic failed. Immediately after Kerensky's Moscow speech, the 
Petrograd Soviet demanded that the Provisional Government take prompt 
and vigorous steps to gather all members of the Romanov family in one 
place under dependable g u a r d , a n d  reaffirmed its stand on March 9 
with a decision to "carry out the arrest of Nicholas Romanov at all 
costs, including the severance of relations with the Provisional 
G o v e r n m e n t . T h e  impending conflict was averted when the British
H^iliukov, Vospominaniia. II, 350.
115"Fevral'skaia revolutsiia 1917 goda," pp. 5^-55* Buchanan,
II, 10^.
U-^Russkoe Slovo. March 8, 1917, p. 3*
117"T rebovanie naroda o zakluchenii Nikolaia Romanova v 
krepost," KA, LXXXI (1937), 123.
118izvestiia, March 10, 1917, p. 1.
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government, fearful of provoking labor unrest in its own country, 
withdrew its initial offer.H9 Suddenly lacking suitable alternatives, 
the Provisional Government imprisoned the Romanov family in the 
Imperial Palace at Tsarskoe Selo. The issue was not really settled; 
extremists in the Petrograd Soviet advanced demands for a speedy trial 
and execution of the former tsar, and the government was determined to 
exile Nicholas as soon as possible. As a provisional measure, and in 
order to buy time, Nicholas remained confined and Kerensky instituted 
a carefully circumscribed investigation into the prior activities of 
the Imperial Court.1^0
With the problem of the monarchy at least tentatively disposed 
of, Kerensky and his fellow ministers finally devoted their full 
attention toward constructing the new order. They had been 
exceptionally fortunate. The old regime’s belated sanction of the 
revolution salved many violated consciences, and Britain’s withdrawal 
of its offer of asylum for the Romanovs averted a dangerous break 
with the Petrograd Soviet. The Provisional Government, anxious to heal 
its rupture with the socialists, emphasized non-controversial 
legislation, and orders began to flow from governmental departments 
that were at long last freed from inertia.
119a . Kerenskii, "Ot’ezd Nikolaia 11-go v Tobol'sk,1 Izdaleka, 
p. 189; Meriel Buchanan, The Dissolution of an Empire (London, 1932), 
p. 195*
120a . Kerensky, La verite sur le massacre des Romanov 
(Paris, 1936), pp. 148-149; VVP, March 23, 1917, p. 2.
CHAPTER III
KERENSKY IN THE FIRST PROVISIONAL GOVERNMENT
Because of his temperment and his training, Alexander Kerensky 
could not have wished for a more suitable position than that of 
Minister of Justice. To many people in those intoxicated and decep­
tively mild days, before ideological and class lines hardened on a 
national scale, the Russian revolution symbolized the eradication of 
evil and the inauguration of a superior way of life. In that respect 
Kerensky's office, more than any other, symbolized the renovative 
power of the revolution. It was the instrument that would destroy the 
causes of old wrongs and create the conditions necessary for the 
emergence of an egalitarian society. In a very real sense, then, it 
could be argued that the guiding hand of the Ministry of Justice also 
held ultimate responsibility for the fulfillment of Russia's highest 
aspirations. While some cautious men disputed these conclusions on 
the grounds that the revolution was a wholesale violation of laws and 
rights and provided an extremely unfavorable environment for reform, 
Kerensky had no doubt that a new era had arrived. His enthusiastic 
attitude was revealed in a March 2 message to the Councils of the Bar, 
when he claimed to act "in the name of the salvation of our native 
land" and called upon the legal apparatus to raise "true justice" to
lv. A. Maklakov, Iz vospominanii (New York, 195*0, p. 377.
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the "heights that correspond to the greatness of the people and the 
importance of the historical m o m e n t . B y  placing Russian law on an 
"unrivaled plane,"3 he hoped to surpass the English and French 
juridical systems that he had so long admired^
While aware of the unique opportunities for legal reform,
Kerensky still recognized limitations upon his activities. These 
boundaries, to which he had adhered from his first days in office, were 
described in his April 13 speech before a special commission charged 
with the revision of judicial charters. The primary task facing them, 
he maintained, was the "cleansing . . .  of all unethical layers that 
the fallen regime had created." The Provisional Government, Kerensky 
continued, was not empowered to pass new laws, for that would amount 
to an illegal anticipation of powers belonging to the Constituent 
Assembly. Nevertheless, "the revolution should be borne in mind" and 
statutes should be "adjusted to modem life. "5 That essentially 
realistic and flexible policy, for which Kerensky had full cabinet 
approval,^ called for a return to the legal purity of the 186*4- reforms 
and at the same time allowed considerable room for discretion.7 it
^Izvestiia. March 3» 1917, p. 1.
3Kerensky to Maklakov, cited in V. A. Maklakov, The First State 
Duma; Contemporary Reminiscenses. trans. Mary Belkin (Bloomington,
1964), p. 240.
^Sir Bernard Pares, The Fall of the Russian Monarchy; a Study of 
the Evidence (London, 1939), p. 475*
5VVP, April 14, 1917, p. 2.
^Sbomik ukazov i postanovlenii Vremennogo Pravitel'stva,
2 vols. (Petrograd, 1917), I , 11.
7The 1864 acts, part of Alexander II's great reforms, abolished 
the class courts and established an equitable system based on the
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appeared to be in keeping with the resources of the government, and in 
view of the multitudinous abuses introduced since the 1880's promised 
to satisfy the most stringent of critics.
Kerensky's measures involving amnesty and the recall of banished 
political prisoners were certainly in accordance with the expectations 
of revolutionary justice. His first directives on March 2 required 
the immediate release of all political prisoners currently held by 
public prosecutors;® the conveyance to Petrograd, with honors, of the 
aged populist heroine, Catherine Breshkovskaia;9 and the release of 
the five Bolshevik Duma deputies who had been exiled for sedition, 
against his strenuous protests and despite his legal defense of them, 
in the first year of the war.-*-® Kerensky was allotted 500,000 rubles 
for the benefit of those returning from exile, and he applied part of 
those funds toward preparations for elaborate official welcomes. •*-■*- A 
formal and comprehensive declaration of amnesty followed on March 6 
for the purpose of realizing the "complete triumph of a new order 
founded on law and freedom." To achieve that end, law code articles 
referring to religious crimes, sedition, subversive activities, and 
laxity in official duties were voided. Further provisions met the 
specific needs of the revolution. All politically motivated criminal
French model. Procedure was modernized and simplified, jury trial for 
criminal offenses was introduced, and judges, except for misconduct in 
office, were irremovable. Alexander III's counter reforms undermined 
the integrity of those improvements.
®VVP, March 7, 1917, p. 1.
9lzvestiia, March 4, 1917, p. 4.
lOlzvestiia, March 3. 1917, p. 4.
llVVP, March 9, 1917, p. 3-
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acts except treason against the Provisional Government that took place 
between February 23 and March 6 were nullified, and the rights of
“J ppetition and appeal were established to deal with ambiguous cases.
The governmental declaration on amnesty signalled a general 
relaxation of legal penalties and an amelioration of the conditions of 
imprisonment. The most significant of these acts was the March 12 
abolition of the death penalty.^3 The replacement of capital punish­
ment by an unspecified term at hard labor was solidly within the 
traditions of the Russian intelligentsia. As Vladimir Nabokov, the 
noted liberal jurist, observed in the Cadet newspaper Rech1 (Speech), 
"in no other country has opposition to this worst kind of murder been 
so powerful as in ours." Most party newspapers subscribed to Nabokov's 
conclusion that the new act was a "comforting phenomenon, a sign of 
genuine magnanimity and wise fo r e s i g h t . T h e  SR organ Delo Naroda 
(The Cause of the People) expressed satisfaction that "the most 
disgraceful blot . . . on our conscience and that of all mankind had 
been removed,"^5 and the conservative Novoe Vremia (New Times) called 
the voiding of the death penalty an "act of colossal majesty" and a 
"lofty example of the ennobling of mores. . . .
Among non-socialists, editorial enthusiasm carried strong over­
tones of relief. The action was justified; the Provisional Government
12WP, March 8, 1917, p. 1.
13vvp, March 18, 1917, p. 1.
14Rech\ March 18, 1917, p. 3-
15pelo Naroda. March 19, 1917, p. 1.
l^Novoe Vremia, March 18, 1917, p. 3*
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had been involved in an unpublicized struggle with left elements in 
the Soviet that had delayed passage of the law for four days and its 
publication for another six. If abolition of capital punishment had 
been blocked, liberals and conservatives would have felt dangerously 
exposed to Jacobin tendencies in the Soviet and an important check 
against intensification of the radical revolution would have been 
removed.
That conflict, the actual course of which is difficult to recon­
struct, apparently stemmed from the controversy surrounding the dis­
position of the Romanov family. As with the dispute over Nicholas, 
the catalyst was Kerensky’s March 7 visit to Moscow. In a speech 
before a liberal group, the Committee of Public Organizations, he 
revealed that he had drawn up, and would sign on March 8, an order 
providing for the abolition of the death penalty. Immediately upon 
his return to Petrograd, Kerensky was approached by Iu. M. Steklov, a 
pro-Bolshevik member of the TsIK and the new Editor-in-Chief of the 
Soviet newspaper Izvestiia (News). The Minister of Justice was 
startled by the tenor of the interview: Steklov informed him that the 
TsIK was extremely dissatisfied with his Moscow revelations and advised 
him to reconsider the proposed abolition of the death penalty.Since 
the implication was that the Petrograd Soviet wished to retain capital 
punishment for use against the deposed tsar, Kerensky took a serious 
view of the matter. He postponed signature of the act until March 12, 
when an agreement reached with the Soviet concerning Nicholas1
17lzvestiia. March 9, 1917, pp. 6-7.
1%. Kerensky, Russia and History's Turning Point (New York,
1965), p. 240.
incarceration at Tsarskoe Selo made the issue less urgent,-*-9 and 
allowed its promulgation in the official Vestnik Vremennogo 
Pravitel'*stva (Provisional Government Herald) only on March 18.^0 it 
is difficult to ascertain whether Steklov had been speaking for a 
permanent minority or a transitory majority of the TsIK. Preservation 
of the death penalty was not advocated on the floor of the Soviet, but 
such a line could have been considered by the TsIK in the general furor 
surrounding Nicholas1 proposed exile. Two non-socialist editors were 
convinced that a vindictive minority campaign was being waged in the 
Soviet. On March 14 the liberal Den* (Day), charging that an attempt 
was being made to "smear democracy and cast a shadow over it," demanded 
that "outside pressure" be removed from the government with regard to 
the bill, and Rech* expressed similar sentiments in a March 15 
editorial.22 Hostility from the extreme Left was expressed indirectly 
after March 18, for both Steklov1s Izvestiia and the Bolshevik Pravda 
(Truth) maintained a disapproving editorial silence when the law went 
into effect.
Obviously, Kerensky's handling of the issue had been impeccable. 
He had played patiently for time, simplified the problem, and relied 
upon popular support to undermine or isolate opposition. As a result, 
a disturbing threat from the Left had been turned aside, revolutionary 
idealism survived intact, and the political Right was assured some
^Izvestiia. March 10, 1917, 1.
20VVP. March 10, 1917, p. 1.
21r. Browder and A. Kerensky, eds., The Russian Provisional 
Government. 1917; Documents. 3 vols. (Stanford, 1961), I, 202.
22Rech', March 15, 1917, p. 2.
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immunity from the worst consequences of past or future defeats.
Abolition of the death penalty had been the only really contro­
versial reform advocated by Kerensky, and associated measures 
encountered no difficulty. On March 17 major reductions of penalties 
for non-political crimes were carried out, and corporal punishment, 
including the use of irons and strait jackets, were eliminated from 
prison practices.23 Furthermore, on April 26 banishment to Siberia, 
an especially hated practice of the old regime, was replaced by 
imprisonment in a fortress or removal to a correctional workhouse.2^ 
Changes in prison administration and the parole system were 
natural adjuncts to legal reform, and Kerensky insured that the Central 
Prison Administration was responsive. On March 17 disabled military 
officers were encouraged to become wardens, courses in prison super­
vision were drawn up, and procedures were instituted to guarantee the 
rectification of abuses. ^  On the same day, plans were announced 
regarding the expansion of Societies of Guardianship. These organ­
izations, created to facilitate the transition of released prisoners 
to civilian life, were broadened to include representatives from all 
social classes.26
Kerensky's legal and correctional reforms were in accordance 
with Western progressive doctrines, but it would be erroneous to view 
them primarily in those terms. While he would have agreed with the
23pelo Naroda, March 19, 1917, p» 1*
24Browder, I, 207-
25VVP, March 18, 1917, p. 2.
26VVP, March 18, 1917, p. 2.
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argument that the strictness of the tsarist law code and the brutality 
existing within the prison system had been necessary consequences of 
the class character of the old regime and that a democratic order would 
be able to sustain itself without resort to such draconian measures, 
he based his actions on still other assumptions. As a Russian populist 
he tempered Western socialist precepts with a religious faith in the 
goodness and wisdom of the uncorrupted peasantry. That set of beliefs 
allowed him to equate the removal of repressive devices with an 
immediate liberation of the potentialities of the people. Rather than 
acts of expediency undertaken to buttress a personal popularity, as 
they later appeared to some observers, Kerensky's reforms were intended 
to facilitate the moral and spiritual transformation of the nation.27 
Despite the adoption of foreign terminology, his measures were really 
justified by an optimistic ideology that was almost exclusively Russian 
in character.
On March 9 the ministerial council requested that Kerensky strike 
down the legal inequities that had formerly existed throughout the 
Russian Empire, and he responded on March 20 with the abolition of
p Qrestrictions based on religion and nationality. Rights of residence 
and travel were affirmed, bringing to an end tsarist restrictions such 
as the Pale of Settlement, so that trades, professions, and 
institutions of learning were thrown open to all on an equal basis.
27Alexander F. Kerensky, "Genesis of the October Revolution of 
1917," unpublished manuscript, Hoover Institute, Stanford, California, 
p. 31.
28lzvestiia, March 12, 1917, p. 4; Sboraik, I, *4-6-49.
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Rights of ownership and use of movable and immovable property, 
including participation in joint-stock companies, were extended, civil 
and military service was opened to all groups, and participation in 
elections, the holding of elected offices, and registration as jurors 
were guaranteed to all. Finally, the use of non-Russian dialects and 
languages was permitted in business proceedings and private schools.^9 
None of these provisions jeopardized the traditional liberal conception 
of an indivisible Russian state, and the various nationality groups 
were certainly not satisfied, but the measure represented a clear 
rejection of past efforts to promote Russification.30 Non-socialist 
newspapers applauded the act. Novoe Vremia observed that the triple 
formula of "Autocracy, Orthodoxy, and Nationality," which had disguised 
a "divide and rule" policy, had come to an end,31 and Russkie 
Vedomosti (Russian Gazette). the liberal Moscow daily, welcomed the 
elimination of long-standing conditions of "oppression, violence, and 
disfranchisement."32 Since the effects of that law were combined with 
a prior affirmation of freedom of the press, assembly, and 
association,33 most political requirements for an open society had 
been met. Voter qualifications remained to be worked out and the 
government hesitated to dispense entirely with aristocratic titles and
29Sbomik, I, 46-^9.
3Ofhe term refers to a systematic governmental policy that 
discouraged the expression of cultural pluralism within the Empire.
3lNovoe Vremia, March 23, 1917, p. 4.
32ftusskie Vedomosti, March 23, 1917, p. 3*
33Sbomik, I, 8.
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honorary ranks,34 but the short period of Kerensky's ministry was 
notable for its progress toward a democratic, egalitarian society.
The Ministry of Justice was also responsible for determining 
the culpability of members of the old regime and applying appropriate 
punishment. Kerensky found that a difficult part of his duties and 
did his utmost to alleviate the burdens of those placed in his 
charge. His solicitude was most apparent with respect to the former 
tsar. Kerensky had expressed concern for the safety of the royal 
family as early as March 1, when the fate of the revolution was still 
in doubt,35 and Nicholas expressed surprise at the consideration and 
courtesy extended to him at Tsarskoe Selo.36 Similar treatment was 
accorded to such arrested functionaries of the former government as 
Protopopov, Stunner, and Shcheglovitov, for their imprisonments were 
really forms of protective custody.37
Kerensky's reluctance to take revenge on members of the old 
regime was shown in a number of other ways. Reactionary senators were 
advised to resign their positions in order to spare themselves the 
embarrassment of forced removal and to preserve the principle of 
senatorial immunity.38 Also, with the notable exception of personnel 
in the Ministry of the Interior, officials of tsarist departments were
3^lzvestiia, March 12, 1917, p. 4.
35Evidence of Dubenskii, Padenie tsarskogo rezhima; steno- 
graficheskie otcheti. doprosov i pokazanii, dannikh v 1917 £* v 
chrezvychainoi sledstvennoi komissii Vremennogo Pravitel1stva, ed.
P. E. Shchegoleva, 7 vols. (Moscow-Leningrad, 1924-27), VI, 408.
36"Dnevnik Nikolaia Romanova," KA, XXI (1927), 94.
37Evidence of Protopopov, Padenie, IV, 55*
38Browder, I, 193•
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encouraged to remain at their posts.39 But the most revealing example 
of Kerensky's determination to limit retribution was his denial of 
Kirghiz demands for an investigation of the Turkestan revolt of 1916.^® 
As an oppositionist Duma deputy, he had investigated that outbreak, 
which had been sparked by the illegal conscription into the army of 
the draft-exempt natives and had claimed over 30,000 casulties.^3. jn 
September of 1916 he had sharply condemned the conduct of Sturmer and 
other involved officials, but he now evaded the issue on the entirely 
unconvincing basis that the amnesty decree applied to everyone involved
in the disturbances.^
There was a particular blatancy about Kerensky's refusal to 
reopen the Turkestan question, for he had just been appointed the 
Prosecutor General of an Extraordinary Commission of Inquiry for the 
investigation of "malfeasance in office of former ministers, chief 
administrators, and other persons in high office of the civil and the 
military and naval services."^ The intent of the commission was the 
investigation of governmental illegalities, and its findings were to 
be turned over to the Prosecutor General for appropriate action.^ 
Kerensky managed to shield former tsarist functionaries even in the
39yyp. March 8, 1917, p. 3-
40vvp, March 18, 1917, p. 1.
N. Pokrovskii, "Politicheskoe polozhenie Rossii nakanune 
Fevral'skoi revoliutsii v zhandarmskom osveshchenii," KA, XVII 
(1926), 29.
^2yyp, March 18, 1917, p. 1.
^Introduction by P. E. Shchegolev, Padenie, I, v.
Wvvp, March 12, 1917, p. 1.
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face of such definite orders* To be sure, his commission displayed 
considerable investigative zeal, for when the October insurrection 
interrupted its activities over eighty witnesses had been examined at 
length and the accumulated testimony, published in 1924-27 in Moscow 
and Leningrad under the title Padenie tsarskogo rezhima (The Fall of 
the Tsarist Regime), comprised seven volumes. Nevertheless, the 
intent of the law was evaded. Tightly controlled by the Minister of 
Justice, who appointed its membership and exercised continued super­
vision over its activities,^ the commission undertook to provide a 
"complete picture of the old regime" in the light of revolutionary 
principles.^ Much of the testimony focused upon quite legal 
practices such as the use of undercover agents**? and the measures 
taken by the tsarist authorities to contain revolutionary outbursts,**® 
or the sensational, but frequently irrelevant, activities of Rasputin 
and the tsarina's confidante, Anna Vyrubova.^9 The result was a 
condemnation of the old order and the justification of revolution, 
but in the process, questions of malfeasance in office were shunted 
aside. In this case, as in so many others, Kerensky tried to persuade 
the political Right that it had nothing to fear.
Those who profited most from Kerensky's protection later
^5VVP, March 12, 1917, p. 1.
^VVP, March 9, 1917, p. 3*
^Evidence of V. L. Vurtseva, Padenie. I, 297.
^Evidence of Khabalov, Padenie, I, 197.
it-9Evidence of Prince N. B. Shchebatov, Padenie, VII, 219-222; 
evidence of S. P. Beletskii, Padenie, IV, 416.
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condemned him, arguing that leniency fostered the spread of anarchy 
and hindered the consolidation of power. That interpretation, 
eloquently expressed in Vasilii Shul'gin's accusation that Kerensky 
"burned Russia on the altar of freedom,"50 was only partially 
justified. Admittedly, Kerensky overvalued the power of exhortation 
and example. He acted from the dubious premises that "all could be 
obtained through good will" and that "a socialist could persuade his 
people to do anything,"51 and his populist confidence in the 
"inexhaustible storehouse of political wisdom and creative power of 
the people"52 proved to be woefully unrealistic. Nonetheless, he was 
undoubtedly correct in assuming that the bitterness of the past should 
not be projected into the present, for such a development would 
disrupt the existing fragile political balance and would threaten the 
survival of the Provisional Government. Kerensky's fervent belief in 
voluntary obedience, the innate goodness of man, and the "inviolability 
of the human personality"53 lent force to a necessary, if contro­
versial, policy. Later efforts to impose discipline were compromised 
by Kerensky's characteristic blending of pragmatism and humani- 
tarianism, but if he had not adopted that moderate course in February, 
there might well have been no government to consolidate in August.
A swift and comprehensive re-establishment of order and authority 
would have been impossible in any event, for the Ministry of Justice
50v. Shul'gin, Dni (Belgrade, 1925), p. 171.
51a. Choulguine, L'Ukraine contre Moscou, 1917 (Paris, 1935),
p. 116.
52izvestiia, April 14, 1917, p. 2.
53Kerensky, "Genesis," p. 16.
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was virtually bereft of enforcement mechanisms. The Okhrana. the 
Gendarme Corps, and the Police Department had been destroyed during 
the February Days, and only months of careful administrative 
reorganization could produce their revolutionary equivalents.54 In 
the interim, law enforcement depended upon a hastily organized and 
ineffectual police administration established by Prince L'vov on 
March 10,55 and after its abolition on April 17 responsibility 
devolved upon a municipal militia of notorious ineffeciency.56 The 
system of courts had also collapsed, and Kerensky was forced to create 
temporary ones (composed of a Justice of the Peace, a worker, and a 
military representative) even before he formally eliminated their 
tsarist counterparts.57 Although he was able on May 4 to institute 
a network of local courts presided over by competent personnel,58 
that was the only implemented measure that promised immediate results. 
In the general administrative disintegration following the revolution, 
Kerensky had few instruments at his disposal besides appeals to 
conscience.
The limitations of that approach and the paucity of governmental 
resources in the face of organized resistance were demonstrated in an 
almost perpetual crisis at the Kronstadt naval base. The Kronstadters 
had welcomed the revolution with a massacre of many of their officers,
54v. Zenzinov, "Fevral'skie dni," NZ, XXXV (1953), 218.
55VVP, March 14, 1917, p. 1.
56izyestiia, April 18, 1917, p. 1.
57yyp. March 29, 1917, p. 1.
58Russkie Vedomosti, May 13, 1917, p. 3»
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including the unpopular commander, Admiral Viren, and the imprisonment 
in dungeons of the s u r v i v o r s . 59 The sailors' hostility to authority 
did not diminish after the February Days; a personal appearance by 
Kerensky failed to alter their attitudes,60 and in late April a 
judicial commission sent to the naval base to establish governmental 
control narrowly escaped execution.61 A strongly disapproving stand 
by the Petrograd Soviet temporarily softened the resistance of the 
Kronstadt Soviet,^2 and the last of the imprisoned officers were 
finally released after the suppression of the July disorders in Petro­
grad, but the island fortress preserved its independence. The 
Kronstadt imbroglio, an excellent illustration of the Provisional 
Government's incapacity to master the forces of disruption, was a grim 
augury of the future.
Regardless of its disquieting implications, the Kronstadt 
situation was only one problem among many, and the ministry devoted 
its major attention to greater needs. As a caretaker regime, its 
essential tasks were the maintenance of order and the preparation for 
its replacement by an elected body. But as challenging as they were, 
those obligations were beset by complicating factors. Clearly, the 
war was a dangerously disruptive force; the pursuance of the struggle
59izyestiia, March 2, 1917, p- 1.
60izvestiia, March 17, 1917, p.
6lNorth Winship to Robert Lansing, April 30, 1917, Records of 
the Department of State Relating to the Internal Affairs of Russia and 
the Soviet Union, 1917, the National Archives, Washington D. C.
Record Group M 316, 861.00/386.
62Izvestiia, May 27, 1917, p.
63Kerensky, Russia, p. 230.
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against the Central Powers, which carried in its wake questions 
regarding relations with allies and the military ambitions of the new 
society, threatened to place enormous strains upon the government's 
resources. The issue of land reform, which could not escape factional 
controversy, and the restiveness of national minorities posed similarly 
obdurate challenges. Also, party disputes, at times expressed within 
the cabinet, then again in the Soviet's intervention in cabinet 
affairs, complicated attempts at establishing effective rule. Those 
difficulties magnified Kerensky's influence within the government, for 
his position as the "defender of the people's interests"^ provided 
him with a mandate to act authoritatively in a steadily increasing 
number of areas. Kerensky's efforts within the cabinet and on behalf 
of it testified to his energy, his breadth of interests, and his 
conviction that he had a right to supervise every aspect of the Pro­
visional Government's activities.
Kerensky had an immediate impact upon governmental policy, for 
from the outset he dominated the ministerial council. His observation 
that the new ministers "had unconsciously seen things in their true 
proportions and realized what was necessary for the whole nation"^ 
was an indirect admission that their decisions had conformed to his 
will. Kerensky's control of the cabinet was not total, for on issues 
such as Ukrainian self-government or foreign policy a minority composed 
of Miliukov, Guchkov, A. A. Manuilov, and A. I. Shingarev held to 
traditional liberal principles. But Prince L'vov, N. V. Nekrasov,
^Izvestiia, March 4, 1917, p. 1.
65a. Kerensky, The Catastrophe; Kerensky's Own Story of the 
Russian Revolution (New York, 1927), p. 6,
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M. I. Tereshchenko, V. L'vov, A. I. Konovalov, and I. V. Godnev 
(the State Controller) consistently followed the lead of the Minister 
of Justice. 66 Vladimir Nabokov, who served as Head of Chancellery to 
the new cabinet and was present at all of its meetings, noted that the 
"real power” was exercised by Kerensky and that most of the other 
ministers deferred to his wishes.̂  As that acquiescence was trans­
lated into a seven-to-four majority on controversial topics, Miliukov 
was justified in asserting that Kerensky possessed the "only voice of 
authority. "68 The overall policy of the first Provisional Government 
was that of its Minister of Justice, and his ascendancy within the 
cabinet was probably more pronounced in March than it would ever be 
again.
Kerensky did not limit himself to the control of general policy; 
he also intervened in the affairs of specific ministries. As befitted 
a socialist, his first actions were directed toward a land settlement 
in accordance with his populist desires. Considering land reform to 
be the "crucial problem of Russian life" and the only issue able to 
"penetrate the heart of the country and pierce the mystery of the 
popular soul,"69 he moved to convince the peasantry that their 
interests would be protected. In an abrupt and legally questionable 
move on March 2, he abolished the Stolypin-established Land Surveying
66p. Miliukov, Vospominaniia, 1859-1917. 2 vols. (New York, 1955). 
II, 129-130.
67v. Nabokov, "Vremennoe Pravitel1stvo," ARR, I (1922), 40.
6Miliukov, Vospominaniia, II, 333.
69a . Kerensky, L 1Experience Kerenski (Paris, 1936), p. 55*
Department, thus serving notice that he favored the traditional 
communal system of land tenure. He was also the first minister to 
suggest impediments to the transfer of land, so that a land fund would 
be readily available for distribution by the Constituent Assembly.71 
Kerensky had the satisfaction of witnessing a prompt cabinet response 
to the question. On March 19 the government authorized the creation 
of a land committee for the study of projected reforms,72 and by 
April 23 the commission, under the chairmanship of A. S. Posnikov, had 
made sufficient progress to attract the favorable notice of the SR 
newspaper Delo Naroda.73 Liberals and moderates bitterly resisted 
the restrictions on the transfer of titles necessary for the amassing 
of a substantial land reservoir, but Kerensky's proposal would finally 
pass into law on July 12.7^
Kerensky was more tentative in dealing with the aspirations of 
national minorities than he had been with regard to the land question.
He joined readily in the granting of Polish independence, for that act
not only reversed acknowledged injustices dating back to the Congress 
of Vienna but caused problems for the occupying Germans.75 He also 
showed sympathy for the Finns. On March 5 he arranged for the
70lzvestiia, March 2, 1917, p. 1.
73-Rech1, May 10, 1917, P* 2.
72Russkie Vedomosti. March 22, 1917, p. 3-
73pelo Naroda. April 23, 1917, p. 1.
7^For an example of such protests, see Russkie Vedomosti,
July 29, 1917, p. 1.
75p. Miliukov, Istoriia vtoroi Russkoi revoliutsii, 1 vol. in 
3 parts (Sofia, 1921-23), part 1, p. 6k.
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conveyance from Siberia of P. E. Svenhufved, a former president of 
the Sejm (the Finnish parliament), according him the honors due to a 
returning revolutionary hero, 76 and supporting a cabinet decision to 
restore the violated constitution of the Grand Duchy of Finland. 
Finally, he extended to Finnish citizens the amnesty provisions 
already implemented within Russia.77 But Kerensky realized that the 
national minorities would press for greater gains than the unitary 
state could tolerate (he privately told Sir Bernard Pares of his fears 
that Russia might have to apply the principle of self-determination to 
itself) ,7 8 and because of the danger inherent in separatism he was 
reluctant to go beyond the redressing of obvious tsarist wrongs. For 
example, he declined to answer a telegram from the Ukrainian Rada 
reminding him of his Duma advocacy of an autonomous Ukraine,79 
evidently hoping to discourage further discussion of the issue. He 
subsequently made it clear that only the Constituent Assembly could 
determine the future relations between the peoples of the former 
empire.^ while separatism did not become a serious issue while 
he was at the head of the Ministry of Justice, from the first he was 
concerned about its disruptive potential.
While Kerensky displayed caution concerning the future status of 
the national minorities, he was forthright about prosecution of the
76izvestiia. March 7, 1917, p. 3*
77wP. March 8, 1917, p. 1.
78sir Bernard Pares, My Russian Memoirs (London, 1931), p. ^33.
79Browder, I, 370.
80lzvestiia, May 30, 1917, p.
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war. Since he believed that patriotic outrage against tsarist 
military ineptitude had been an important cause of the revolution, he 
saw no major obstacles to a vigorous continuation of the allied 
struggle against the Central Powers. "The whole army," he claimed in 
a Times interview, "from the commander down to the last soldier" 
realized that anything less would "betray the revolution.Allied 
representatives were quick to realize Kerensky's commitment to the war 
effort. On March 15 Maurice Paleologue, the French ambassador, 
informed his government that Kerensky "alone was capable of making the 
Soviet realize the necessity of continuing the war and maintaining the 
a l l i a n c e , and on March 20 the United States consul at Petrograd, 
North Winship, reported to his superiors that the entire cabinet, 
including its socialist representative, was determined to mount a 
vigorous military effort against the Central Powers.83
Kerensky's pro-war activities were not confined to the reassuring 
of Allied missions. On March 1 he had tried to obtain a retraction of 
Order Number One, which had been issued by the Soviet without his 
knowledge and which threatened to destroy the cohesion of the armed 
forces, arguing that its contents were so offensive to non-socialists 
that they would not participate in the Provisional Government. When
8-̂ 1 he Times (London), March 23, 1917, p. 5-
82Maurice Paleologue, La Russie des tsars pendant la grande 
guerre, 3 vols. (Paris, 192277 III, 23^.
$3winship to Lansing, March 20, 1917, Russian Internal Affairs, 
861.00/28̂ .
®̂ N. N. Sukhanov, The Russian Revolution, 1917; Eyewitness 
Account, trans. and ed., Joel Carmichael, 2 volsT (New York, 19^2),
I, 130. Order Number One, passed on March 1 by the Soldier's section 
of the Petrograd Soviet, undermined military discipline. Although
9̂
that tactic failed, he ended his first formal speech as Minister of 
Justice with an emotional appeal for military discipline.^5 Kerensky 
continued to emphasize that theme throughout the term of the first 
cabinet, he returned constantly to the concepts of duty and obedience 
to authority, arguing that without them the new Russia would become a 
"State of rebellious slaves" and that the aspirations of the revolution 
would be "drowned in b l o o d . H i s  appointment to a newly-established 
war cabinet created to control the Stavka (the army General Head­
quarters) gave him a convenient platform for the furthering of these 
views. Kerensky*s new position also allowed him to participate 
actively in the efforts of A. I. Guchkov, the Minister of War, to 
increase the efficiency of the armed forces.8? In public appearances 
with Guchkov, he linked the success of the revolution with success in 
war, claiming that the defense of the "hearth of democratic freedom" 
would allow the "achievement of everything we d e s i r e . I t  was his 
tragedy, and that of his country, that Kerensky never altered that 
stand. He remained convinced that as a "free, self-liberated state" 
Russia was honor bound to prove its worth on the field of battle.̂
applying officially only to the Petrograd garrison, the order affected
all elements of the armed forces to some degree. Important articles 
of that document called for the subordination of the military command 
to the Soviet in all political actions, the formation of military 
committees through election from the lower ranks, adherence to mili­
tary discipline only in the performance of active duty, and the control 
of weapons by the elected battalion committees.
85izvestiia, March 3. 1917, P- 1«
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Kerensky's activities regarding land reform, national self- 
determination, and the position of the army in the revolutionary state 
were partially acceptable to the ministers involved. His intervention 
in foreign policy was not, and that action shattered the cabinet, 
clearly revealed the antagonisms and contradictions aroused by the 
revolution, and contributed to the failure of succeeding governments 
to meet the demands imposed on them. There are strong ironic overtones 
to the struggle between Kerensky and Miliukov, the Minister of Foreign 
Affairs, for they were in agreement regarding the objectives of 
Russian foreign policy and differed only with respect to the tactics 
that should be employed. Both were partially justified in their 
approaches; Kerensky possessed a sure instinct for domestic necessities 
and Miliukov had a fine awareness of international complexities. But 
the results of their duel satisfied the requirements of neither and 
promoted the destruction of the principles they were both trying to 
preserve.
Russia's relations with its allies and the postwar settlement 
lay at the heart of the controversy. Miliukov shared the rightist 
conviction that the revolution had resulted from dissatisfaction with 
the tsarist conduct of the war, and he was firmly persuaded that the 
success of a military offensive and the resulting revival of patriotism 
within the country would sweep away the half-formed socialist formula 
of peace without victory.90 Therefore, Miliukov was determined to 
maintain the incentives for a continuance of the struggle. The agree­
ments with the Allies should be affirmed vigorously, and, in
9C>Miliukov, Vospominaniia, II, 337.
particular, Russia's acquisition of Constantinople and the Straits 
should be defended. The new Minister of Foreign Affairs, dignified 
and cosmopolitan in manner, fit the traditional mold and would have 
been at ease in the foreign offices of any of the major European 
powers. He felt that national interests dictated an advantageous 
material settlement, for altered boundaries and the corresponding 
shift in material resources would represent the only significant change 
in the postwar relations among states. Miliukov also understood that 
the Allies had agreed to Russian territorial expansion only out of 
real or imagined necessity. Accordingly, they would be delighted to 
see a one-sided Russian repudiation of annexations so long as that 
action did not jeopardize their own annexationist plans.91
Kerensky, who had never been abroad, lacked Miliukov's expertise 
in foreign affairs and misunderstood the inflexibility and selfishness 
of the Western Allies with regard to their war objectives. 92 Still, 
he was as sensitive to Russian national interests as was Miliukov. 
Victory had its own logic, and Kerensky was privately determined that 
Russia would control European Turkey at the war's end.93 But he had 
a sincere aversion to Miliukov's methods. The revolution had to be 
taken into consideration, and demands for war trophies had to be 
replaced by an emphasis upon national defense. Since the revolution 
was expected to open a new era in the relations between peoples, it 
was necessary to abandon the imperialistic vocabulary of the old
9lMiliukov, Vospominaniia, II, 337*
92a . Kerenskii, "Orientatsiia na Rossiiu," Izdaleka. sbornik 
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regime. A new language, one that appealed simultaneously to 
revolutionary idealism and patriotism, had to be adopted before the 
government could be assured of sufficient support for the resumption 
of military operations.9^
The ultimate objective of Kerensky's intervention in foreign 
policy was successful prosecution of the war with unreserved popular 
backing, but his immediate aim was the avoidance of conflict with the 
Petrograd Soviet. Kerensky had not kept in close personal contact 
with the TsIK, for he wished to "stay on the boundary between the 
bourgeoisie and the Soviet democracy" in order to appear as the leading 
"exponent of the all-national character of the revolution."95 Never­
theless, he still realized that Miliukov's course of action would lead 
to a serious clash with that body. Hoping to forestall the Soviet's 
intervention, he embraced the principles of revolutionary defensism 
in order to settle the issue within the cabinet. Kerensky's campaign 
began on March 6 with a suggestion that Constantinople and the Straits 
be internationalized. A few days later, probably on March 10, he 
linked that proposal to a general revision of war aims. He reproached 
the Allies for cooperating with tsarism while pretending to wage a 
war of liberation, argued that full support of free Russia and its 
policies would redress that wrong, and claimed that the war could now 
be transformed into a legitimate struggle between the forces of
9̂ A. Kerenskii, "Znachitel'nyiia stroki," Izdaleka, 
pp. 2hh-2k5.
95l. 0. Tsereteli, Vospominaniia o Fevral'skoi revolirtsii.
2 vols. (Paris, 1963), I, 123-
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autocracy and those of f r e e d o m .96
Kerensky's timing was unfortunate. On March 7 the Petrograd 
Soviet, disturbed by his attitude concerning the Romanovs, created a 
Liaison Commission to exert direct pressure upon the government.97 
Plainly, the TsIK lacked full confidence in Kerensky and was prepared 
to broaden its demands and increase its rate of intervention. Proof 
of Kerensky's diminished influence came on March 14, for in an "Appeal 
to the PeoDles of the World," the Petrograd Soviet formulated its own 
stand on foreign policy. While the declaration was couched in 
defensist language, it called for a "decisive struggle against the 
acquisitive ambitions of the governments of all countries" and pro­
claimed opposition by "every means" to the "policy of conquest of its 
ruling classes. . . ."98 once the revolutionary democracy entered 
into the dispute over foreign policy, Kerensky's plans were ruined.
He had wished to attack Miliukov on his own grounds and for objectives 
of his own choosing, and really desired no more than concessions in 
terminology. Instead, trapped in a net of his own weaving, he became 
a reluctant accomplice in a drastic reorganization of the principles 
affecting nations.
Miliukov, intimidated by neither Kerensky nor the Petrograd 
Soviet, strenuously defended his conduct in a Rech* interview on 
March 23. Appealing to Wilsonian principles, the Foreign Minister 
argued that alterations in the southern European map, especially with
96comments of Kerensky cited by J. Dillon, Great Britain, 
Parliamentary Debates (Commons), XCII (1917), col. 301*
97Tsereteli, I, 122.
98lzvestiia, March 15, 1917, p. 1.
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regard to the reorganization of Austro-Hungary and the "liquidation 
of European Turkey," would guarantee future peace and should not be 
considered annexations. "Peace without annexations," he continued 
provocatively, was a German formula camouflaging itself as an inter­
nationalist one. Indulging in dubious self-righteousness, he further 
maintained that the Turks, even after four and a half centuries, were 
"strangers" in Constantinople and retained their hold there exclusively 
through force. Consequently, the transfer of the Straits to Russia 
would not contradict the principle of self-determination of nations. 
Miliukov concluded with a classic affirmation of Realpolitik: pos­
session of the Straits, he said, was the possession of the "doors to 
our home," and that protection "should belong to us."99
Miliukov's interview placed Kerensky in an intolerable position. 
The March 23 evening session of the Petrograd Soviet revealed growing 
suspicions that the Minister of Justice had defaulted on his socialist 
obligations, and in the heat of debate he even appeared in some danger 
of formal disavowment by his own party. When a personal appearance 
on the floor of the Soviet failed to dispel the gathering tension, 
Kerensky decided upon vigorous measures. On March 2k, he broke openly 
with Miliukov by declaring publicly that the Foreign Minister had 
expressed only his own personal views,101 and he pressed his attack in 
a cabinet meeting of the same day. Angrily waving the offending copy 
of Rech1 before the assembled ministers, Kerensky insisted that
99Rech1, March 23, 1917, p. 2.
10°Russkie Vedomosti, March 28, 1917, p. 5*
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Miliukov should not be allowed to "get away with" personal diplomacy, 
that only a decision of the ministerial council could be advanced as 
official policy, and that an immediate retraction of the Rech* inter­
view was imperative. For the moment, Miliukov's position was quite 
impregnable. The Foreign Minister correctly observed that he was only 
countering similar tactics pursued by Kerensky and that, to the best 
of his knowledge, his conduct of his ministry had the approval of the 
majority of the cabinet. In this case. Prince L'vov felt obliged to 
reprove Kerensky; he noted the lack of prior ministerial criticism of 
Miliukov's policies and formally endorsed his conduct
The Cadet leader's victory did not last. While Kerensky was 
forced into temporary silence, other socialists intensified their 
demands for a governmental repudiation of annexations and indemnities. 
The sharpest of the public responses to Miliukov's cabinet vindication 
was a March 25 editorial by Vladimir Zenzinov in Delo Naroda. In a 
signed article entitled "The War Aims of the Provisional Government," 
the rotund, energetic SR issued a direct challenge to Prince L'vov.
The cabinet, Zenzinov stated bluntly, had to decide between Miliukov's 
imperialism and revolutionary defensism. If it chose territorial 
expansion, the Soviet democracy could only reply with civil war.1^3 
The timing and content of the Delo Naroda editorial indicate collusion 
between the author and the Minister of Justice. An old friend of 
Kerensky's, Zenzinov had been moved to tears by his eloquence during
102Nabokov, p. 58*
103Pelo Naroda, March 25, 191?. P* 1*
the February Days and was firmly under his influence.104 Also, he was 
currently acting as an informal liaison between the socialist minister 
and the Petrograd Soviet;1°5 in that consultative role, he was surely 
aware of Kerensky’s needs and desires. While direct evidence is 
lacking, it. appears unlikely that Zenzinov would have launched such a 
strong attack upon the government without the approval of his mentor. 
But regardless of its source of inspiration, the March 25 editorial 
was effective in restoring Kerensky's position among his colleagues.
On March 2k, Prince L'vov had resisted demands by the Liaison Com­
mission for an official clarification of Miliukov's views, but by 
March 26 he was willing to expose the issue to a cabinet vote. On that
day, by a seven-to-four margin, Miliukov was ordered to draft a compro-
106mise document on war arms.
The tenacious Minister of Foreign Affairs managed to preserve a 
considerable part of his program. His March 27 statement, which was 
approved by the cabinet and the Liaison Commission, rejected "dominion 
over other nations, deprivation of their national possessions, or 
forcible occupation of foreign territories." But it avoided the slogan 
"without annexations or indemnities" and maintained that the "Russian 
people would not allow its Motherland to emerge from this struggle 
humiliated and undermined in its vital forces." Furthermore, the 
declaration upheld all obligations assumed toward Russia's allies.10?
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It was apparent that the document could be viewed in a number of ways; 
Miliukov certainly reserved the right to interpret it to his own 
satisfaction, and the Liaison Commission was willing to allow him to 
do so if that fact could be hidden from the rank and file delegates of 
the Petrograd S o v i e t . A s  a compromise solution, the March 27 
declaration had only one serious defect. Since it was directed solely 
to the citizens of Russia and was not a diplomatic note, it had no 
direct bearing upon official relations with Russia's allies.
Had viliukov conducted himself with circumspection after 
March 27, that deficiency would probably have been overlooked. The 
Petrograd Soviet expressed satisfaction with the compromise, and 
Kerensky's objections concerning terminology had been met. But the 
Foreign Minister continued to behave in a provocative manner. On 
April 1 he notified the Allies that Russian abandonment of the Straits 
would be an abandonment of previous agreements and mutual obligations, 
and attributed contrary assertions to "weakened and undermined" groups 
on the extreme Left.m He also pressed for an immediate assault on 
Constantinople, hoping in that way to present his political opponents 
with a fait accompli. But Miliukov's maneuver failed, for the 
Stavka refused to cooperate. The officers consulted argued that the
10%abokov, p. 59.
109Novoe Vremia, March 28, 1917, p. 5*
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assault would be politically ill-timed, that the major military threat 
lay on the German front, and that the army lacked the discipline and 
organization required for such a difficult operation.-*--̂  Kerensky was 
convinced that Miliukov's actions would be taken as evidence of bad 
faith on the part of the cabinet, and he responded by adopting an 
uncompromisingly internationalist posture. The Justice Minister 
unveiled his new line at a reception for British and French socialists 
at the Marinskii Palace on April 6, when he took sharp issue with the 
surprised Foreign Minister. While Miliukov spoke of increasing Russian 
military pressure upon the Central Powers, Kerensky attacked Allied war 
aims, repudiated annexations, and urged the embarrassed foreign envoys 
to emulate the example of Russian socialists.^-5 Thus, in a typically 
dramatic fashion, he publicly re-opened the cabinet split that 
ostensibly had been healed on March 27.
The 1etrograd Soviet moved into the widening breach. Its inter­
vention carried new dangers, for on April 8 Victor Chernov, the veteran 
SR leader, had arrived from exile in Great Britain. A dedicated inter­
nationalist, Chernov immediately attacked the tenor of Miliukov's 
foreirn communiques^^ and mobilized support for a diplomatic note 
based on the March 27 declaration.^? Kerensky was alarmed by his
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declining influence and decided to force the issue in the cabinet, 
thereby eliminating the need for outside intervention. The Justice 
Minister began his campaign on April 13; in violation of a ban imposed 
by Prince L'vov against individual revelations regarding cabinet 
activities, he announced the preparation of a note to the Allies 
affirming the socialist position. His plans backfired when Miliukov, 
who was not. even considering such a project,^ 9  indignantly demanded 
an official governmental denial. Kerensky tried to defend himself; 
he claimed that he had been misquoted, that he had really meant that 
a revision of war aims was being discussed, and that some concessions 
were necessary in any event.-^0 But the rights of the Foreign Minister 
had been clearly infringed upon, and a majority of the cabinet agreed 
that he was justified in his demand. On April 14 the Provisional 
Government, fully aware of the danger it was courting, officially 
announced that Kerensky's statement was inaccurate.-*-21
The governmental retraction provoked a violent response in the 
Petrograd Soviet, and its new spokesman, the Georgian Menshevik leader 
I. G. Tsereteli, made continued socialist support of the government 
dependent upon the direct transformation of the March 27 declaration 
into a diplomatic document.122 Kerensky's policy lay in shambles. His 
attempt to ward off Soviet intervention had produced the opposite
H^Nabokov, p. 58.
H9Miliukov, Vospominaniia, II, 352.
120Kerensky, Russia, p. 246.
121VVP, April 14, 1917, p. 1.
122xsereteli, I, 85-
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effect, and in the approaching conflict he had to stand with Miliukov 
to preserve some flexibility in the conduct of international affairs.
The embattled cabinet adopted a bold line; it agreed to 
Tsereteli's demands but attached a covering statement that contradicted 
large parts of the declaration. While Kerensky was uneasy regarding 
the tenor of some of the passages,-*-23 he endorsed the final draft, 
claiming that it "should have satisfied the most extreme critics of 
Miliukov's impe r i a l i s m . " - * - 2 ^  That assertion was insupportable. The 
covering statement made it apparent that the cabinet had no thought of 
peace short of total victory, that war aims would be revised only 
within the bounds "established by previous agreements," and that 
"guarantees and sanctions" meant ounitive measures against the Central 
Powers, with the accompanying territorial gains that these measures 
implied.r' The cabinet's challenge to the Soviet was emphasized by 
the peremptory fashion in which the matter was handled. The Soviet 
had not been informed that an explanation would accompany the diplo­
matic statement ,126 ancj was no  ̂notified of the contents of the 
covering note until that document had been dispatched.-*-2 7̂ The cabinet 
also aroused the Soviet's resentment by issuing the note on April 18, 
which coincided with the Russian observance of May Day, the inter­
national socialist holiday.128 The matter had come to a head in the
123Nabokov, p. 63.
12%erensky, Catastrophe, p. 135•
125Chugaev, p. 725- 
126Tsereteli, I, 86.
127chugaev, p. 727.
12-8j2vestiia, April 21, 1917, p. 1.
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worst way possible: as open defiance of the Petrograd Soviet by the 
government.
If the now unified cabinet had had to contend solely with the 
Soviet leadership (which had been remarkably sympathetic in the past), 
it probably would have prevailed. But the TsIK was not the Soviet 
democracy, and the immediate result was a serious outbreak of violence. 
The streets of Petrograd filled with protesting soldiers and workers, 
and some military units even considered direct assaults against the 
government.129 a conciliatory stance by the TsIK and the cabinet eased 
the situation. Both leadership centers appealed for sufficient time 
to work out further compromises,130 and Kerensky persuaded the 
commander of the Petrograd garrison, General Lavr Kornilov, to refrain 
from forcibly dispersing the crowds.131 On April 20 and April 21, in 
a series of extended meetings, the ministerial council, the TsIK, and 
the Temporary Committee of the State Duma (resurrected to buttress the 
position of the government) discussed ways to appease the unruly 
population.132 a really workable solution to the dispute over foreign 
policy could wait. Of greater importance was the diminution of popular 
passions and a restoration of confidence in the present leadership.133
129v. Rakhmetov, ed., "Aprel'skie dni 1917 goda v Petrograde,"
KA, XXXIII (1929), 78-80.
130Chernov, p. 368.
13lE. Varneck and H. Fisher, The Testimony of Admiral Kolchak 
and Other Siberian Materials (Stanford, 1935), p.~S5»
132Nabokov, p. 62.
133Tsereteli, I, 87 •
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Kerensky took little part in the proceedings and was absent much of 
the time. ̂ 4  Since his ventures into foreign affairs had proved 
uniformly disastrous, the government position was defended mainly by 
Prince L'vov and N. V. Nekrasov.135
While the resulting compromise ended the "April Days," it was a 
clearly inadequate solution. The government agreed, over Miliukov's 
strenuous protests, to release a suitable interpretation of the 
April 18 note to the internal press and to forward it as a non-diplo- 
matic item to the Allies.-*-36 The explanation, published on April 22, 
represented a Soviet victory. "Guarantees and sanctions," the 
sensitive passage of the April 18 statement, was interpreted as arms 
limitations and the formation of international tribunals, and "decisive 
victory" as the creation of a stable international order based on 
national self-determination.137 Miliukov immediately claimed, with 
technical accuracy, that nothing had been officially conceded.^38 But 
it was obvious that the April 21 agreement had been an interim measure 
passed to pacify the masses, that Miliukov, defeated in his own 
ministry, was in an untenable position, and that the issue could be 
resolved safely only when a more flexible and less controversial person 
assumed direction of foreign affairs.
!3**v. Stankevich, Vospominaniia, 1914-1919 (Berlin, 1920), p. 115*
135'1'sereteli, I, 105.
136Nabokov, p. 64.
137lzvestiia. April 22, 1917, p. 3*
138Sir George Buchanan, My Mission to Russia and Other Diplomatic 
Memories, 2 vols. (New York, 1923), II, 124.
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On April 26, Kerensky publicly opened the question of govern­
mental reconstruction and linked political stabilization to the 
inclusion within the cabinet of representatives from the TsIK. In an 
open letter to Delo Naroda. he declared that the situation had changed 
drastically since he had first entered the government. The "toiling 
democracy," initially disorganized, was now so strong that it was 
obliged to participate actively in the life of the state. A coalition 
including the leaders of the principal liberal and socialist parties, 
he continued, was imperative. The Provisional Government lacked the 
authority to govern, and while he was willing to remain at his post "to 
the end," his position was "perhaps too difficult to bear alone."139 
Suspicions that Kerensky was again playing a lone hand were soon 
dispelled; on April 27 Prince L'vov, in the name of the ministerial 
council, formally requested that the TsIK consider the question of 
coalition.While the Soviet debated the issue, Kerensky continued 
his campaign within the cabinet. Since concessions would have to be 
made before the Soviet would agree to participation in the government, 
he suggested that foreign policy be conducted by a ministerial com­
mission and demanded, on the threat of resignation, that Miliukov be 
transferred to the Ministry of Education.1^1
The TsIK split sharply over the question of coalition. The 
populist parties, less bound than the Social Democrats to a Marxist 
interpretation of political development, supported the proposal to
139pelo Naroda. April 26, 1917, p* 3* 
l^Olzvestiia, April 28, 1917, p. 2. 
l^lKerensky, Catastrophe, p. 137*
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allow their representatives into the cabinet, but the Mensheviks and 
Bolsheviks opposed it,1^2 and enforced their will on April 29 by a 
close twenty-three to twenty-two vote.1^3 Events forced the TsIK to 
reconsider its position. In the first place, the Soviet's opposition 
was eroded by continued popular pressure for coalition;!^ by April 30, 
those sentiments reached such a pitch that they were "very difficult 
to resist."1^5 But the decisive point occurred on May 1, when 
Alexander Guchkov resigned on the grounds that he was unable to fulfill 
his obligations as Minister of War.1^6 A renewed request for 
coalition by Prince L'vov^? followed by a personal appearance by 
Kerensky on the floor of the Soviet^S provided the opportunity for a 
socialistic volte face. On May 2, by a decisive forty-four to nine 
margin, the TsIK agreed to allow socialistic participation in the
government.1^9
The Soviet's reversal appeared to be a vindication of Kerensky's
long-held policies. He had finally realized the "union and cooperation
of all living, creative forces of the country," and believed that 
coalition ended the destructive Soviet formula of conditional support
-̂ Delo Naroda, April 26, 1917, p. 1.
1^3Russkie Vedomosti. April 30, 1917, p- 5* 
l̂ Izvestiia, April 29, 19"17, p. 3*
1^5Tsereteli, I, 135-
l^Russkie Vedomosti, May 2, 1917, p. 5»
147VVP, May 2, 1917, p. 1. 
148Kerensky, Russia, p. 248.
1^9rsereteli, I, 136.
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of the Provisional Government.150 The TsIK seemed to agree. While 
it took the precaution of binding prospective socialist ministers to 
their parties' will,151 its newspaper, Izvestiia, proclaimed that "so 
long as our comrades are in the government, it is our government."152
The resulting cabinet possessed greater authority than its 
predecessor, but it was compromised by the problems that had called it 
forth. The Allies had interpreted Miliukov's forced resignation on 
May 2 as a renunciation of Constantinople and the Straits;153 the new 
cabinet could not contradict that view publicly, but most of its 
members were firmly committed to preserving Russia's anticipated war 
prizes.15^ That determination lured the government into a major 
military offensive in its efforts to regain the respect and consider­
ation necessary for diplomatic concessions,155 and the results were 
shattering military defeat, the July uprising, and the disintegration 
of the cabinet. Of course, no cabinet could have circumvented the war 
and its related problems. But the First Coalition's difficulties were 
vastly increased by the legacy of Miliukov's doctrinaire inflexibility 
and Kerensky's badly-handled intervention in foreign affairs.
150Rerensky Catastrophe, p. 141.
151lzvestiia, May 6, 1917, p. 4.
152Izvestiia, May 6, 1917, p. 3-
153a . Kerensky, The Crucifixion of Liberty, trans. G. Kerensky 
(London, 1934), p. 304.
l54Kerensky, Catastrophe. p. 130.
155Miliukov, Vospominaniia, II, 378.
CHAPTER IV
THE COALITION EXPERIMENT
The First Coalition, formed on May 5. ended the governmental 
instability that had lasted since mid-April and opened a new phase of 
the revolution. Kerensky had often insisted that effective rule was 
impossible without the participation of those who previously had been 
"objects rather than subjects" of power,! and his prediction had been 
fulfilled. As the embattled cabinet admitted on April 26, the absence 
of direct socialistic representation had so fostered internal disinte­
gration that the country was on the verge of civil war.^ The April 
disorders had been almost as disturbing to the members of the TsIK as 
to the liberals, for they had not previously realized the full extent 
of their strength. They had wished only to bend the government to 
their will, and had had no desire actually to destroy it. But that 
was no consolation, for the Soviet's opposition to Miliukov's foreign 
policy had shattered the authority of the cabinet and had fostered the 
spread of anarchy. Since the moderate socialists in the Soviet were 
unwilling to adopt the Leninist position of uncompromising hostility
!a . F. Kerenskii, "Politika Vremennogo Pravitel'stva," SZ, L 
(1932), 419.
2vvp, April 26, 1917, p. 1.
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to the middle classes,3 they felt compelled to retrieve the situation 
through a broadening of the governmental base.**
While a cabinet able to provide vigorous national leadership 
required a fusion of liberals and socialists,5 both groups undertook 
serious risks in adopting that approach. Under the previous regime, 
th” Soviet leaders had enjoyed the easy popularity stemming from an 
adversary position. In sharing formal responsibility for state 
actions, they were exposed to the same kinds of criticism that they 
previously had engaged in. The moderate majority of the TsIK agreed 
to coalition in the dubious expectation that they could successfully 
resist pressure from the extreme Left and exercise a continuing control 
over the masses.^ Were they to fail, as Kerensky had during the April 
crisis, the resources of moderation would be exhausted. The Cadets, 
who represented the viable political Right, were also placed in a 
difficult position. They freely acknowledged their current helpless­
ness in the face of popular disenchantment and recognized that the 
political situation could only be alleviated through socialistic repre­
sentation in the cabinet.7 But they resented the ouster of their party 
leader, Miliukov,3 and were concerned that the socialist ministers,
3Pravda, April 7, 1917, p. 1-
^Izvestiia, May 6, 1917, p. 4.
5a . F. Kerenskii, "Korotkaia pamiat', " Izdaleka. sbomik statei 
(Paris, 1922), p. 166.
^Izvestiia, May 6, 1917, p- 3*
?Russkie Vedomosti, May 6, 1917, p* 3*
%. Nabokov, "Vremennoe Pravitel1stvo," ARR, I, (1922), 6k.
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answerable to their party organizations, would not possess sufficient 
independence to deal effectively with controversial issues on a cabinet 
level.9 They also feared that the socialists would use their liberal 
associates as a front behind which to pursue purely partisan 
policies.
Demonstrating his usual impatience with party concerns, Kerensky 
recalled that negotiations were complicated by a formidable array of 
"theoretical formulae and dead political blueprints" advanced by both 
the Right and the Left.H He should have expected that response.
Liberals were thrown on the defensive and afraid that defeat would be 
transformed into an ideological rout, and socialists were exposed to 
possible attacks from their own volatile supporters. Under those 
conditions, it was only to be expected that difficult and protracted 
debates would ensue. As the editors of Russkie Vedomosti observed, an 
experiment was being introduced that "could be attempted effectively 
only once."12
The Minister of Justice succeeded in reducing the impact of those 
"deadly class antagonisms."13 His open letter in Delo Naroda had been
9p. Miliukov, Vospominaniia. 1859-1917, 2 vols. (New York, 1955),
II, 374.
lOSee the report of the April 27 meeting of the Fourth State 
Duma cited in Izvestiia, April 29, 1917, p. 3*
llA. Kerensky, The Catastrophe; Kerensky8s Own Story of the 
Russian Revolution (New York, 1927), p. 141.
12Russkie Vedomosti, May 6, 1917, p. 3*
l3Kerenskii, "Politika," p. 419.
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a cogent and timely appeal for coalition,!^ and his successful 
authoring of a council resolution to transfer Miliukov to the Ministry 
of Education, which provoked the Foreign Minister’s May 2 resignation, 
had been an indispensable preliminary to socialist cooperation.15 
Kerensky's conciliatory efforts continued throughout the period of the 
governmental crisis. From May 2 to May 5, he acted as a vital link 
between the cabinet, the TsIK, a special delegation of the TsIK created 
to negotiate with the cabinet,16 the Stavka, and the Cadet Central 
Committee, all of whom participated in various stages of the coalition 
discussions.
While the negotiations were acrimonious and extended, they took 
an unexpected turn that greatly strengthened Kerensky’s position. 
Ironically, that situation arose from a tactical decision on the part 
of the Cadets, the very group that had come to view Kerensky with grave 
suspicion.Under adversity, the Cadet Central Committee abandoned 
its February position of social reconciliation and reverted to the 
tested parliamentary tactics of a minority party. In a partial 
softening of Miliukov’s original program, they decided to insist on 
only two matters of principle: a vigorous prosecution of the war and a
l̂ Delo Naroda. April 26, 1917, p. 3«
15Miliukov, Vospominaniia. II, 3^9 •
l6The special delegation of the TsIK consisted of Chkheidze, 
Tsereteli, B. 0. Bogdanov, F. I. Dan, V. Stankevich, I. M. Bramson, 
Chernov, L. B. Kamenev, Iu. Iurenev, Sukhanov, Sokolovskii, A. V. 
Peshekhovov, and N. D. Avksent'ev. See Izvestiia. May 3. 1917* 
p. 3.
17v. Stankevich, Vospominaniia. 1914-1919 (Berlin, 1920), p. 129.
lBMiliukov, Vospominaniia, II, 371*
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firm stand against internal disorganization.19 The rest of the 
governmental platform was considered temporarily expendable, counters 
to be bartered for a majority of non-socialist posts within the 
cabinet.20 Thus, they adopted the ancient device of reculer pour 
mieux sauter, for they relied upon future cabinet maneuvers to regain 
the ground lost by unavoidable verbal concessions to socialist 
sentiments.
While the new Cadet policy was certainly venturesome, it rested 
upon several dubious assumptions: that domestic stabilization would 
proceed to the point that orthodox parliamentary manipulations could 
succeed; that the period of non-party politics was over, so that 
ministerial votes would consistently split along ideological lines; 
and that an active resumption of the war would result in a popular 
shift to the Right, with a subsequent relaxation of socialist pressure 
upon the government.2-'- In short, the Cadets took a calculated risk. 
They assumed that socialist participation in the new ministry would 
allow a normalization of the political process and that their greater 
parliamentary skills would assure the protection of their essential
19Russkie Vedomosti. May 6, 1917, p» 3*
20i. g . Tsereteli, Vospominaniia o Fevralfskoi revoliutsii.
2 vols. (Paris, 1963), I, 15^• The Cadets gained both points. The new 
platform rejected annexations and called for a revision of war aims but 
pledged to continue the war and to provide strong rule. Military power 
was to be increased while the army was democratized, and the intro­
duction of self-government into the provinces would be speeded up.
Also, vital industries would be nationalized, preparations for land 
reform would begin, and income would be redistributed. Finally, the 
government pledged to convoke the Constituent Assembly as quickly as 
possible. The full text is cited in VVP, May 6, 1917, p. 1.
2lExamples of those sentiments can be found in Rech*, May 5,
1917, p. 3; Russkie Vedomosti, May 6, 1917, p. 3; and Izvestiia.
May 11, 1917, p. 2.
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interests.
In retrospect, of course, it is obvious that Miliukov's followers 
erred on almost every point. But their pivotal mistake, the one that 
determined the complexion of the new government and nullified their 
strategy from the outset, was the belief that non-partisan politics 
were in fact a thing of the past. They had. assumed that a serious con­
test for cabinet supremacy would take place, and to counter that 
imagined danger they had insisted that the Cadets occupy at least as 
many ministerial positions as the socialists.22 That safeguard, 
designed to produce a liberal majority within the cabinet, became a 
snare. The TsIK, concerned primarily with pacifying its followers, 
stressed the importance of the projected platform but was markedly 
reluctant to invest its members with governmental portfolios.23 The 
surfeit of positions that suddenly appeared gave Kerensky unexpected 
room for anti-party manipulations and allowed a limited revival of his 
nadpartiinost' line.
As a result, the First Coalition was practically tailored to 
Kerensky's desires and was a testament to his skill in exploiting 
opportunities. He had insisted upon an impressive socialist presence 
and Victor Chernov, I. G. Tsereteli, and M. I. Skobelev, all 
influential members of the TsIK, agreed to enter. Admittedly, his new 
colleagues showed little enthusiasm for their posts. Tsereteli had 
resisted Kerensky's first approaches and became Minister of Post and
22stankevich, p. 131.
23W. S. Woytinsky, Stormy Passage; a Personal History Through 
Two Russian Revolutions to Democracy and Freedom, 1905-19&Q (New York, 
1961), p. Voitinskii was a Left member of the TsIK.
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Telegraph only after receiving assurances that he would be exempted 
from administrative duties.24 Chernov bitterly protested his transfer 
from the Soviet, made his entrance into the cabinet dependent upon 
Tsereteli's,25 and finally accepted the sensitive office of Minister 
of Agriculture with the understanding that Kerensky's support would 
assure the success of a land policy based on SR principles.^
Skobelev also raised difficulties; he made a strong attempt to acquire 
control over naval affairs27 and was persuaded to enter the ministry 
of labor only after the intervention of the Stavka and the cabinet.^8 
But those dissatisfactions could be ignored, for the new ministers had 
been opposed to the general principle of coalition and they would 
naturally resent the specific conditions of their participation. The 
important point was that they assured a government of popular
confidence.29
Once that was accomplished the portfolio Kerensky particularly 
desired, that of War and Navy,30 acquired great importance. The 
government was totally committed to an offensive, for it felt that
24see Tsereteli's explanations before a plenary session of the 
Petrograd Soviet, cited in Izvestiia, May 9, 1917, p. 5«
25v. Chernov, Rozhdenie revoliutsionnoi Rossii (Paris, 193*0♦ 
p. 373.




29a. Kerenskii, "Natsional'nymi kylisami," Izdaleka. p. 96. 
30chemov, Rozhdenie, p. 373*
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success in the field would protect the revolution from German inter­
ference and so restore domestic confidence that violent political 
oscillation would be eliminated.31 As the coalition was predicated 
upon a vigorous military effort, much would have to be subordinated 
to the needs of the army and the wishes of the Minister of War. Since 
Alexander Guchkov resigned on May 1 under unusual conditions, with the 
proper approach the ministry of war was virtually in Kerensky's hands.
Guchkov's letter of resignation, which had been given wide 
currency in the press, made it clear that a conservative minister 
could not hope to reverse the debilitating effects of Order Number 
One.32 As the Cadets were excluded on that basis, and as the Stavka 
was completely opposed to an unabashedly leftist candidate,33 Kerensky 
came under active consideration. The military leadership did advance 
an alternative name: that of P. I. Pal'chinskii, an efficient 
administrator and a former member of the M;ilitary Commission of the 
State Duma. But Kerensky countered Pal'chinskii's candidacy by 
seeking the approval of the cabinet and the TsIK for himself, and the 
two groups responded so vigorously that his appointment was virtually 
a "directed governmental decision."34 A brief conversation between 
Prince L'vov and General M. V. Alekseev, the Supreme Commander and the 
acknowledged spokesman of the Stavka, settled the issue. Prince L'vov
31see Kerensky's comments cited in Izvestiia, April 14, 1917,
p. 2.
32Russkie Vedomosti. May 2, 1917, p. 5*
33Stankevich, p. 131.
34see the excellent analysis in Birzhevye Vedomosti, May 3 ,
1917, p. 4.
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reminded the aged general of Kerensky's prior support of the army and 
the war, his still considerable influence with the populace and the 
Soviet, and his potential to moderate the disruptive effects of 
military democratization. When the Stavka yielded to the Minister- 
President's arguments, Kerensky's appointment was formalized.35
Kerensky's acquisition of the ministry of war allowed continuity, 
on an efficient basis, with Guchkov's policies, and was thus an 
indirect assault on the verdict of the April Days. His success in 
placing M. I. Tereshchenko, the urbane former finance minister, into 
the ministry of foreign affairs strengthened that attack by permitting 
a sophisticated continuation of Miliukov's policies. Even more than 
in Kerensky's case, Tereshchenko's nomination involved a timely recog­
nition of opportunity. Prior to the May 2 negotiations, Victor Chernov 
had been considered Miliukov's most likely successor. He had led the 
Soviet's resistance to governmental foreign policy, and most socialists 
thought that as foreign minister he could best protect their 
interests.36 But the Cadets opposed his candidacy for that very 
reason, and Kerensky suggested that Tereshchenko fill the disputed 
position37 when they threatened to boycott the cabinet unless Chernov 
occupied another post.38 While the Ukrainian sugar producer's entry 
was due more to general exhaustion by the various disputants than to
35a. Kerenskii, "Iz vospominanii," SZ, XXXVII (1928), 296.
36stankevich, p. 131.
37Tsereteli, I, 159*
38d . Francis, Russia from the American Embassy: April 1916. 
November 1918 (New York, 1921)’, p. 119.
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his actual qualifications,39 he completely satisfied Kerensky's 
requirements. Tereshchenko's imperialist leanings were disguised by 
an idealistic p o s t u r e h e  was fluent in French and familiar with 
international a f f a i r s a n d  he had, as of yet, acquired no dangerous 
political enemies.*4-2 Furthermore, the new Foreign Minister was a firm 
advocate of interclass cooperation and had already demonstrated his 
affinity with Kerensky in a series of clashes with Miliukov.^3 His 
presence in the cabinet significantly increased Kerensky's ability to 
influence governmental policy.*4̂
The TsIK's reluctance to become entangled in governmental admin­
istration provided Kerensky with further opportunities to determine 
the political complexion of the First Coalition. A dearth of prominent 
candidates for socialist-orientated posts allowed him to sponsor 
successfully the appointments of two personal supporters: A. V. 
Peshekhonov, a Popular Socialist, as Minister of Food,^5 and a former 
deputy, P. N. Pereverzev, a Right SR, as Minister of Justice.^ As 
these men were only minor political figures, their contributions to
39stankevich, p. 132.
*<-0p. Milioukov, Ch. Seignobos, and L. Eisenmann, Histoire de 




*4'3Miliukov, Vospominaniia, II, 329; Shidlovskii, II, 133*
^Kerenskii, "Iz vospominanii," p. 305*
*>-5Stankevich, p. 130.
^6a . Dem'ianov, "Moia sluzhba pri Vremennom Pravitel'stve,"
ARR, IV (1922), 78.
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the popularity of the new regime were marginal. Their real signifi­
cance lay in the resultant expansion of Kerensky's influence in the 
ministerial Left.
Kerensky also established a solid foothold on the Right. Of the 
five Cadets in the ministerial council, only three, A. A. Manuilov, the 
Minister of Education, A. I. Shingarev, the Minister of Finance, and 
D. I. Shakhovskii, the Minister of Welfare, were reliable party 
agents.^? A. I. Konovalov, the Minister of Trade and Industry, and 
N. V. Nekrasov, the Minister of Transport, had broken with Miliukov and 
defended Kerensky in the first government.^8 The Minister of War also 
retained the core of his support from the previous regime. As V. N. 
L'vov, I. V. Godnev, and Prince G. E. L'vov were in possession of their 
former seats,^9 Kerensky was in a position to do considerably more than 
determine the direction of foreign policy and the conduct of the war.
He controlled a powerful voting bloc theoretically able to dominate
the cabinet.50
While Kerensky held tangible advantages— concrete popular backing 
in the form of socialist ministers, an institutionally powerful post, 
a picked successor to his major rival, and imposing support within the 
cabinet— his nadpartiinost' program faced new obstacles. The Cadet 
return to political orthodoxy presented the primary difficulty. It
^?Miliukov, Vospominaniia, II, 380.
48yospominaniia, II, 329-330.
49VVP, May 6, 1917, p. 1.
50Kerensky had the potential virtually to engulf the ministerial 
Left, for Tsereteli and Skobelev sided with him with great consistency. 
See Miliukov, Vospominaniia, II, 374; P. Sorokin, Leaves from a Russian 
Diary (New York, 1924), p. 89.
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had been the cause of Kerensky's opportunities from May 2 to May 5, 
but it revived a situation with which he had never had success. His 
political ascendency began only after the revolution weakened the 
strength of traditional party precepts, and their full resurrection 
threatened him with a reversion to his Duma ineffectiveness.
Kerensky's creation of an intermediate bloc within the cabinet 
accelerated that dangerous development, for it increased the intensity 
of the Cadet response and jeopardized the support of Nekrasov and 
Konovalov. The Left Cadets' previous differences with Miliukov had 
been more over methods than aims; finding their party in an unfavorable
position, they were increasingly drawn to the minority devices of
obstructionism, protest, and resignation.51 Since Kerensky's approach 
to provisional rule was based upon the softening of class antagonisms, 
his effectiveness diminished as class and party lines hardened.
Finally, the presence of Tsereteli and Chernov in the cabinet 
significantly reduced Kerensky's tactical elasticity. At a stroke, 
the War Minister was deprived of his most dramatic argument: the claim 
that he alone in the cabinet represented the democratic masses, that 
defiance of his will was denial of the revolution.52 While Kerensky 
could still advance a modified version of that claim, it did not carry 
the same force and he could not use it with the imaginative freedom
that he had in the past.
5lAfter initial vacillation, Nekrasov decided to remain with 
Kerensky. Konovalov chose a different course; on May 20, he resigned 
from the government in protest of a cabinet decision to permit worker 
control over factory policy. He was replaced by V. A. Stepanov, a 
fellow Cadet. See VVP, May 21, 1917, p. 2.
52Nabokov, p. 40.
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Thus, the state of the cabinet and of Kerensky's position within 
it were altered. The First Coalition was more representative than its 
predecessor, and was therefore more powerful and better able to command 
the obedience of the population. At the same time, it lacked its 
previous homogeneity and was exposed to grave internal conflict. Dual 
power had not been abolished; it had been transferred from public view 
to the cabinet, where it assumed more subtle, but sharper, forms. The 
Cadet denial of the spirit of coalition and the influx of new socialist 
ministers also caused a serious erosion of Kerensky's moral authority. 
While he did not fully understand the implications of those two related 
events,53 Kerensky still surrendered unique assets in his quest for 
enhanced power. His institutional advantages were impressive, but they 
could endure only as long as the coalition itself.
Because of its increased obligations, the longevity of the new 
government was problematical. Its ability to act decisively in natters 
of war, foreign policy, and internal reconstruction were hampered by 
the disastrous legacy of the April Days, and the magnitude of its tasks 
promised to introduce stresses that could easily shatter it from 
within. Had the cabinet been able to choose a policy of guarded re­
trenchment and compromise rather than one of headlong retrieval, its 
history would perhaps have been different. In that special sense, and 
in a way that he did not intend, Chernov was correct in observing that 
the new regime was "trying to remedy a mistake of the past rather than 
solving the problems of the present and the future."5^ In pursuit of
53Tsereteli, I, 121.
5^Chernov claimed that the time for class harmony had vanished 
and the period of class struggle was at hand. Chernov, Rozhdenie, p.
37 .̂
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that goal, especially with regard to the war, the government expended 
its strength in defiance of the increased risks of failure.
Kerensky had sought command of the war ministry because the war 
was the major problem facing the country, but he was aware of his own 
shortcomings and of the difficulties that lay ahead. He was a lawyer, 
not an expert in military affairs, and he felt the lack of a formal 
military training.55 But his tours with Guchkov had revealed the 
serious extent to which demoralization within the army had progressed, 
and that destructive process had to be reversed.56 Furthermore, only 
a figure of revolutionary statue could attempt the military recon­
struction necessary to an offensive.57 While the new War Minister 
confronted a host of specific problems, most of them resolved them­
selves into one central difficulty: how best to re-establish discipline 
within the revolutionary climate fostered by Order Number One.
That declaration, issued unilaterally by the Petrograd Soviet on 
March 1,58 threw the relationships between upper and lower ranks into 
a state of great confusion. Each of its major articles (subordination 
of the military command to the Soviet in political matters, the 
formation of military committees through election from the lower ranks, 
the relaxation of off-duty discipline, and control of weapons by the 
elected battalion committees)59 contributed severely to military
55VVP, May 11, 1917, p. 3-
56see Kerensky's speech in VVP, April 30, 1917, p. 2.
57izvestiia, May 5, 1917, p. 2.
58m. V. Rodzianko, "Gosudarstvennaia Duma i Fevral'skaia 1917 
goda revoliutsiia," ARR, VI (1922), ?k.
59izvestiia, March 2, 1917, p. 1.
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disorganization throughout the armed forces.60 Alexander Guchkov, 
Kerensky's predecessor in the war ministry, had made a sincere effort 
to strike an effective balance between the rival needs of discipline 
and democratization. On March 5, he abolished the use by enlisted men 
of honorifics in military address and accepted the existence of 
soldier's committees as a fait accompli.61 On the following day, he 
announced the creation of a special commission, headed by General A. A. 
Polivanov but composed equally of military personnel and Soviet dele­
gates, charged with defining the mutual relations of officers and 
m e n . 62 Until the latter part of April, Guchkov believed that a satis­
factory compromise was possible. Just prior to his resignation, in a 
proclamation approving the principle of elected military courts, he 
maintained that respect of authority could coexist with individual 
freedom.63
Guchkov's inability to moderate the Soviet-backed proposals 
of the Polivanov Commission finally caused him to re-evaluate his 
position. Unable to accept the abolition of saluting, corporal punish­
ment, and the powers of commanders to appoint and dismiss o f ficers,64 
he resigned in protest. While the War Minister's May 1 resignation 
was symptomatic of the malaise affecting the entire government, he 
still managed to transform it into an asset for his successor. Guchkov
60y. 1. Nevskii, "Verkhovnoe komandovanie v pervye dni 
revoliutsii," KA, V (1924), 228.
olvVP, March 7, 1917, p. 1.
62yyp, March 8, 1917, p. 1.
63VVP, April 20, 1917, p. 2.
64WP, May 3, 1917, p. 1.
126
achieved that result by refusing to coordinate his retirement with 
Miliukov's and by insisting that his action was provoked by conditions 
which he, personally, had been unable to alter.65 He thus separated 
military issues from the current crisis over foreign policy, dramatized 
the difficult plight of the armed forces, and implied that a more 
popular minister could prevail where he had been defeated.
Kerensky effectively exploited Guchkov1s resignation. When its 
impact was added to his still considerable status as a guardian of the 
revolution and the government's renewed dedication to a strong military 
effort, he had little difficulty in revising the Polivanov recom­
mendations . As a result the new act, Order Number Eight (also known 
as the Declaration of Soldiers' Rights), contained two vital clauses 
that Guchkov had fought vainly to obtain. It now provided for the use 
of force to inspire obedience under combat conditions, and it allowed 
commanders exclusive power in the appointment and temporary suspension
of o f f i c e r s . 66 Kerensky's modifications were not entirely unopposed;
Pravda launched a blistering attack upon them,67 and the All-Russian 
Congress of Soviets expressed concern over the powers invested in the 
Officer C o r p s . 68 But the dominant socialist institution, the TsIK, 
offered adequate support for Kerensky's actions and the reforms went
65VVP, May 2, 1917, p. 1. Miliukov considered Guchkov's act to 
be a betrayal of liberal and nationalistic interests. See Miliukov, 
Vospominaniia, II, 369.
66yypt May 14, 1917, p. 1. Order Number Eight effectively ended 
the work of the Polivanov Commission, but Kerensky did not feel free to 
disband it until July 14. See VVP, July 28, 1917, p. 2.
67izvestiia, May 26, 1917, P» 2.
68izvestiia, June 29, 1917, p. 5-
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into effect without serious difficulty.6 9
Order Number Eight strengthened discipline among the lower 
military grades, but it did not provide adequate control over the army 
command. Kerensky approached that problem in a direct and brusque 
manner. Prior to his May 11 publication of Order Number Eight,
Kerensky announced that he required aid in "carrying the burden of the 
Fatherland." Accordingly, no resignations would be accepted from the 
high command if such actions were designed to avoid responsibility or 
to protest against democratic reform in the army.70 Evidently, he 
anticipated a rash of resignations in response to Guchkov's, and he 
was determined to prevent depletion of the Officer Corps.
The Minister of War was quickly provided with the opportunity to 
demonstrate his sincerity. On May 15 General V. I. Romeiko-Gurko, the 
Commander-in-Chief of the Western front, declared that he could not 
tolerate the contents of Order Number Eight, denied all moral respon­
sibility for the satisfactory performance of his duties, and indicated 
an intention to return to private life. Kerensky refused to accept 
his resignation, demoted him to the rank of divisional commander, and 
made it clear that only Gurko's previous record prevented his being 
reduced to the lowest ranks.71 Kerensky's treatment of the recal­
citrant general had been harsh. But at the same time, it had been an 
indication to the Officer Corps that the major upheavals of the 
Guchkov ministry (during which over a hundred generals had been
69lzvestiia, May 14, 1917, p. 2.
70VVP, May 6, 1917, p. 2.
71VVP, May 27, 1917, p. 1.
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retired) were ended.72 Kerensky emphasized that point with great 
intensity. Officers, he maintained, could look forward to a period 
of personal security and military stabilization. The "process of 
revolutionizing the country and the army" had been completed, and 
"creative work" could begin.73
As much as Kerensky wished to retain the confidence of the army 
leadership, he was forced to accept some changes in command. General 
L. G. Kornilov, the Commander of the Petrograd Military District, had 
resigned immediately before Guchkov7^ and was immune from Kerensky1s 
injunction. Since Kornilov's relations with the Petrograd garrison 
were strained in any case, Kerensky felt it best to transfer him to 
the front75 and to tolerate his replacement by General P. A. Polovtsev, 
a former member of the Duma Military Commission.76 The War Minister 
also decided to replace General M. V. Alekseev, the Supreme Commander, 
with General A. A. Brusilov, the former Commander of the Southwestern 
(Galician) front. While widely respected by the Officer Corps,77
72yyp. April 5, 1917, p. 2; Chernov, Rozhdenie. pp. 392-393*
73A. I. Denikine, La decomposition de l'armee et du pouvoir, 
Fevrier-Septembre, 1917 (Paris, 1921), p. 287. Kerensky's attitude 
regarding promotions from the ranks is a good illustration of his 
desire to placate the Officer Corps. Apparently, the only step he 
took in that direction was an order on May 6 that authorized the 
elevation of non-commissioned officers who lacked scholastic quali­
fications to the rank of sub-lieutenant upon the recommendation of 
their commanding officer. VVP, May 7, 1917, p. 2.
7̂ -Birzhevye Vedomosti, April 30, 1917, p. 5*
75VVP, May 9, 1917, p. 3*
76Birzhevye Vedomosti, April 30, 1917, p. 5*
77VVP, May 24, 1917, p. 5*
Alekseev had been a continual trial to Guchkov,78 sought every oppor­
tunity to decry the democratic reforms that had taken place,79 and 
continually advocated the postponement of offensive activities.80 
Dismissal of the conservative general had not been completely within 
Kerensky's power, for it required cabinet approval. That was provided
on May 7, however, after Alekseev's public declaration that a peace
0*1without annexations or indemnities was impossible.OJ- In many respects, 
Brusilov was an excellent choice. Since he had a deserved reputation 
as a fighting general, his appointment was expected to have a catalytic 
effect upon army morale.82 Also, he had often opposed the ideological 
rigidity of the traditional army leadership, understood the necessity 
of democratic reforms, and expresses a willingness to second Kerensky's 
efforts.The War Minister recognized the mark of personal ambition 
in Brusilov's political resiliency but still felt that he would be a 
reliable associate. The new Supreme Commander, he claimed, was a 
"strong man" able to "create, to act, and to take risks."8^
While Kerensky had been at pains to strike a good working 
relationship with the traditional military leadership, he chose to rely 
primarily upon officers of a liberal cast. Accordingly, he surrounded
78Nevskii, p. 238.
79"Fevral'skie revoliutsii 1917 goda," KA, XXL (1927), 69.
80m . Pokrovskii, "Stavka i ministerstvo inostrannykh del," KA,
XXX (1928), 29.
81WP, May 11, 1917, p. k.
82Rech«, May 2k, 1917, p. 2.
83Denikine, p. 256.
8^Kerensky, Catastrophe, p. 198.
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himself with persons of his own political persuasion.85 General 
B. S. Romanovskii, one of the youngest generals in the army and a 
partisan of Kerensky, was appointed Chief of Staff within the Stavka, 
where he exercised considerable control over appointments.®® Lieu­
tenant General A. A. Manikovskii, Colonel P. Iakubovich, and Prince 
Tumanov were withdrawn from the Stavka and assigned positions as 
Deputy Ministers of War.®? Those choices demonstrated impeccable 
judgement. Manikovskii had been one of the few general officers to 
advocate compromise with socialist demands,®® and both Iakubovich and 
Tumanov had aligned themselves with the revolution from its outbreak, 
had served in the Duma Military Commission,®9 and continued on good 
terms with the Petrograd Soviet.90 The Minister of War also asked 
Colonel V. L. Baranovskii, his brother-in-law, to head a military 
cabinet designed to oversee political matters concerning the armed 
forces.91 The army had proven itself the arbiter of the revolution, 
and Kerensky intended to control it through the appointment of
®5Miliukov, Vospominaniia, II, 379*
86vvP, May 26, 1917, p. 1. General B. S. Romanovskii should not
be confused with General P. I. Romanovskii, who was involved deeply in
the Kornilov revolt.
®7Manikovskii's appointment is noted in Sjt̂ nkevich, p. 143; 
Tumanov's can be found in VVP, May 26, 1917, p. 1; and Iakubovich's
is cited in VVP, May 11, 1917, p. 1.
88e. Varneck and H. Fisher, eds., The Testimony of Kolchak and 
Other Siberian Materials (Stanford, 1935), p* 67.
89A. Kerensky, The Prelude to Bolshevism; the Kornilov Rising 
(New York, 1919), pp. 286, 310.




Within a short period, Kerensky managed to retard the erosion 
of authority affecting the lower ranks, to stabilize the Officer Corps, 
and to submit the military to a supervisory organization of his own 
creation. But he could gain real freedom of action only be securing 
command of the Soviet-appointed commissars attached to the various area 
headquarters and by obtaining the respect of the army committees that 
determined, to a great extent, the attitudes of the rank and file.
The War Minister easily accomplished both of these objectives. The 
practice of sending commissars to military commands had begun under 
the first government, when the Soviet still feared counterrevolution; 
at that time, socialist control over the political activities and 
internal affairs of the army had been justified.92 Under a coalition 
government and a socialist Minister of War, though, that no longer 
seemed the case. On May 6, after consultations with Skobelev and 
Tsereteli, Kerensky was given complete jurisdiction over all military 
commissars.93 Technically, the Petrograd Soviet retained some 
influence, for Kerensky was obliged to notify it of specific actions 
that he had taken. But since the Soviet was dependent upon the 
Ministry of War for any information that it might receive, it lost 
practical control over the armed forces.9^ The army committees, for 
similar reasons, yielded as completely as had the Soviet. Headed in
92stankevich, p. 169.
93Tsereteli, II, 36.
S&While in effect from May 6 as an informal agreement, an 
official proclamation transferring the commissars to Kerensky's control 
was composed only on July; 14-. VVP, July 28, 1917, p. 2.
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large part by moderate SR's and Mensheviks, they gave Kerensky their 
full support and contributed heavily to his popularity among the masses
of the soldiery.95
Demonstrating his usual political sensitivity, Kerensky had 
balanced the needs of the Left and the Right without seriously compro­
mising essentials in the revitalization of the military leadership. He 
adopted the same approach with the disciplinary mechanisms of the armed 
forces. In a characteristic appeasement of socialist sentiments, he 
began with a judicial reform of the military courts. Provisions were 
made for the election of regimental court judges, and the resulting 
boards had to be comprised of an equal number of officers and soldiers. 
Juries, also comprising an equal number of officers and men, were 
introduced into military circuit courts and army corps military courts, 
to which crimes of a really serious nature were referred. Jury 
decisions were determined by majority vote; in case of a tie, the view 
most favorable to the defendent was adopted.96
Kerensky also invested military committees with considerable 
powers. They were granted the right to share communication facilities 
(except under urgent wartime conditions), they were given authority to 
enforce discipline under normal circumstances, and they had an un­
restrained right to conduct political education sessions among the 
soldiers. Furthermore, the committees were placed in possession of 
broad powers in the examination of complaints and the conducting of
95lu. Danilov, La Russie dans la guerre mondiale. 1914-1917. 
trans. A. Kaznakov (Paris, 1927), p. 542; Miliukov, Vospominaniia.
II, 379.
96Russkie Vedomosti, June 17, 1917, p. 2.
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appropriate investigations. They were also allowed a significant 
share in the determination of work loads and schedules.97
Those concessions allowed Kerensky to move into a quite different 
area. On May 30, he imposed severe penalties upon persons convicted of 
evasion of orders, open revolt, voluntary abandonment of assigned 
positions, refusal to carry out orders, or incitement to those crimes. 
Punishments included penal servitude and the loss of all civil rights.
The latter penalty was a particularly harsh one, for it included the 
inability to serve in any public capacity, to take part in elections, 
or to own property. In the case of mass evasions of duty, when it 
proved impossible to evaluate individual guilt, the recalcitrant 
military units were subjected to disbandment.98
The passage of these disciplinary regulations completed 
Kerensky's administrative reorganizations. In order to assure the 
"combat prepardness of the army," which he defined as his particular 
mission,99 he had one other major duty: the generation of sufficient 
enthusiasm for an offensive by a "free army of citizen soldiers."100 
He began that task on May 12 with a whirlwind tour of the front.
Adopting an emotional approach, in which he argued that the army would 
be "accursed" if it failed to defend the "honor and dignity" of free 
R u s s i a , h e  kindled patriotic demonstrations at almost every place
97izvestiia, May 25, 1917, p. 1.
98yyp, June 1, 1917, p. 1.
99a . Kerenskii, Ob armii i voine (Petrograd, 1917), p. 9« 
lOOlzvestiia, May 14, 1917, p. 2.
IQlVVP, May 14, 1917, p. 1.
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that he appeared.I®2 By the end of May, reports flowing into the 
Stavka from various army headquarters testified to Kerensky's effect­
iveness and revealed heightened confidence in the probable success of 
the offensive.1°3 Except for occasional moments of self-doubt,1^ the 
War Minister shared in the general optimism that was infecting govern­
mental circles and widening portions of the army leadership.1^5 It 
would have been difficult to react otherwise: his appearances before 
the troops produced such excitement that his right arm was disabled 
by the handshakes of fervent admirers.106
Active military operations were again feasible by the middle of 
June. At the same time, internal political developments dictated that 
such attempts should be pressed forward without delay. The general 
euphoria over coalition had faded, and there were disturbing 
intimations that the Left was reviewing its commitment to an aggressive 
war policy. Kerensky received his first indications of impending 
difficulties shortly after June 6, when the TsIK secretly informed him 
that he should obtain the support of the All-Russian Congress of 
Soviets before launching an offensive.107 The Congress1 response,
102^. Pokrovskii and la. A. Iakovlev, eds., Razlozhenie armii 
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that the army should remain in a condition to "take either the 
offensive or the defensive" and that a "purely military and strategic 
point of view" should dictate the choice,108 indicated a return to 
strict revolutionary defensism. Other revolutionary institutions 
displayed the same tendency. The Third All-Russian Conference of the 
SR Party refused to offer Kerensky membership in its Central Committee 
because of his zealous militarism,109 and a sizable minority of the 
Petrograd Soviet declined to send fraternal greetings to the army for 
the same reason.HO The final, and perhaps most ominous, sign of 
gathering discontent was increasing restiveness in the Petrograd 
garrison. Kerensky's efforts to move its personnel and weaponry to the 
front had been bitterly resented,m and some units had flatly refused 
to cooperate.H2 Direct intervention by the TsIK moderated the 
garrison's attitude, but that was accomplished only by equating 
defiance of Kerensky with a "stab in the back" of comrades at the 
front.113 Those warning signs could not be ignored; the offensive had 
to begin before disenchantment in the rear affected the newly estab­
lished situation on the front lines.
The Minister of War responded quickly to the altered political
IQBRech', June 13, 1917, p. 1. 
109Pelo Naroda, June 9, 1917, p- !• 
llORech1, June 13, 1917, p. 1. 
llllzvestiia, June 23, 1917, p. 2.
112l. Toblin, "Iiul'skie dni v Petrograde," KA, XXIII (1927), 
H 3lzyestiia, June 25, 1917, P» 7»
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circumstances. His orders were dispatched on June 1 6 , and fighting 
broke out on June 18 on the Galician front, July 7 on the Western,
July 8 on the Northern, and July 9 on the Rumanian front.H5 Initial 
successes in Galicia, due chiefly to elaborate artillary preparation, 
superior manpower, and the low morale of the opposing Austrian 
troops,H6 supported the liberal thesis that victory would promote 
internal stabilization. The All-Russian Congress of Soviets reversed 
its previous stand and expressed complete approval of the offensive,H ?  
restlessness within the Petrograd garrison diminished,H 8  and the 
capital was swept by patriotic outbursts unknown since the first year 
of the war.119
Unfortunately, the celebrations were premature. On July 6 a 
German counter-blow shattered the Russian drive in Galicia,120 trans­
formed the Russian divisions there into disorderly and panic-stricken 
mobs,121 and reduced the Russian assaults on other fronts into 
localized holding actions.122 On July 13 Kerensky acknowledged defeat
n^VVP, June 20, 1917, p. 1.
115Pcnikine, pp. 266-267.
U6Nilioukov, Histoire, III, 1236-1237.
H 7lzyestiia, June 20, 1917, p-
H SRusskie Vedomosti. June 21, 1917, p. 1.
119Pelo Naroda, June 20, 1917, p. 1; Novoe Vremia, June 20, 1917, 
p. 3; Birzhevye Vedomosti, June 22, 1917, p. 1.
120WP, July 11, 1917, p. 2.
121y. Vladimirova, "Bol'shevizatsiia fronta v prediiul1skie 
dni 1917 g.," KA, LVIII (1933), 98.
122izvestiia, July 11, 1917, p. 1.
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by ordering: the armies on all fronts to stand on the defensive.
Galicia was lost, over 40,000 casulties had been sustained,123 and 
irreparable damage had been inflicted upon the cohesion of the revo­
lutionary armies. The First Coalition's military gamble had failed, 
and its bargaining power with the Allies, as well as its ability to 
keen political extremism in check, dissolved along with its armies in 
the field.
Kerensky was forced to endure heavy criticism for the failure of
the summer offensive. Derisively called a Persuader-in-Chief by many
conservative officers, he was condemned for relying too much upon
moral exhortation and too little upon traditional methods of military
discipline. That argument was perhaps best expressed by General
A. I. Denikin, then the commander of the Western front:
Kerensky called on the army to do its duty. He spoke of honor, 
of discipline, of obedience to commanders. Vain WordsJ When 
Russia was consumed in flames, he cried out to the fire: 
Extinguish yourselfJ124
While accurate in part, that interpretation ignored both the narrow
framework in which the Minister of War was forced to operate and the
real administrative accomplishments that were due to his efforts.
Furthermore, the inevitability of military failure was clear only in
retrospect. The short-lived enthusiasm of the troops was easily taken
for patriotic dedication,125 and not even the most skeptical officers
123N. N. Golovine, The Russian Army in the World War, ed.




anticipated the extent and rapidity of the Russian c o l l a p s e . 126 Given 
the political strictures that he was forced to tolerate and the state 
of the army since February, Kerensky achieved as much as was possible.
His failure, and that of the coalition as a whole, lay in the erroneous 
assumption that a strong: war posture could coexist with fundamental 
domestic experimentation.
The resounding military catastrophe that destroyed the Russian 
army as an effective instrument of state power was accompanied by the 
disintegration of the government. That event had been likely from the 
beginning, when the Cadets renounced the conception of a Union Sacree 
and considered their alliance with socialism as a temporary stage in an 
ongoing political struggle. But exposed though the cabinet was to 
serious strains, a remarkable number of problems were required to 
disrupt it. Disputes over agrarian policy, a major crisis over the 
status of the Ukraine, renewed disorders in Petrograd, and the 
political repercussions of military defeat finally combined to dis­
credit the notion of coalition and to destroy the fragile balance that 
had retarded the deepening of the revolution. By the first week of 
July, Kerensky's policy of class mediation had become obsolete.
Although he would elaborate brilliant stratagems to revitalize that 
concept, his efforts would be frustrated by a diminishing base of 
popular support.
An important element in the failure of the coalition experiment 
was the inability of the government to formulate an effective agrarian 
policy. While the peasantry remained passive during the first weeks
126p. Browder and A. Kerensky, eds., The Russian Provisional 
Government, 1917; Documents, 3 vols. (Stanford, 1961), II, 998-1010.
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of the revolution, incidents of agrarian disorders rose dramatically 
in April and May.127 Governmental ineffectiveness apparently 
reinforced that trend, 128 for j_n june the number of land seizures and 
rural disturbances doubled over the preceding month.129 Chernov 
admitted that irreversible action relating to land ownership would 
compromise the work of the Constituent Assembly, but he was convinced 
that interim measures were necessary to pacify the rural population.
As a result, he moved to halt the conversion of communal holdings into 
private property and proposed a ban on land transactions to preserve 
a land fund upon which the Constituent Assembly could act. In order 
to facilitate those two measures, the Minister of Agriculture further 
proposed to establish land committees that would specify the conditions 
of land use until a permanent solution could be achieved. ̂-30 These 
proposals were familiar, for Kerensky had advanced them in the first 
cabinet. But there was a substantial difference between a statement 
of principle and the direct threat of implementation. Prince L'vov, 
charging that such actions would "undermine the people's respect for 
the law" and "confront the Constituent Assembly with an accomplished 
fact," led the liberal opposition that blocked Chernov's program.^31 
As the embattled Agriculture Minister refused either to modify or to 
shelve his proposals, the issue remained in public view. Socialist
127VVP, July 14, 1917, p. 1.
128}*. p., "Bor'ba za zemliu v 1917 g.," KA* LKXVII (1936), 90.
129m. Marminov, "Agramoe dvizhenie v 1917 godu po dokumentam 
glavnogo zemel'nogo komiteta," KA, XIV (1926), 215.
130Pelo Naroda, July 9, 1917, p. 1.
13lRusskie Vedomosti, July 4, 1917, p. 4.
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demands for land reform intensified,132 and the publicity generated 
by the cabinet's internal conflict increased the serious unrest already 
afflicting the countryside.133
The nationality problem posed an even more severe challenge to 
the cabinet than the agrarian issue. Fundamental land reform assured 
a gradual redistribution of wealth and a realignment of classes, but 
the status of the Russian borderlands immediately affected the power, 
resources, and international standing of the nation. Furthermore, the 
integrity of the centralized state was definitely threatened. The 
breakdown of imperial order throughout the country allowed the 
outlying nationalities to gather local authority into their own hands, 
and the feeble machinery of the Provisional Government was insufficient 
to reverse that process. Because of the ingrained resentment of the 
national minorities against the Russification policies of the old 
regime, de facto autonomy automatically revived separatist tendencies 
in the border regions.3-3̂
Influenced by its nationalistic liberal majority, the cabinet 
vigorously defended the principle of national unity. Kerensky, as 
committed as any liberal to the doctrine of an indivisible Russia, 
upheld that position in a June 11 speech, when he asked the democrats 
of the Ukraine, the Caucasus, and Finland to maintain their ties with 
Russia. The Constituent Assembly, he declared, was the only organ
3-32izvestiia, June 27, 1917, p. 9*
133VVP, July 14, 1917, p. 1.
13%he V. A. Maklakov Archive of the Russian Embassy in Paris, 
1917-1924, 4 boxes, Collection of the Hoover Institute at Stanford 
University, box 1, accession no. 26003-937-
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empowered to fix the relations between the Russian people and its 
outlying nationalities. Any premature attempt at dismemberment, he 
continued, would result in the collective ruin of all concerned 
parties.^85 The nationalistic Minister of War had already indicated 
a readiness to supplement persuasion with force. At a speech in 
Helsingfors on May 10, he warned Finnish separatists that the govern­
ment would not move beyond the restoration of the Finnish constitution. 
Extremists, Kerensky added, should be especially careful not to 
"confuse love with weakness." Revolutionary Russia, the source of 
"creative strength," could mobilize power superior to that of tsarism 
and had to be "taken into account."136
That threatening stance helped to keep most of the centrifugal 
forces in check. The intimidated Finnish Sejm resisted considerable 
popular pressure for a formal declaration of independence,^? pleading 
that the moment was not propitious.138 Estonia, Latvia, and Livonia 
followed Finland's general lead, but showed a greater tolerance for 
the concept of autonomy within a loosely federated republican 
system.-*-39 A similar pattern of temporary restraint appeared in most 
other outlying regions of the former empire. In the Caucasus, the 
various national committees kept full control over local affairs. But 
for the sake of military defense against Turkey, they were careful to
135Russell Diary, July 8, 1917.
136izvestiia, May 30, 1917, p. 4.
137lzvestiia, June 23, 1917, p. 6.
3-38yiiiiukov, Vospominaniia, II, 391.
139s. M. Dimanshtein, ed., Revoliutsiia i natsional1nyi vopros 
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recognize the principle of national unity.1^0 Turkestan also main­
tained the tenuous balance between submission to the central government 
and de facto independence. The government-appointed Turkestan 
Committee, which supposedly administered the province, exercised little 
meaningful influence. Yet serious political differences between 
traditionalists and westemizers divided the Moslem ranks, and mutual 
suspicion between Russian settlers and the indigenous population 
checked an immediate drive for full autonomy.
The Ukraine did not feel a comparable need for prudent measures.
The most important and populous of Russia's border regions, possessed 
of a proud cultural tradition and led by fervent nationalists, it 
moved steadily toward collision with the Provisional Government. The 
March 20 governmental declaration removing restrictions on national 
minorities had only a palliative effect,1^3 and throughout April and 
May Ukrainian demands for effective self-government multiplied.
Michael Hrushevskii, a lifelong proponent of Ukrainian independence 
and the President of the Central Rada (the dominant organ of regional 
goverranent) brought the issue into the open on May JO. In a note 
addressed jointly to the Provisional Government and to the TsIK, 
Hrushevskii issued a clear challenge to established minority policy.
He called for the recognition of the Ukrainian right to autonomy; the
lAODimanshtein, pp. 392-402.
141«iz istorii natsional'noi politiki Vremennago Pravitel1stva,"
KA, XXX (1928), 79.
142"Xz dnevnika A. h. Kuropatkina,1 KA, XX (1927), 65*
l43Sbornik ukazov i postanovlenii Vremennago Pravitel'stva.
2 vols. (Petrograd, 19177, I, 46-49-
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admission of Ukrainian delegates to international conferences dealing 
with the rectification of national borders; the formation of Ukrainian 
military units in the rear and, where possible, at the front; the 
immediate consolidation of the Southwestern provinces into a discrete 
Ukrainian political unit; and the transfer of state funds to the 
R a d a .  344 There is no doubt that Hrushevskii's demands reflected 
popular sentiments. April congresses of the Ukrainian Socialist Revo­
lutionary and Socialist Democratic parties, the Ukrainian National 
Congress (convoked by the Rada to broaden its popular base), the All- 
Ukrainian Peasant Congress, and the First Ukrainian Military Congress 
oassed similar resolutions.345
The cabinet rejected the Ukrainian demands on the tested grounds 
that the self-appointed Rada had not been elected democratically and 
that the will of the Constituent Assembly could not be compromised.346 
But it soon became apparent that a mutual accommodation was necessary. 
The political freedom that existed within the armed forces promoted 
contact between Ukrainian nationals, and after the convocation on 
May 6 of the First Ukrainian Military Congress the formation of ethnic 
units advanced at an alarming rate. While Kerensky was completely 
opposed to the fragmentation of the army, which jeopardized the pending 
offensive,347 he was unable to halt the process.348 His helplessness
344a . Choulguine, L ’Ukraine contre Moscou, 191? (Paris, 1935), 
p. 117.
l45Choulguine, p. 97-
146VVP, July 2, 1917, p. 2.
1471. V. Demkin, ed., Velikaja Oktiabr1skaia sotsialisticheskaja 
revoliutsiia na Ukraine, 3 vols. (Kiev, 1957), I, 304-305.
148izvestiia, June 2, 1917, p. 2.
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was demonstrated on June 5 by the convocation, against his orders,^49 
of a Second Ukrainian Military Congress* Meeting under the protection 
of the Central Rada, the congress declared its intent to create a 
separate national army despite the wishes of the government or the war 
ministry.150 That action placed Kerensky in an extremely difficult 
position. He could remain true to his Great Russian proclivities, 
refuse to treat with the Rada, and accept the continued disintegration 
of the army; or he could seek an agreement that would at least protect 
the integrity of the armed forces. In a typical display of tactical 
elasticity and faith in the future, he chose the latter course.
The opportunity for a settlement arose after the June 10 
proclamation of the First Universal by the Ukrainian Central Rada.
That declaration, virtually one of independence, announced the complete 
re,lection of the Provisional Government's authority within the 
boundaries of the Ukraine. It also established the Rada as the tempo­
rary ruling body of that area, promised the swift convocation of a 
national assembly to establish a permanent government, and called for 
the creation of a national army.151 Neither a direct appeal by the 
Provisional Government to the Ukrainian population!52 nor the open 
airing of the possibility of civil war by the Russian liberal press!53
I49pravda, June 2, 1917, p- 2.
150stankevich, p. 148.
151p. N. Sobolev, ed., Velikaia Oktiabr1skaja sotsialisticheskaia 
revoliutsiia, khronika sobytii, 4 vols~ (Moscow, 1957-196l), II, 417.
152VVP, June 17, 1917, p. 1.
153For example, see Russkie Vedomosti, June 18, 1917, p. 3*
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proved to be deterrents. The broadening crisis, exacerbated by the 
appearance of a Ukrainian General Secretariat that gave immediate form 
to the threat of self-rule, was met by a proposal from Tsereteli, 
Chernov, and Skobelev for direct negotiations. On June 26, despite 
strong Cadet misgivings that Russian national interests would be 
sacrificed by such a precipitous move, the cabinet resolved to dispatch 
Kerensky, Tsereteli, and Tereshchenko to Kiev.15^
In all probability, Cadet fears were aroused by Tsereteli’s 
inclusion in the cabinet delegation. Socialistic distrust of the 
unitary nation-state was well known, and recent debates on the 
Ukrainian question in the All-Russian Congress of Soviets had revealed 
considerable sympathy for the principle of regional autonomy.^55 But 
if the Cadets depended upon Kerensky to defend the inviolability of the 
centralized state at that particular time, they were to be seriously 
disappointed. The Minister of War realized that the cohesion of the 
army depended upon the results of the Rada negotiations. Since further 
decomposition endangered the offensive and, through it, the very 
existence of revolutionary Russia, he was willing to subordinate all 
other considerations to military needs.156
At the Kiev Conference, which lasted from June 28 to June 30, he 
achieved that end at the exclusion of almost everything else. The 
essential Ukrainian demands were accepted. The General Secretariat 
was acknowledged to be the central administrative institution, the
15M'sereteli, II, 133*
155lzvestiia, June 16, 1917, p«
156choulguine, p. 123.
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Southwestern provinces were merged into a single area under the 
authority of the Rada, and the legislative acts of the Rada were 
accepted as complete and binding upon the cabinet. A final concession, 
one that further alienated the Cadets, specified that the Constituent 
Assembly would determine the transfer of land within the Ukraine 
according to Socialist Revolutionary principles. In exchange, the 
Rada agreed to moderate its military demands. Ukrainian national 
units were to be formed only where the combat effectiveness of the 
army would not be imperilled, governmental recruitment within the 
Ukraine was allowed to continue, and the Russian military command in 
Kiev was freed from interference by local authorities.157
The Ukrainian agreement was presented on a non-negotiable basis 
to the ministerial council on July 2, despite Cadet objections that 
such a course was "judicially incompetent" and a "betrayal of Russian 
interests."158 Kerensky's passionate insistence that the document 
immediately be approved won the requisite cabinet support, but the 
Cadets responded with wholesale resignations.159 Kerensky's reaction 
was both vitriolic and theatrical. He condemned the Cadet ministers 
for needlessly complicating the government's position during a time of 
crisis,150 urged the rump cabinet to retain power with its present 
membership until a convenient time could be found for its expansion,
157d . A. Chugaev, et al., eds., Revoliutsionnoe dvizhenie v 
Rossii v Iiule 1917 g.; Iiul'skii krizis (Moscow, 1959). P» 506.
158Miliukov, Vospominaniia, II, 391.
159lzvestiia, July 4, 1917, p. 3*
160Kerensky, "Iz vospominaniia," p. 301.
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and made a dramatic departure from Petrograd to prepare for the 
impending offensive on the Western front.161
The cabinet's disruption was particularly untimely, for it 
coincided with a serious increase of tension within the capital.
Chronic unrest within the Petrograd garrison!62 was supplemented by 
a general disenchantment with the failure of Chernov’s agrarian 
proposalsl63 and recent governmental refusals to expedite worker 
control over the factories.164 But perhaps the most important cause 
of popular disaffection was the steadily growing influence of the 
Bolshevik Party among the revolutionary workers and soldiers of Petro- 
grad. Under the vigorous leadership of V. I. Lenin, the Bolsheviks had 
been hammering incessantly at the government. Their objections to the 
launching of an offensive prior to a suitable revision of war aimsl65 
were especially effective; that approach inflamed a garrison manifestly 
opposed to fighting and an urban population increasingly resentful of 
the sacrifices demanded by the war. The abrupt Cadet resignations 
touched off the gathering violence.166 From July 3 to July 5, Petro- 
grad was exposed to mass disorders of a magnitude unknown since the 
fall of the monarchy.16?
161a . Ker-enskii, "Arest1 bol1 shevikov,1 Izdaleka. p. 170. 
l62Tobolin, p. 58.
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The predominant characteristic of the radical uprising during 
the July Days, and one that detracted seriously from its effectiveness, 
was its unplanned and uncoordinated nature. As B. 0. Bogdanov, a 
member of the TsIK, observed, confusion was so widespread that he 
could not determine whether the movement was an armed uprising or an 
armed demonstration.168 The disturbances possessed a Leninist com­
plexion from the outset, for they were conducted under the slogans 
"Down with the Ten Capitalist Ministers" and "All Power to the 
Soviets. "169 But so long as they retained their spontaneous nature, 
neither the truncated cabinet nor the Petrograd Soviet dared to attempt 
forcible suppression. That situation changed on July 4 when the 
Bolsheviks assumed responsibility for the m o v e m e n t . W i t h  the July 
Days clearly identified with a radical leftist party, revolutionary 
spontaneity was transformed into conspiracy and Kerensky was able to 
intervene. The War Minister was delighted at the opportunity to strike 
at the major anti-war party in the country. Acting with the consent
of the cabinet,^ 1  he directed loyal troops toward the capital and
allowed the release of information linking Lenin with the flow into 
Russia of German funds.^ 2  The arrival in Petrograd of government 
troops, together with charges of treason against the Bolshevik leader­
ship, produced a rapid restoration of order.173 By July 5, the
l68Tobolin, XIV (1927), 69.
16 9Nabokov, p. 77•
170Delo Naroda, July 5, 1917, p. 1.
171VVP. July 6, 1917, p. 2.
172wp, July 8, 1917, p. 1.
173lzvestiia, July 6, 1917, p- 1*
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Provisional Government was again in full command of the situation.174
The leaders of the moderate Left greeted the quelling of the 
July disorders with open relief,175 for the socialist party organ­
izations, far more than the Provisional Government, had been the 
targets of mass hostility.176 But their sentiments turned into con­
sternation on July 5* after Kerensky declared a vendetta against the 
entire radical Left. The public accusations of treason against Lenin 
served a valuable purpose in pacifying the garrison, but they were not 
sufficiently substantiated to warrant the widespread arrests of 
Bolshevik leadersl77 and the governmental seizure of the Bolshevik 
headquarters at the Kshesinskaia Palace.178 The TsIK also resented 
Kerensky's arbitrary manner. His decision to dismiss Pereverzevl79 
and General Polovtsov on grounds of incompetence,180 his summary 
disbandment of garrison units,1®1 and his countenance of excessive 
force in the confiscation of weapons and the dispelling of street 
gatherings!82 seemed unnecessary. The TsIK still retained confidence
174yyp, July 9, 1917, p. 1.
175lzvestiia, July 5, 1917, p. 1.
176izyestiia, July 4, 1917, p. 2.
177Dem'ianov, pp. 93-94.
178Kerenskii, "Iz vospominanii," p. 305*
179VVP, July 9, 1917, p. 3* Pereverzev was replaced in the 
Justice Ministry by I. N. Efremov. VVP, July 11, 1917, p. 3.
180p. a . Polovtsov, Dni zatmeniia (Paris, 1927), p. 140.
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in the parity of Kerensky's motives, but they agreed to approve his 
methods only after he coupled revelations about the extent of the 
Galician defeat with a threat of resignation.183
Although the TsIK accepted the necessity of an anti-Bolshevik 
crusade, they began maneuvers designed to limit the scope of reaction. 
The outlines of that prudent campaign appeared on the evening of 
July 5* when the SR and Menshevik Central Committees demanded that for 
the time being the rump cabinet act in accordance with the wishes of 
the All-Russian Congress of Soviets.184 Their demand, born of an 
awareness of vulnerability and a fear of counterrevolution, created a 
very dangerous situation. By unilaterally reducing the independence 
of the cabinet and reintroducing dual power in the midst of a serious 
political crisis, it cleared the way for open class warfare.
Kerensky, determined to retain the initiative, immediately sought 
an understanding with the moderate Left. On the night of July 6, in 
an informal meeting with the leading figures of the Soviet democracy, 
he advanced concrete proposals for future political tactics.185 His 
preferred solutions were characteristic, and included opportunism and 
the balancing of class interests. The July Days and the current 
difficulties at the front, he maintained, had served to discredit Left 
extremism. In an excited manner, which Tsereteli later described as 
".joyful and stimulated," the War Minister claimed that a "blessed 
turning point in the mood of the country" had been reached and that
l83Kerensky, Catastrophe, pp. 243-244.
184Russkie Vedomosti, July 9, 1917, p. 4.
185The participants were Tsereteli, Chernov, Skobelev, Chkheidze, 
F. I. Dan, and A. R. Gots. See Tsereteli, II, 3̂ 8.
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the opportunity was finally present for the exercise of "solid power." 
While the imposition of strong rule was both desirable and inevitable, 
Kerensky continued, it should be prefaced by a demonstration of 
socialist strength and proceed with socialist participation. In that 
way, counterrevolution would be checked and the restoration of the 
government could be accompanied by tangible concessions to popular 
demands.186 Despite some spirited opposition, especially from the 
Menshevik F. I. Dan, Kerensky's arguments prevailed.187
That demonstration of socialist strength, designed in large part 
to place Kerensky at the head of a cabinet of his own choice, assumed 
a dramatic form. On July 7, the All-Russian Congress of Soviets 
confronted the government with a list of controversial demands: the 
dissolution of the State Duma; proclamation of a republic; immediate 
passage of Chernov's agrarian legislation; and adoption of an active 
peace policy.188 Prince L'vov, justifiably angered by their peremptory 
tone, attacked them as a "deviation from non-party principles" in favor 
of "purely socialistic aims" and withdrew from the cabinet.189 Upon 
his resignation, he suggested that Kerensky occupy his vacated
position.190
Kerensky has sturdily defended his analysis of July 6, main­
taining that Prince L'vov's resignation opened the way to genuine
186rSereteli, II, 348.
187Sukhanov, Revolution. II, 473*
188pelo Naroda, July 8, 1917, P* 2.
189Russkie Vedomosti, July 9, 1917, p. 4.
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political stabilization. In the first weeks following the collapse 
of the July rising, he claimed, unrest subsided in the countryside, 
the factories, and the front.191 That constructive process, which 
protected and extended the gains of the revolution, was reversed only 
by the intervention of "reckless generals" who had an inferior under­
standing of state needs.192 Even before the formation of the ill-fated 
Second Coalition, however, there were indications that the lull would 
prove temporary, that the July Days and the military reverses had 
produced a sharpening of class antagonisms, and that further revo­
lutionary spasms lay ahead. Kerensky’s conviction that Bolshevism was 
a political aberrationl93 blinded him to the real meaning of July 3*
He joined liberals and moderate socialists in attributing the disorders 
to conspiracy,194 but the tardy Bolshevik response to the July Days 
indicated that the Petrograd masses were more radicalized than even 
they had suspected. If such substantial and continuing popular 
dissatisfactions could build up while the government leaned on the 
Petrograd Soviet, it was unlikely that a Right resurgence would dispel 
them.
At the same time that mass support for the Provisional Govern­
ment was eroding, Kerensky chose to court the political Right. Since 
in many respects he was more nearly a liberal than a socialist, he was 
drawn naturally to that course of action. Yet the past months had
191A. Kerenskii, "Fevral' i Oktiabr'," SZ, IX (1922), 287.
192Kerenskii, "Politika," p. 421.
l93Kerenskii, "Arest1 bol'shevikov," p. 170.
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demonstrated the popularity of radical socialist ideals, and the 
non-socialist parties could no longer look forward to ideological 
vindication in the Constituent Assembly. Under those circumstances, 
adherence to strict non-partisan policies and democratic principles 
was a form of political suicide. Kerensky hoped to exploit the July 
Days in order to establish a poxverful, independent government that 
could protect state interests and exercise control over disruptive 
forces at each end of the political spectrum. In fact, he placed 
himself and his moderate allies between a weakened but resentful Left 
and a frightened, belligerent Right. That course of action led 
directly to the political convulsions of August and September.
CHAPTER V
THE FINAL BID FOR POLITICAL STABILIZATION
Prince L'vov resigned on July 7 because of a conviction that the 
rupture between liberals and socialists could not be healed and that 
the country was on an unavoidable course toward civil war. His 
participation in the Provisional Government had been based on the 
premise that moderate policies would preserve the best of the old 
order and provide a painless transition to the new one.l The July 
Days and the attendant polarization of politics shattered that belief. 
Although the former Finister-President assumed a public position of 
confidence in the possibilities for compromise,2 he revealed his acute 
discouragement to T. I. Polner, a close friend and future biographer. 
He made way for Kerensky, Prince L'vov told Polner on July 9, because 
it was time for a strong leader to assume control of the state. The 
salvation of Russia required the forcible dispersion of the soviets 
and the firing upon of the populace, and while he could not issue such 
orders, Kerensky could.3
lv. Chernov, Rozhdenie revoliutsionnoi Rossii; Fevral1skaia 
revoliutsiia (New York, 193*0. P» 33***
2Russkoe Slovo, July 12, 1917, p. 3*
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Kerensky certainly had not manipulated Prince L'vov's 
resignation in order to wage war indiscriminately upon the socialist 
forces, but he did agree that the former Minister-President1s useful­
ness had come to an end. It was necessary, Kerensky recalled later, 
to complete the rout of the extreme Left and to curb anarchy. 
Unfortunately, Prince L'vov's nature was too gentle to permit the 
external compulsion that was now required.2* Kerensky's decision to 
assume formal leadership did seem to be a sound one. The collapse 
of the Galician front, the July uprising, and the Cadet resignations 
had created a dangerous situation, and it was evident that the nation 
was gravely imperilled. Kerensky's personal standing among the 
masses was still unrivaled,5 he had demonstrated a capacity for de­
cisive action in the suppression of the Bolshevik disorders,6 and he 
was guaranteed support from the socialist leadership in the intro­
duction of disciplinary measures.7 In that crucial time, replete with 
danger and with opportunity, it seemed imperative that he be in a
Qposition to implement fully his nadpartiinost' program.
Kerensky was equally confident that the political Right would 
accept his leadership and, in particular, that the Cadet Party would 
extend full cooperation. Since his attempt to strengthen the
**A. Kerenskii, "Iz vospominaniia," SZ, XXXVIII (1929), 251.
5p. Milioukov, Ch. Seignobos, and L. Eisenmann, Histoire de 
Russie; reforms, reaction, revolutions, 3 vols. (Paris, 1933), HI, 
1280.
6p. A. Polovtsov, Dni zatmeniia (Paris, 1927), p. 1^0.
7l. G. Tsereteli, Vospominaniia o Fevral'skoi revoliutsii.
2 vols. (Paris, 1963), II, 3̂ 8.
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non-socialist forces and still exert control over them came to such a 
dismal end, it is useful to examine his evaluation of the current 
political situation. Kerensky's key assumption, and in retrospect hie 
most surprising one, was that liberal disenchantment with coalition 
politics could be totally discounted. In referring to the July 2 
resignations of the Cadet ministers, he argued that their "unfounded 
dissatisfaction" was of "no particular significance." The Cadets, 
Kerensky continued, had simply panicked under stress; in less difficult 
circumstances, the crisis would have dissolved "quickly and without 
trouble."9 An important factor in his calculations was a conviction 
that neither agrarian reform nor the Ukrainian problem were at the 
root of Cadet discontents. The real issue that had provoked the 
ministerial withdrawals was the disproportionate influence of the 
Petrograd Soviet in the conduct of governmental affairs.16 Since the 
previous imbalance had been corrected by the defeat of Left extremism, 
liberals could re-enter the cabinet with clear consciences.H
Kerensky's optimism stemmed from confidence in the beneficent 
effects of the Bolshevik rising and from faith in his ability to 
establish an effective regime under those new conditions. Yet, he did 
have specific cause to believe that the Cadets would prove tractable.
N. V. Nekrasov, who acted as Kerensky's link to the Cadet Central 
Committee in much the same fashion as Vladimir Zenzinov did with
%. Kerensky, The Catastrophe; Kerensky's Own Story of the 
Russian Revolution (New York, 1927), p. 236.
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regard to the TsIK,12 informed him that serious stresses existed 
within the Petrograd party leadership.13 Miliukov had encountered 
grave difficulties in a crucial meeting on July 1, and he had barely 
been able to win approval for the ministerial resignations of the 
following day. The obvious connection between the Cadet withdrawals 
and the beginning of the holshevik uprising served further to under­
mine Miliukov's authority, and important segments of the liberal press 
were sharply critical of his ideological inflexibility.^ Nekrasov's 
public airing of the supposedly confidential Central Committee pro­
ceedings, 15 which Kerensky had probably encouraged, generated lively 
polemics among liberals throughout the country,16 and it appeared 
entirely possible that Miliukov's hard-line policies would be 
repudiated.17
Kerensky was to be disappointed, for the Cadet Party was not at 
all ready to topple into his hands. Liberal dissatisfaction with 
the coalition experiment ran too deep to be easily expurged, and 
Miliukov kept control over his forces. Furthermore, he came to his 
own conclusions about the meaning of the July Days, and they 
were wholly incompatible with Kerensky's. The acting Minister-
12p. Miliukov, Vospominaniia, 185^-1917, 2 vols. (New York,
1955), II, 331-
13Kerensky, Catastrophe, p. 236.
l̂ Russkie Vedomosti, July 9, 1917, p. 2.
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President saw in the disorders a discrediting of irresponsible 
extremism and a growing socialist commitment to political restraint. 
The Cadet statesman discerned in them a welcome division in the 
previously united socialist ranks and an ebbing of socialist power.18 
The satisfaction with which he noted the appearance of that rift 
indicated that he saw an opportunity to consolidate the state on his 
own terms. Most liberals, significant elements of the army command, 
and virtually the whole of privileged Russia would arrive at a similar 
interpretation. The results would be the political isolation of the 
Provisional Government, attempted counterrevolution, and the 
intensification of the radical revolution. Since the February Days, 
Kerensky’s political instincts had been remarkably trustworthy. But 
on this occasion his self-confidence, his natural optimism, and his 
persistent underestimation of the power of class interests blinded him 
to the evident discontents of the Right and the real danger inherent 
in its revitalization.
But at first events occurred much as Kerensky anticipated. He 
assumed control over the cabinet immediately upon Prince L'vov's 
withdrawal,19 and the Soviet leadership responded with an abandonment 
of its demands for the dissolution of the Duma, the proclamation of a 
republic, and the deference of the cabinet to the will of the All- 
Russian Congress of Soviets. In fact, the July 8 declaration of the 
truncated government conceded very little to the socialist pressures 
that had been applied in the recent past. Prior demands for an active
l%!iliukov, Vospominaniia, II, 39̂ -•
19v. Nabokov, "Vremennoe Pravitel’stvo," ARR, I (1922), 79.
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peace policy found reflection in a renewed dedication to revolutionary 
defensism, and the cabinet merely promised to "propose" an Allied 
conference for the revision of war aims. The intense agitation of 
Petrograd workers for an eight-hour day and control of factory adminis­
tration was met by an agreement to draft bills "concerning" those 
issues. The only firm commitments that Kerensky and his surviving 
colleagues accepted were the holding of elections to the Constituent 
Assembly on September 1?, the abolition of civil ranks and orders, and 
an agreement that the land should be transferred to the toilers.20 
The cabinet's ambiguous stand on these vital issues won the complete 
acceptance of the VTsIK (the All-Russian Central Executive Committee) 
and the Executive Committee of the Soviets of Peasants Deputies, and 
on July 9 they named the Provisional Government the "Government to 
Save the Revolution."21 The title was meaningful. Kerensky's rump 
cabinet was invested with "unlimited power" to restore military 
discipline and combat extremism,22 and an Izvestiia editorial urged 
the population to "give it all your strength and all your resources."23
The July 9 Soviet debates had revealed the precarious state of 
the army and the pressing need for forceful measures against military 
dissolution,2^ and the government responded on July 12 with a limited 
reintroduction of the death penalty for servicemen. While the
20yyp. July 8, 1917, p. 1.
21lzvestiia, July 11, 1917, p. 6.
22Bjrzhevye Vedomosti, July 11, 1917, P- 1-
23Izvestiia, July 11, 1917, p. 1.
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cabinet agreed unanimously that the act was necessary,25 Kerensky 
signed it reluctantly and only after erecting numerous safeguards for 
the benefit of the accused. The measure applied only in the zones of 
active military operations, the special courts which conducted the 
proceedings were composed equally of officers and men, and initiative 
for a trial had to come from at least the level of divisional 
commander. Also, simplified procedures were established for the miti­
gation of sentences. As he explained in the promulgation of the 
decree, its passage had been a "painful decision" taken to correct a 
"tragic" situation.26 Kerensky’s entire approach to government in the 
post-July period was foreshadowed in the way he handled the restor­
ation of the death penalty. The turn to the Right was to be both 
gradual and qualified, revolutionary idealism was to be preserved as 
much as possible, and only after threats failed was actual punishment 
to be carried out. As much as any other factor, it was Kerensky's 
continued dedication to moderation and restraint in times of crisis 
that led to the profound liberal and conservative disenchantment with 
his leadership.
Non-socialists were also disgruntled with Kerensky's abrupt 
July 12 ban on land transactions. But in his view, that act resulted 
from a happy coincidence of necessity and principle. He had long 
advocated the preservation of a land reservoir that the Constituent 
Assembly could draw upon on short notice, and the new law would 
certainly accomplish that aim. Land speculation, fictitious sales,
25Pelo Naroda, September 15, 1917, p. 2.
26v v p, July 13, 1917, p. 3-
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and the encumbering of property with mortgages were hindered by a 
requirement that all deeds passed since March 1, 1917, be approved by 
both the ministry of agriculture and local guberniia land committees. 
Furthermore, any property put up for public auction could be taken 
under state management at the discretion of those two agencies.27 The 
act satisfied Kerensky's populist sentiments, he was convinced that it 
marked an important step in pacifying the restive peasantry, and it 
discharged a personal promise that he had made to the socialist Star 
Chamber on July 6.28 The new ban, which Russkie Vedomosti promptly 
termed "monstrous,"29 also served to remind liberals that they had 
only harmed themselves by boycotting the cabinet.
After the passage of the agrarian legislation on July 12, 
Kerensky was prepared to negotiate with the Right for the recon­
struction of the ministry. But while he was convinced that the "quick 
rehabilitation of the nation" required the presence within the cabinet 
of liberal ministers,30 he was determined that the new ones would 
prove more adaptable than their predecessors. Accordingly, he tried 
to circumvent Miliukov's militant Petrograd organization, which had 
expressed strenuous opposition to the July 8 declaration. On July 12, 
in a transparent effort to exploit the recent dissension in liberal 
ranks, he offered portfolios to the Moscow Cadets N. I. Astrov and
27VVP, July 14, 1917, p. 1.
28rsereteli, II, 348. The term refers to those prominent 
socialists, including Chernov, Tsereteli, Dan, Chkheidze, Gots, and 
Skobelev, who dominated the TsIK and the VTsIK.
29Russkie Vedomosti, July 29, 1917, p. 1.
30Kerensky, Catastrophe, p. 250.
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N. M. Kishkin and the Moscow Trade-Industrialist S. N. Tret'iakov.31- 
While Kerensky had chosen candidates who were strongly attracted to 
the principle of coalition,32 his attempt to dispense with the Petro- 
mrad Cadets failed. When they arrived in the capital from Moscow 
on July 14, the three prospective ministers were immediately closeted 
with the Temporary Committee of the State Duma and the Cadet Central 
Committee, where they were given an intensive course in power politics.
As a result, they placed stringent conditions upon their entry into 
the cabinet.33 in those uncertain times, the pressures to present a 
common liberal front were too great to resist; in the last analysis, 
that meant Kerensky would have to contend with Miliukov after all.
A July 15 letter to Kerensky from Astrov, Kishkin, and V. D. 
Nabokov, in which Miliukov's influence was clearly visible, set forth 
the Cadet requirements for coalition. At the moment, the liberal 
demands were impossible to fulfill. The new government was to pledge 
itself solely to the "preservation of the revolution" and was to avoid 
any measures that would cause "civil strife" or hinder the powers of 
the Constituent Assembly. Thus, interim social reforms such as the 
restrictions on land transactions or constitutional experimentation 
such as the Ukrainian agreement were to be renounced. The Cadets 
further required "total union" with the Allies in matters of war and 
peace, the creation of a strong, disciplined army, and the abridgement 
of the rights of soldiers' committees. They also demanded an end to
3lRusskie Vedomosti, July 18, 1917, p. 4.
32Birzhevye Vedomosti, July 16, 1917, p. 4.
33See the detailed interview with Astrov in Russkie Vedomosti,
July 18, 1917, p. 4.
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the "many authorities" participating in the administration of the 
state and insisted that cabinet members be freed from responsibility 
to outside organizations. Finally, since their influence in the 
country had suffered a recent decline, the Cadets implied that 
elections to the Constituent Assembly should be postponed so that the 
"true national will" could be expressed. 3^ It was evident that the 
Cadets were interested in far more than a repudiation of the July 8 
declaration. They sought no less than a reversal of all the political 
setbacks sustained since the outbreak of the February revolution, and 
they were willing to accept coalition only if their socialist 
colleagues acted as liberals.
While Kerensky rejected the Cadet demands, he attempted to prove 
that the practical differences separating them were relatively minor.
In moves obviously aimed at mollifying liberal opinion, the Minister- 
President began investigations aimed at further discrediting political 
extremists,35 ordered the closing of the Bolshevik newspapers Pravda 
and Okopnaia Pravda (The Trench Truth),36 and appointed a known 
disciplinarian, General Lavr G. Kornilov, Supreme Commander of the 
armed forces.37 Furthermore, in a short written reply to the July 15 
Cadet letter, he argued that the present national emergency erased the 
distinction between the July 8 declaration and previous cabinet 
platforms. In light of the present necessities, Kerensky informed the
3^The text is cited in Russkie Vedomosti, July 18, 1917, p* b. 
35Rech1, July 22, 1917, p. 5»
36Birzhevye Vedomosti, July 16, 1917, p« 5*
37Russkie Vedomosti, July 22, 1917, p* !•
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Cadets, "the statement contained in your letter does not ..prevent your 
entry into the government."38 Kerensky had been very explicit, and 
Miliukov's party could hardly have misunderstood him. He had indicated 
that the necessary adjustments to the revolution had been made, and 
they had to be accented. But no further concessions were required, and 
the way was finally clear to the curbing of excesses and the 
strengthening of state authority.
The Cadets would have accepted Kerensky's offer at any previous 
time, for it represented a definite commitment to governmental con­
solidation and stabilization. But they now thought they could afford 
to wait; the July Days and the military crisis had weakened the entire 
Left, not just the Bolsheviks, and they were confident that Kerensky 
would recognize his isolation and meet their specific terms. The 
formal Cadet answer, which was both stilted and unnecessarily rude, 
came on July 20. In a deliberate misrepresentation of Kerensky's 
position, the Cadets accused him of attempting to alter the program 
and purpose of the Provisional Government for partisan ends. They 
further charged that he had remained inflexible in the face of signi­
ficant concessions (a reference to their decision not to demand 
Chernov's resignation from the cabinet), and they concluded with an 
assertion that Kerensky's attitude amounted to an "abandonment of any 
attempts to come to an agreement with us on a really national 
program. "39
The sharp Cadet rejection of Kerensky's offer was preceded by
38Russkie Vedomosti. July 22, 1917, p« 2.
39Rech', July 21, 1917, p. 2.
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other reverses. A meeting of the State Duma on July 18 had revealed 
severe dissatisfaction with Kerensky, and there had been several 
instances when he had been personally vilified. More importantly, 
Miliukov had delivered two very disturbing speeches to the Duma 
members. While he admitted that Kerensky's leadership was still 
required, he claimed that the present situation "would not last." It 
would soon become essential, the Cadet statesman continued, for the 
Minister-President either to "yield his post or to take as his 
assistants military leaders" who would exercise the real authority.
Shortly after Miliukov predicted either Kerensky's dismissal or 
his effacement before a thinly-disguised military dictatorship, the 
Minister-President was given a foretaste of the treatment he could 
expect. Victor Chernov had been the object of defamatory attacks 
since the July 12 passage of the agrarian reforms, and on July 20 he 
resigned in order to prosecute his libelers in the courts.^ Under 
other conditions, Kerensky would have welcomed Chernov's departure.
The relationship between the former Trudovik and the SR veteran (who 
considered his younger rival an upstart and an interloper) had often 
been strained, and Kerensky was already considering excluding Chernov 
from the projected cabinet.^2 But it was one thing for Kerensky to 
use liberal discontent to ease Chernov from power, and quite another 
to see the Agriculture Minister virtually driven from office while he 
himself was similarly threatened. If the Right could force such a
^QIzvestiia, July 21, 1917, p. 3*
^llzvestiia, July 21, 1917, p« 5*
^2Boris Savinkov, K Delu Kornilova (Paris, 1919), p» 9»
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noted socialist from the ministry, Kerensky could well be the next 
victim.
The final blow came from the Left. Antagonized by the liberal 
demands, the socialist leaders forbade any alteration of the July 8 
declaration^ and proposed that the cabinet be reconstructed without 
recourse to the Cadets.^ Kerensky was now placed in a completely 
untenable position, for he was charged with the creation of a new 
government yet prevented from reaching any accommodation with the 
necessary participants. He broke the impasse on July 21 in a defiant 
and theatrical fashion. In a dramatic re-creation of Ivan Groznyi's 
flight from Moscow in 1564, he resigned his office, declared Nekrasov 
acting head of state, and left Petrograd. His letter of resignation, 
which was promptly released to the press, was brief and direct. In it, 
Kerensky stressed the impossibility of expanding the government 
sufficiently to meet the present requirements. As a result, he could 
no longer retain power and still remain true either to his conscience 
or to his understanding of current political needs.
Kerensky's angry gesture spread consternation among almost the 
entire political leadership of Petrograd. As the cabinet itself was 
caught by surprise, the first impulse of most ministers was to place 
their resignations alongside that of the Minister-President's. But 
after a confused interval, Nekrasov observed that some governing body
Tsereteli, II, 382.
44Kerensky, Catastrophe, p. 251.
45Russkie Vedomosti, July 22, 1917, p. 2.
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ought to exist in the event that Kerensky chose to return. "̂6 
Accordingly, the ministers agreed temporarily to remain in office, 
decided to reject Kerensky's resignation, and called for an extra­
ordinary conference of the major political parties and organizations 
in Petrograd.The response was immediate. On the evening of 
July 21, the representatives of the principle socialist and liberal 
grouos assembled in the Malachite Hall of the Winter Palace in order 
to resolve the acute governmental crisis.^
The long and difficult session, which lasted from 10:30 p.m. to 
6:00 a.m., resulted in a grudging and embittered admission that the 
class truce should, after all, be extepded. A number of speakers 
succeeded each other, and some of them, notably the Right Socialist 
Revolutionary N D. Avksent’ev, the Trudovik A. V. Peshekhonov, and 
the Cadet-echappe Nekrasov, delivered stirring appeals for genuine 
cooperation and non-partisan c o m p r o m i s e . ^  But the conference 
proceedings were dominated by Miliukov and Tsereteli, the protagonists 
of the Right and the Left, and they probed mercilessly into the wounds 
of the past months. Neither accepted responsibility for the current 
governmental paralysis, each accused, the other of a systematic 
subversion of state authority, and they both refused to yield on the 
main points of controversy. Miliukov again rejected the July 8 
declaration and reiterated his disapproval of the recent agrarian
46Rech», July 22, 1917, p. 2.
^Russkie Vedomosti, July 22, 1917, p. 2.
Tsereteli, II, 382.
^^Russkie Vedomosti, July 22, 1917, pp. 3-̂ *
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reforms, and conceded only that a resolution of those issues should 
await the reconstitution of the cabinet and the recovery of state 
power.50 Tsereteli proved equally obdurate. He refused to abandon 
demands for a revision of war aims and maintained that socialist 
ministers would continue to report to their party organizations, 
arguing that such actions represented an exchange of information 
rather than actual supervision.51 Both agreed, however, that neither 
the socialists nor the liberals were prepared to assume sole respon­
sibility for the state and that recourse to coalition was again 
necessary. They also admitted that only Kerensky possessed sufficient 
popularity to form such a government.52
The various party resolutions marking the end of the conference 
followed the outlines of the debates. The Menshevik and SR statements, 
delivered by Dan and Gots respectively, gave Kerensky the right to 
choose ministers who would support the July 8 declaration. The Cadet 
resolution, presented by M. V. Vinaver, permitted Kerensky to select 
ministers on an "all national basis" and stressed that they had to be 
exempt from party control. The small Trudovik and Radical Democratic 
parties, which occupied the interstices between the Cadets and the 
SR-Menshevik nexus, expressed complete confidence in Kerensky and 
refused to set any conditions on the formation of the ministry.53 
After being informed of the results of the extraordinary conference,
5^Birzhevye Vedomosti, July 22, 1917, P»
53-Pelo Naroda, July 22, 1917, P* 3* 
52RUsskie Vedomosti, July 22, 1917, p. 3* 
53Pelo Naroda, July 22, 1917, p* 3*
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Kerensky returned to the capital, withdrew his resignation, and opened 
negotiations for the rebuilding of the government. The Minister- 
President indicated immediately that the new cabinet would be free of 
partisan restrictions. In a July 22 announcement to the press, he 
condemned "oarty controversies," warned that he would not tolerate 
interference with necessary changes in the "order and distribution" of 
governmental work, and hinted that he might assume extraordinary 
governing powers.5^
The membership of the Second Coalition reflected Kerensky's 
unique position and testified to his victory of July 21. While party 
disputes flared as soon as he began to distribute portfolios,55 he 
came very close to the cherished goal of a non-partisan cabinet. The 
diminution of the Petrograd Soviet was particularly evident; Tsereteli 
had retired from the government, and just two ministers, Chernov and 
Skobelev, held posts in the TsIK.5^ Furthermore, Chernov's presence 
was the only real imposition on the Minister-President. Kerensky 
attributed his recent exclusion from the Central Committee of the SR 
Party directly to Chernov, actively disliked him as a result, and 
would have preferred to see the ministry of agriculture in other 
hands.57 But in this case, Kerensky had to yield to the will of his 
nominal party. The intensive Right campaign against the SR leader had
5^VVP, July 23, 1917, p. 1.
55Pelo Naroda, July 26, 1917, p. 1.
56Tsereteli, II, 386.
57v. B. Stankevich, Vospominaniia, 191V1919 (Berlin, 1920), 
p. 225*
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inflamed socialists at all political levels,58 and the Soviet demanded 
that he retain his previous position.59 The Minister-President was 
almost as successful in restricting the ministerial influence of the 
Right as he had been with the Left. While four Cadets joined the new 
government, only F. F. Kokoshkin and P. P. Iurenev were closely 
identified with Miliukov.The rest of the cabinet consisted either 
of personal friends such as I. N. Efremov, A. V. Peshekhonov, and 
Nekrasov, or relatively uninfluential but compromise-orientated figures 
such as S. N. Protopovich and N. D. Avksent'ev.*^
Kerensky's initial pronouncements demonstrated his freedom from 
direct party control. To the discomfiture of Miliukov and Chernov,̂ 2 
the Minister-President signaled his disdain for the recent doctrinal 
disputes by refusing to release a governmental platform.*^3 Instead, 
he issued a "Declaration to the Citizens of Russia" which promised an
58For example, see Delo Naroda, July 25, 1917, p* 1; Izvestiia. 
July 23, 1917, p. 7-
59Russkie Vedomosti, July 27, 1917, p. 2.
60Kerensky, Catastrophe, p. 256.
8Ithe cabinet membership was as follows: Kerensky, Minister- 
President and Minister of War and Navy; Nekrasov, Deputy Minister- 
President and Minister of Finance; Tereshchenko, Minister of Foreign 
Affairs; Skobelev, Minister of Labor; Peshekhonov, Minister of Food; 
Chernov, Minister of Agriculture; S. F. Ol'senburg, Minister of 
Welfare; Iurenev, Minister of Transport; Prokopovich, Minister of 
Trade and Industry; A. M. Nikitin, Minister of Posts and Telegraph; 
Kokoshkin, State Controller; A. V. Kartashev, Ober-Procurator of the 
Holy Synod; Avksent'ev, Minister of the Interior. See Izvestiia.
July 25, 1917, p. 3»
^^Milioukov, Histoire. Ill, 1280; V. ’Chernov, Pered burei. 
vospominaniia (New York, 1953), P* 339*
63Kerensky, "Iz vospominaniia," XVIII (1929), p. 256.
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"iron government" that would weld national unity and restore the 
country's honor.^ Both the Right and the Left viewed Kerensky's 
independent stand with deep misgivings: Russkie Vedomosti criticized 
the peremptory tone of the declaration, which seemed to exclude any 
consultation with liberal organizations,65 and Izvestiia warned that 
further social reforms were imperative.66 Nevertheless, the Minister- 
President 's first actions passed without serious challenge. Kerensky 
had apparently attained the position that he had envisioned on July 6. 
While he had not silenced his critics, he had certainly intimidated
them, and he was confident that his advantage could be maintained into
the foreseeable future.
Kerensky had badly miscalculated. He had attributed his success 
on July 22 to the belated recognition that only a true union of social 
forces could extricate the country from its difficult position.^? In 
fact, the Second Coalition had been made possible only by the sudden
weakening of the Soviet and a concurrent dispersion of liberal
strength. As the enforced solidarity of the Left and the Right was 
based on little more than a present lack of suitable alternatives, it 
could not be expected to endure. Kerensky had temporarily bridged a 
widening gap between two antagonistic blocs in his victory at the 
Malachite Hall, but he had not forged a new Union Sacree. As soon as 
liberals or socialists found a new point of leverage, his regime would
64izvestiia, July 26, 1917, p. 6.
65Russkie Vedomosti, July 27, 1917, p. 2.
^izvestiia, July 25, 1917, p. 2.
67izyestiia, July 23, 1917, p« 5*
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come under severe pressure. Also, the above-party configuration of 
the Second Coalition prevented an effective response to the revival of 
social or political tensions. Largely sundered from supportive party 
institutions, the new cabinet lacked the capacity to moderate conflict 
and was exposed to outside assault.
It was Kerensky's ill fortune that he provided the instrument 
through which that precarious political balance was disrupted. That 
occurred when he appointed General Lavr Kornilov to the post of Supreme 
Commander on July 18 ° and reaffirmed his original decision, after 
some hesitation, on July 22.^9 Kornilov’s promotion appeared to be a 
logical step in the recovery of state power. The new army leader was 
highly respected in military circles,70 and as he had been invaluable 
in containing the German advance in Galicia,71 he seemed an excellent 
choice to replace the demoralized Brusilov.72
But Kornilov immediately indicated that he would not be a pliant 
tool in Kerensky's hands. As conditions to his acceptance of the post, 
the Supreme Commander insisted that he be held responsible only to his 
conscience and the will of the nation, that he be freed from inter­
ference in the conduct of military affairs, and that the death penalty 
be extended to all areas where military reserves were stationed.
^Birzhevye Vedomosti, July 20, 1917, p. 3*
69Savinkov, p. 20.
70A. I. Denikin, Ocherki Russkoi smuty, 5 vols. (Paris, 1921-25), 
II, 15-
7lRusskie Vedomosti, July 22, 1917, p. 2.
72penikin, Smuty, II, 15.
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Kornilov also demanded that his recommendations at the July 16 Stavka 
conference, which included a purging of the Officer Corps, the ' 
prohibition of soldiers' meetings, and restrictions on the activities 
of military committees, be implemented without delay.73 Kornilov's 
strong stand attracted national attention, and non-socialists saw him 
as the awaited "general on a white horse" who would lead Russia away 
from the abyss.7^ The discontents of the Right, previously so 
diffused, had found an object about which to coalesce. From the moment 
of the Supreme Commander's appointment, liberal toleration of Kerensky 
depended upon the degree to which he aligned himself with his unruly 
subordinate.
After the Kornilov putsch, that unfortunate general was cast in 
a distorted mold which left serious traces in historical works on the 
period.75 The major contributors to that view were Kerensky, who 
wished to salvage the reputations of the Officer Corps and the Cadets, 
and Boris Savinkov, the famed terrorist, who was interested in 
enhancing his own reputation. According to Kerensky, the Supreme 
Commander was a true "man of the people," a straightforward patriot 
unfamiliar with political subtlety.76 Kornilov's faults stemmed from 
his virtues; outrage at the excesses of the Left and the decomposition
73Russkie Vedomosti. July 28, 1917, p« 3*
7̂ A. Denikine, La decomposition de l'armee et du pouvoir; 
Fevrier-Septembre, 1917 (Paris, 1921), p. 300*
7$For examples, see W. H. Chamberlin, The Russian Revolution.
2 vols. (New York, 1965), II, 19^; A. Moorehead, The Russian 
Revolution (New York, 1958), P> 217.
76Kerensky, Catastrophe, p. 298.
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of the army permitted his exploitation by unscrupulous advisors like 
N. N. Filonenko and Savinkov, and his fighting qualities led to 
impetuous, ill-considered acts.’'7'7 The Minister-President further 
maintained that Kornilov was slowly guided into treasonous activities 
and that his final decision to establish a dictatorship was due to an 
erroneous conviction that the government harbored German agents.''7® 
Kerensky's assertions, which really amounted to a partial 
exoneration of the Supreme Commander, were indirectly supported by 
Savinkov, the Assistant Minister of War during the Second Coalition. 
From almost the beginning of the revolution, Savinkov claimed, he had 
used the general to advance his own ambitions. In need of a deus ex 
machina to help him replace Kerensky, Savinkov had assured Kornilov's 
promotion to Corps Commander and then Supreme Commander;79 in fact, he 
had even shown contempt for the general's intelligence by indicating 
his fraudulent intentions.The conclusions, at least by inference, 
were that Kornilov was first misled and then victimized by a small 
clique of adventurers and that his revolt was an aberration in an 
otherwise constructive political process.
That interpretation was oversimplified. An impatience with the 
nuances of coalition politics was not the same thing as political 
naivete, and there is ample evidence that the slight, Asiatic appearing
77a . Kerensky, The Prelude to Bolshevism; the Kornilov Rising 





general was neither obtuse nor credulous. His natural talents were 
beyond dispute; born a commoner, he rose to the level of general 
officer at a time when family status was still an important factor in 
promotions.83- Furthermore, Kornilov’s disenchantment with governmental 
policy was the result of personal experience, first as the commandant 
of the demoralized Petrograd garrison®^ and then as a corps commander 
on the Galician front, and was thus based on practical rather than 
ideological considerations. Because his alienation from the revolution 
had developed gradually, it was actually less complete than that of 
many officers. For example, even after the military debacle at 
'Iarnopol, at which he had been present, he was less vehement than his 
colleagues in urging corrective measures; under questioning by a 
commission of inquiry, Kerensky later admitted that the restrained tone 
of Kornilov's proposals at the July 16 Stavka conference had been an 
important consideration in his promotion two days l a t e r . T h e  editors 
of Izvestiia were also appreciative of Kornilov1s past services and 
previously conciliatory attitude and applauded his appointment in the 
belief that it preserved the safety of the revolution.Kerensky and 
the moderate socialists had misjudged Kornilov’s reliability, but they 
did so only because they failed to take the times into account. While 
the Supreme Commander was less disillusioned with compromise than the 
majority of the Right, the difference in degree was of little
8̂ -Birzhevye Vedomosti, July 20, 1917, p. 3*
82por an example of Kornilov’s efforts, see VVP, March 7, 1917,
p. 1 .
83Kerensky, Prelude, p. 19*
8̂ -Izvestiia, July 20, 1917, p* 5-
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significance. In common with the great majority of non-socialists, he 
was now firmly convinced that the state was in mortal danger and that 
extraordinary measures were necessary. After July 18 he was in a 
position to act upon those convictions.
But at first Kornilov was inclined toward cooperation with the 
government. His startling declaration of responsibility only to his 
conscience and the will of the nation on July 19 had not been the claim 
to dictatorial power that Kerensky had suspected.®5 instead, it had 
been a variation of the same rather self-righteous argument that the 
Minister-President had often applied against both the Left and the 
Right.®® Events quickly changed the Supreme Commander’s attitude. 
Kerensky sympathized with the Kornilov program, but he delayed imple­
mentation because he wished to introduce it gradually and in less 
abrasive forms.®? Kornilov, on the other hand, had been assured by 
Savinkov that his demands would be accepted,®® and he became increas­
ingly resentful of the Minister-President's imagined breach of 
promise.®9
The developing conflict became public knowledge and its 
progression was well documented in the press. A strong editorial 
urging the immediate adoption of Kornilov's proposals appeared in
85stankevich, p. 221.
®6chemov, Pered burei, p. 339.
87yyp, August 15, 1917, p. 3.
88savinkov, p. 20.
89Denikin, Smuty, II, 17.
Russkie Vedomosti on July 28,90 and the barren results of a meeting 
between the Supreme Commander and the cabinet on August 3 produced 
increased liberal criticism of Kerensky's "obstructionist" tactics.91 
A second conference between Kornilov and Kerensky, held at the 
general's request on August 10, served only to underline their dif­
ferences. The meeting was preceded by rumors of the Supreme 
Commander's impending dismissal,92 which gained credence when he 
arrived in Petrograd with bodyguards carrying machine guns.93 The con­
ference was conducted in a strained atmosphere and had an inconclusive 
result. Kerensky again refused to implement Kornilov's original
program, turned aside a request to militarize the war industry and the
rail system, and agreed only to "consider" the extension of the death 
penalty to the rear.94 In the opinion of non-socialists, the unsatis­
factory meeting of August 10 defined the issues. Their sentiments were 
perhaps best expressed by an incorrigible monarchist, the English-bom 
Grand Duchess Marie, whose preferences allowed the drawing of sharp 
distinctions. The choice, she maintained, was now between the "great 
Russian patriot General Kornilov" and the "Kerensky faction with its 
wordy vacillation."95
9QRusskie Vedomosti, July 28, 191?, P- 3*
9lRech1, August 4, 1917, p. 3- 
92izyestiia, August 6, 1917, P- 3*
93lzvestiia, August 11, 1917* p. 4.
94izVestiia, August 11, 1917, P- 3»
95Grand Duchess Marie, Education of a Princess: a Memoir 
(New York, 1930), P. 330.
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Ironically, the furor surrounding the Kornilov program obscured 
serious efforts by Kerensky to consolidate state authority. From the 
latter part of July to the middle of August, the harried Minister- 
President enacted measures that had been far beyond the capacity of the 
First Coalition and that, in less critical times, would have been 
warmly welcomed by the liberal forces. On July 15, he imposed strict 
penalties upon the violation of censorship regulations,^ thus 
converting an ineffectual voluntary policy into one that had real force. 
A week later, he assumed the right to close any meetings or disperse 
any assemblies that threatened the success of the war effort or
imperilled the security of the state.97 On July 30. he extended the
death penalty to the navy on the same terms as the army.98 On August 3. 
Kerensky created a special political administration, directly 
responsible to the war ministry, that subordinated soldiers' committees 
to the will of military commissars.99 Also, on August 5 he provided 
severe penalties, including banishment to Siberia,100 for those guilty 
of insulting Allied countries or their agents by "word, deed, or in 
publications."101
Those vigorous measures were accompanied by others specifically 
designed to placate liberal sensibilities. On August 5, he ordered
96VVP, July 15, 1917, p. 1.
97VVP, July 29, 1917, p. 1.
98lzvestiia, August 18, 1917, P*
99yyp, August 10, 1917, p. 2. 
looyyp, August 23, 1917, p. 3* 
loiyyp, August 6, 1917, p. 2.
179
the transfer of the Romanov family from Tsarskoe Selo to Tobol'sk,^®^ 
where they would be secure from interference by the Petrograd Soviet.
On August 9, Kerensky postponed elections to the Constituent Assembly 
from September 17 to November 12,103 providing the Cadets with 
additional time to develop their political campaigns throughout the 
country. The Minister-President also hardened the tone of his speeches 
and proclamations. For example, he applied the term "counter­
revolution" to Left protests against state centralization, 10** and he 
substituted "Directives to the Population of the State" for "Appeals 
to the People" in official pronouncements.105 A new firmness was also 
evident in his approach to nationality problems. Kerensky sharply 
turned aside a Finnish bid for full independence and insured that 
their inevitable protests would remain uncoordinated by dissolving the 
Finnish Sejm.106 Furthermore, he issued to the Ukrainian Rada a set 
of unexpectedly restrictive instructions that partially negated the 
concessions of July 2. While Ukrainian nationalists objected to the 
content of the new directive, which nullified the Rada’s right to
ratify laws passed by the Provisional Government and seriously reduced
its authority over minority groups in Ukrainian territory,107 they
1°2VVP, August 6, 1917, p. 1.
103d . A. Chugaev, et al., eds., Revoliutsionnoe dvizhenie v 
Rossii v Avgust 1917; Razgrom Kornilovskogo miatezha (Moscow, 1959).
p. 177.
lO^Rech1, August 5. 1917, p.
105vvp, July 20, 1917, p. 1.
106yyp, July 21, 1917, p. 1.
107VVP, August 5, 1917, p. 3-
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avoided an open clash with Kerensky and agreed to continued nego­
tiations. The Minister-President also assumed a firm stance in the 
conduct of foreign policy. Official declarations to the Allies 
reflected a determination to restore the fighting capacity of the armed 
forces and to wage further military campaigns, and the issue of revised 
war aims was carefully avoided.^^9 Kerensky had completely fulfilled 
the Cadet demands of July 1j, and except for an immediate imple­
mentation of Kornilov's program, there was little more that he could 
have done to pacify the Right.
His efforts were wasted, for the Kornilov program had become an 
inflexible standard by which all else was measured. While the Left 
viewed Kerensky's actions with growing alarm,HO the Right impatiently 
aligned itself on the side of the Supreme Commander. Kerensky was 
unable to halt that attrition in popularity. His differences with 
Kornilov concerned only questions of emphasis and timing, and an out­
right repudiation of the general would have had severe repercussions 
on his own policy. Under those conditions, the sole alternative was 
a form of passive resistance; he was forced to endure a progressive 
loss of influence in both political camps in hopes that the passage of 
time would reduce the clamor form the Right and still allow a 
continuation of his own platform.m
1°^A. Choulguine, L'Ukraine contre Koscou, 1917 (Paris, 1935). 
p. 133-
109Kor example, see VVP, July 19, 1917, P* 1-
ll^Delo Naroda, August 22, 1917, P« 1*
llldee Kerensky's speech before the Democratic Conference, cited 
in Izvestiia, September 15, 1917, p.
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That enforced passivity was very hard to bear. Kerensky had 
always reacted to opposition in an aggressive fashion, and the present 
lack of resources left him increasingly despondent. After a 
particularly disturbing interview with Kokoshkin on August 11, when 
mass Cadet resignations were threatened unless the Kornilov program 
was instituted,112 Kerensky revealed his discouragement. "They accuse 
me of inefficiency," he complained to Pitirim Sorokin, his private 
secretary. "They think a dictatorship is necessary. How tired I am 
with all this hopeless striving. . . . "H3 The beleaguered Minister- 
President had ample cause to be disheartened. He had almost lost 
control of the cabinet, and he faced the certainty of renewed criticism 
at the approaching Moscow State Conference.
The Moscow State Conference, scheduled to meet at the Bolshoi 
Theatre from August 12 to August 15, had been originally conceived as 
a means to bolster the government's influence in the country and to 
gamer support for its aggressive p o l i c i e s . T h e  optimistic days of 
the Government to Save the Revolution were past, however, and the 
controlled turn to the Right had become a desperate holding action 
against political extremism. Kerensky had seriously considered 
cancellation, for he recognized the dangers of allowing a rallying 
point for Kornilov's supporters.H 5  But liberal pressure for a public
H2Kerensky, Prelude, p. 38.
113P. Sorokin, Leaves from a Russian Diary (New York, 1924), 
pp. 79-80.
114VVP, July 13, 1917, p. 3- 
115Kerensky, Prelude, p. 33-
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appearance by the Supreme Commander had been unremitting,-*--*̂  and the 
Minister-President finally agreed to let "everything be openly 
expressed."H7 Kerensky did take some precautions; he ordered Kornilov 
to speak only of the current situation at the front,H8 an<} he urged 
Petrograd socialists to send impressive delegations to Moscow.^ 9  But 
those measures were clearly inadequate, and he dreaded the coming test 
of strength with the Right.-*-20
As Kerensky had feared, the Moscow conference turned into a 
prolonged demonstration of liberal solidarity with the Supreme 
Commander. The 2,414 delegates were drawn equally from socialist and 
non-socialist ranks, but "frock coats and starched shirts overshadowed 
blouses" in the enormous crowds surrounding the Kremlin.121 Further­
more, the propertied elements obviously had come to support Kornilov. 
Although the Minister-President arrived with an impressive retinue, he 
was unable to distract attention from his rival. He later recalled, 
with considerable bitterness, that he had been virtually ignored while 
the "popular hero," Kornilov, was treated as the titular head of state 
by some and as a savior by others.^ 2
H ^Izvestiia. August 11, 1917. P* 4.
H7s. P. Mel'gunov, Vospominaniia i drevniki, 3 vols.
(Paris, 196-14-), II, 224.
H^Kerensky, Prelude, p. 82.
H 9lzvestiia, August 11, 1917, p. 4.
120sorokin, p. 89.
121lzvestiia, August 13, 1917, p. 2.
122Kerensky, Catastrophe, p. 315.
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That disparity in treatment continued into the conference 
proceedings. Kerensky's opening address, a lengthy defense of 
coalition interspersed with warnings against counterrevolution,123 was 
listened to with visible impatience by the audience.12^ But Kornilov's 
speech, which consisted of little else than repeated demands for the 
immediate adoption of his program, was often interrupted by tumultuous 
ovations from the Right.1^5 The Supreme Commander's appearance marked 
the beginning of a general liberal attack upon Kerensky. Vasilii 
Maklakov, a Right Cadet, charged that Russia had reached the crucial 
point where "salvation, not revolution," was required,126 and Miliukov, 
continuing in the same vein, asserted that Kerensky had failed 
completely to take effective measures for the "restoration of order or 
the protection of lives and property."12? But the sharpest assault at 
the conference was delivered by the newly-elected Cossack Ataman, 
General A. M. Kaledin, who expressed disdain for the Minister-President 
and urged the creation of a "really strong government resting in 
capable hands."128 Kerensky was badly shaken by the criticism directed 
against his leadership, and his closing speech, which Rech' accurately 
characterized as a reaction of "nervous sensitivity to the new
123VVP, August 15, 1917, PP* 2-3.
12̂ S. I. Shidlovskii, Vospominaniia. 2 vols. (Berlin, 1923),
II, 138.
125lzvestiia, August 15, 1917, p. 3*
126ia. A. Iakovlev, ed., Gcsudarstvennoe Soveshchanie; 1917 god 
v dokumentakh i materialakh (Moscow, 1930), p. 117*
127izvestiia, August 16, 1917, p. 2.
128iakovlev, p. 76.
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wave,"129 was an open admission of personal defeat. He agreed to 
abandon the "middle course," to suppress revolutionary idealism, and 
to think "solely of the state." Finally, in an emotional peroration 
that startled the delegates, he promised to satisfy their "yearning 
for autocracy, for a power that applies pressure from above."130 The 
Minister-President's agitated performance only underlined his desperate 
position. It was apparent that he had lost control of the conference, 
that his leadership had been rejected, and that his political isolation 
was almost total. Kerensky's repudiation by the Right had been so 
complete that, in looking back at the Moscow events, he took solace in 
the fact that he had not been ousted by Kornilov through the simple 
device of acclamation.^31
The Moscow State Conference was followed by the Kornilov revolt.
The Supreme Commander, increasingly irritated by governmental 
hesitations that "bordered on the criminal,"̂ 32 had considered the 
possibility of a military coup for some time, and his adulatory 
reception in Moscow reinforced his opinion that the moment for direct 
action had arrived. The political signs were certainly favorable.
The Left had been in steady decline since the July Days, Kerensky's 
authority had been seriously undermined, and the entire Right awaited 
the establishment of a stronger form of rule. "Unwilling to miss such
129Rech\ August 17, 1917, p. 1. 
130lzvestiia, August 16, 1917, p. 2.
13lKerensky, Catastrophe, p. 316.
132see the interview with Boris Savinkov, cited in Birzhevye 
Vedomosti, September 12, 1917, p. 1.
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an opportunity,"133 Kornilov set several cavalry divisions in motion 
against Petrograd on August 20.134 He acted in the belief that 
resistance would be minimal and that unreserved liberal support would 
assure a rapid re-establishment of the state apparatus.135
It was a measure of Kerensky's isolation that he was unaware of 
Kornilov's intentions. While Petrograd liberals were not informed of 
the details,136 they knew that a major assault against the government 
was in preparation. On August 13 Kornilov had warned Miliukov that an 
"open conflict" with Kerensky was imminent,137 and he had apparently 
even sent subordinates to the State Duma to investigate the deputies5 
attitudes toward a military coup.138 But the Minister-President1s 
control over the Stavka had completely broken down, and he received 
only faint indications of approaching difficulties. While he placed 
the Grand Duke Nicholas under house arrest in response to tenuous 
reports of counterrevolutionary plots, 139 he failed to extend his 
suspicions to the Supreme Commander. In fact, he unintentionally 
facilitated Kornilov1s plans. Riga had fallen to the Germans on the 
night of August 20, and the way was suddenly open for a rapid enemy 
advance toward Petrograd. The unexpectedly poor showing of the
133p. Miliukov, Istoriia vtoriia Russkoi revoliutsii, 1 vol. in 
3 parts (Sofia, 1921-23), part 2, p. 173*
13̂ -Denikin, Smuty. II, 22.
13^1iliukov, Istoriia, part 2, p. 174.
136Nabokov, p. 44.
137Miliukov, Istoriia, part 2, p. 173*
138shidlovskii, II, 14-1.
139Russkie Vedomosti, August 24, 1917, P- 2.
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defending troops, who had allowed the crossing of the Dvina by 
numerically inferior forces, persuaded Kerensky that the Kornilov 
program had to be adopted after all. Accordingly, he dispatched 
Savinkov to the Stavka with a proposal for the extension of the death 
penalty to the rear,^- he further reduced the influence of soldiers' 
committees in military affairs, and he announced plans to transfer 
the government to Moscow. -^3 Anticipating that those actions would 
provoke disorders, the Minister-President also directed the Third 
Cavalry Corps to Petrograd for the enforcement of martial law.l^
Kerensky's concessions completely misled the Supreme Commander. 
Since they involved a drastic break with the Left which carried the 
threat of civil war, and since the Third Cavalry Corps was already 
advancing against the capital, Kornilov evidently assumed that his 
superior had uncovered the plot and had chosen compliance rather than 
resistance. Coordinated action with the government suddenly appeared 
possible, and N. V. L'vov was dispatched to Kerensky with the Supreme 
Commander's terms. The conditions were practically identical to 
Miliukov's proposals at the State Duma meeting of July 18; a military 
dictatorship was to be established, and Kerensky was offered a minor 
post, the portfolio of justice, in the projected r e g i m e .
l^ONovoe Vremia, August 22, 1917, p. 3*
l^lSavinkov, p. 19-
142vvp, August 26, 1917, p. 3*
l^Russkie Vedomosti. August 27, 1917, p* 3*
l^See Kerensky's speech in Izvestiia, September 15, 1917, p.
1^5stankevich, p. 229; A. Kerenskii, "0 vozstanii Gen. 
Kornilova," Izdaleka, sboroik statei (Paris, 1922), p. 178.
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That illusory period of unanimity, during which both Kerensky 
and Kornilov thought they were in control of the situation, was 
shattered on August 26 when N. V. L'vov arrived at the Winter Palace. 
After confirming the accuracy of the former Ober-Procurator’s message 
in a cautious telegraphic conversation with the Supreme Commander, 
Kerensky assembled the cabinet and demanded absolute authority to 
suppress the rebellion. The ministers reacted to Kerensky's charges 
with a mixture of skepticism and alarm. Kokoshkin, speaking for the 
Cadets, protested against the Minister-President's "dictatorial 
character," argued that a misunderstanding had occurred, and threatened 
to resign unless a suitable accommodation was reached with Kornilov.
But when Kornilov refused a direct order to yield his position to 
General V. N. Klembovskii^? and raised the standard of civil war,-^8 
the cabinet submitted to Kerensky's will. While Chernov left the 
government, judging accurately that he would be needed in the Soviet, 
the rest of the ministers stayed at Kerensky1s disposal in hopes that 
they could exert a moderating influence upon events.-^9
To the frustration of the Petrograd Cadets, who tried to strike 
an understanding with the Supreme Commander,-*-50 Kerensky adamently 
resisted negotiations. His response was characteristic, for an 
association with overt counterrevolution was a serious violation of
l^°Russkie Vedomosti. September 1, 1917, p. 5-
147vyp, August 29, 1917, p. 1.
l^Bpusskie Vedomosti, September 1, 1917, p. 2.
1^9Russkie Vedomosti, August 30, 1917, p. 3*
150chugaev, p. 452.
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his fundamental beliefs. In that respect, the Minister-President was 
as ideologically inflexible as the party leaders that he had so often 
castigated. Despite his unquestioned sympathy with liberalism, 
Kerensky's commitment to the revolution was unqualified. He could 
agree to harness it, or even temporarily to compromise its integrity 
if national goals were at stake, but he was unable to participate in 
its destruction. He later indicated that if the choice had been 
between extremism of the Right and the Left, he would have supported 
the former on the grounds that the chances for democratic evolution 
were greater where liberal values existed.-1-51 But Kerensky considered 
the Kornilov revolt to be a reactionary challenge to moderation, and 
for that reason he was compelled to oppose it with all the resources 
at his command.
Accordingly, the Minister-President sought the immediate 
liquidation of the revolt. On August 27, he forestalled further 
liberal attempts at a rapproachement with Kornilov by publicly 
declaring the general a traitor "consciously provoking a fratricidal 
war. "-1-52 He then appealed to the Soviet for aid-1-53 and appointed 
Savinkov Governor-General of the Petrograd Military District, investing 
him with authority to conduct the defense of the capital.154 As 
General Klembovskii refused to replace Kornilov and declared solidarity
151a . Kerenskii, La Russie des Soviets d'apres les Bolcheviks 
eux-memes (Paris, 1920), p. 7-
152yyp. August 28, 1917, p. 1. 
153lzvestiia, August 29, 1917, p. 4. 
154yyp, August 29, 1917, p. 2.
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with the revolt,155 Kerensky assumed the office of Supreme Commander 
and appointed the manifestly unwilling Alekseev as his Chief of Staff.
In his new role as dictator, he pointedly ignored the majority of the 
cabinet by selecting Nekrasov and Tereshchenko as his assistants,156 
commanded a halt to all troop movements toward Petrograd, and declared 
a rail strike to assure the execution of that order.157
Kerensky raised the alarm before Kornilov's forces were within 
striking distance of the capital, and to that extent he took part in 
the effective defense of the revolution. But after that act, events 
passed completely out of his hands.158 while liberals stood aside, 
the reinvigorated Soviet transformed Petrograd into an armed camp where 
hastily organized workers' detachments mingled freely with garrison 
troops.159 Governmental orders were ignored, and the dispersion of 
Kornilov's forces along the mil system, their breach of communications 
with the Stavka, and their demoralization in the face of intensive 
propaganda were conducted under the auspices of the Petrograd 
Soviet.160
The result was an accelerated re-enactment of the last days of 
the tsarist regime. Kornilov's troops lost cohesion as they neared
155RUsskie Vedomosti, August 29, 1917, P» 3*
156Russkie Vedomosti, September 1, 1917, p.
157vvp, August 29, 1917, p. 3>
158V. Zenzinov, Iz zhizni revoliutsionera (Paris, 1919), p» 90.
159lzvestiia, August 29, 1917, p« 6.
I60por a vivid portrait of the ineffectiveness of the Provisional 
Government during the Kornilov revolt, see Sorokin, p. 89*
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the capital, and at the first clear opportunity they joined the ranks 
of the revolutionary forces.161 Even the formal conclusion of the 
revolt was reminiscent of the February Days. On September 1, against 
Kerensky's advice, General Alekseev journeyed to Mogilev and obtained 
the peaceful surrenders of Kornilov, General A. S. Lukomskii, and 
other participants in the u p r i s i n g . 162 The revolution had inscribed 
a full circle and was again at the fluid point that had been reached 
in February.1^3
But this time the restraints of February had been swept aside.
In the space of two months, the failures of the First Coalition had 
produced their fatal consequences. The social equilibrium was 
completely disrupted, the advocates of coalition were discredited, and 
compromise, as understood in the February settlement, had become 
impossible. If Kornilov's defeat had embraced only the Cadets and the 
army command, the government, with the aid of the traditional socialist 
leadership, might well have preserved sufficient authority to bring 
the country to the Constituent Assembly and an eventual reconstruction 
of the sta+e apparatus. But a series of governmental blunders, 
prompted by Kerensky's unrealistic desire to recreate a strong cabinet 
in the immediate wake of the Kornilov revolt, led to his political 
disgrace and the enfeeblement of the moderate leadership that had
l6llzvestiia, September 2, 1917, p« 3«
l62por discussions of that event, see Novoe Vremia, October b, 
1917, p. 3; W P , September 2, 1917, p. 2.
1^3See A. Kerenskii, "Genesis of the October Revolution of 1917," 
MMS, The Hoover Institute, Stanford University, ps 25.
supported him in the past.164 While the major forces of the Right 
withdrew from active politics in sullen anticipation of civil war,1^5 
important soviets, including those in Petrograd and Moscow, fell under 
the sway of Bolshevik majorities hostile to the Provisional Govern­
ment .166 By early September, Russia was split into irreconciliable 
factions, with their most extreme elements prepared for a forcible 
settlement of their differences. In the interim, Kerensky's regime, 
divorced from real support by either the Right or the Left, was 
tolerated as an inconvenient relic of an unsuccessful and embarrassing 
political experiment.
l64see the discussion on the fate of political moderation in 
Delo Naroda. October 15* 1917, P» 1«
l65shidlovskii, II, 145.
I66izvestiia. September 22, 1917, P* 4.
CHAPTER VI
THE COLLAPSE OF THE DEMOCRATIC EXPERIMENT
In 1920, Kerensky expressed regret over his participation in the 
Second Coalition. Its failure had been foreshadowed in the debates at 
the Malachite Hall, and if he had stood by his resignation of July 21, 
events might well have taken a different course. The gathering 
reaction, unable to proceed in the guise of stabilization, would not 
have gained the same momentum, and its impact would have been less 
destructive.̂  Furthermore, if he had escaped involvement with Kornilov 
he would have preserved his standing among the populace, and in the 
"darkest days that lay ahead" perhaps could have been of additional 
use to his country.^
That was a significant evaluation, as important for its omissions 
as for its affirmations. Without abandoning the charge of Komilovist 
treachery, Kerensky tacitly acknowledged the workings of a deeper 
force— the dissolution of the class truce in the wake of the Galician 
defeats and the Ukrainian crisis. Yet his populist belief in the 
renovative power of the revolution forbade the conclusion that the
lA. Kerenskii, "Gatchina," Izdaleka, sbomik statei (Paris, 1922), 
p. 213.
2a . Kerensky, The Catastrophe; Kerensky’s Own Story of the 
Russian Revolution (New York, 1927), p. 254.
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class rupture was permanent,3 and his nationalistic bias led him to 
deny a necessary connection between the exorbitant demands of the First 
Coalition and the Kornilovshchina.4 In Kerensky's opinion, his error 
had simply been one of faulty timing. His return to power on July 22 
had bean a precipitate act undertaken when the energies of the Russian 
people had been temporarily depleted, so his subsequent inability to 
control events did not reflect adversely on either the validity of 
coalition or the feasibility of state consolidation.5 The former 
Minister-President was particularly insistent on those two vital 
points. The Second Coalition succumbed to conspiracy, not to a funda­
mental alteration in the dynamics of the revolution. Since it 
"accurately expressed resolutions freely adopted by all parties (except 
the Bolsheviks) that had any weight in the nation,"6 its aims and 
methods conformed to the true will of the population.
Historians of the period have tended either to ignore Kerensky's 
assertions or to note them with visible impatience.7 Their negative 
reactions are understandable, for his argument contained the typical 
distortions of the experienced political lawyer, and the consensus to 
which he referred existed largely in his imagination. Yet it would be
3a . Kerenskii, Ob armii i voine (Petrograd, 1917), p. 6.
4a . Kerenskii, "0 vozstanii Gen. Kornilova," Izdaleka. p. 186.
5A. Kerenskii, "Politika Vremennogo Pravitel'stva," SZ,
L (1932), 422.
6Kerenskii, "Politika," p. 423.
7See W. G. Rosenberg, Liberals in the Russian Revolution 
(Princeton, 1974), p. 472; 0. H. Radkey, The Agrarian Foes of 
Bolshevism (New York, 1958), p. 462; R. V. Daniels, Red October; 
the Russian Revolution of 1917 (New York, 1967), p. 88.
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a serious error to dismiss Kerensky's statements as still another 
round in the seemingly endless recriminations of the emigration, for 
they provide valuable insights into the otherwise perplexing denouement 
of the Kornilov revolt. Even before the formation of the Second 
Coalition, Kerensky believed that popular support for coalition could 
only be temporarily dampened. As he was convinced that it could never 
be eradicated, he was forced to accept the corollary that extremism was 
merely a surface phenomenon that would fail to strike enduring roots in 
the national consciousness. Those assumptions were erroneous, but 
once it is realized that the Minister-President accepted them as valid 
political principles, his initial reaction to Kornilov's challenge 
becomes understandable. It is then possible to describe the way in 
which Kornilovism discredited Kerensky and, through him, the last 
bastion of governmental stability— the moderate bloc in the Petrograd 
Soviet.
Of course, the Stavka uprising promised severe repercussions in 
any event. Upon its outbreak P. P. Iurenev, the Cadet Minister of 
Transport, predicted that it would deliver a "terrible blow to the 
reconstruction of the country's forces,"8 and while he spoke, a new 
wave of anarchy was erasing the disciplinary gains of the previous 
weeks.9 An intensification of the radical revolution was clearly 
unavoidable; the established revolutionary leaders had initiated the 
swing to the Right that had so quickly surged out of control, and their 
disgruntled followers were unlikely to be easily appeased. Even
^Russkie Vedomosti. September 1, 1917, p. 5.
9lzvestiia, September 2, 1917, p. 5-
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Kerensky's staunchest supporters in the TsJK accepted the necessity 
of drastic concessions. At a plenary session on August 30, Tsereteli 
admitted that the "organized democracy" faced a difficult task in 
ending the "confusion in the ranks of the popular m a s s e s , "10 and 
Skobelev expressed the general opinion by noting that a tactical shift 
to the Left was essential to the restoration of order.H
Major socialist newspapers had already arrived at the same 
conclusion. On August 30 Delo Naroda observed that the Provisional 
Government could provide effective rule only if it "depended fully" 
upon the revolutionary democracy and prophetically added that there 
was no other reliable route to the Constituent Assembly.12 Izvestiia, 
on the following day, was more explicit. It called for a halt to 
those reforms that had promoted counterrevolution, demanded that the 
government become "clearly and consistently revolutionary in both its 
program and policy," and urged complete reliance upon the "democratic 
masses."13 The Kornilovshchina had evidently diminished the 
ideological inhibitions of the Menshevik and SR parties and they 
appeared disposed to assume primary direction of the revolution. But 
their intervention implied the abandonment of a balanced coalition, 
the termination of cabinet independence, and the renunciation of Great- 
Power status.
Prompt adoption of the socialist formula might well have
IQlzvestiia, August 31. 1917. P» 5»
Hlbid.
12pelo Naroda. August 30, 1917, p. 1.
13lzvestiia. August 31, 1917, p. 1.
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prevented the Bolshevik insurrection of October. It is necessary to 
remember that in the last days of August radicalism did not yet mean 
Bolshevism, and because the Constituent Assembly would soon meet, class 
rule did not mean unrestrained class tyranny. The Soviet was still 
committed to the minimum objectives of provisional mile, and a govern­
mental displacement to the Left might have perpetuated that commitment. 
The timing was also propitious, for the Right, demoralized by the rapid 
collapse of counterrevolution, was incapable of serious obstructionism. 
In sum, the Komilovshchina provided a unique opportunity to sweep 
away the detritus of the broken class truce and to erect in its place 
a viable political order.
In the greatest miscalculation of his political career, Kerensky 
negated that possibility at the very moment of its appearance. While 
the Minister-President was quite reticent about his decision— he 
succeeded, after all, only in intensifying the firestorm that was 
raging on the Left— -he evidently thought that vigorous political 
manipulation could forestall a radical resurgence. Relying upon the 
resiliency of moderation and the weakness of extremism, he attempted 
to exploit the Kornilov revolt in order to duplicate the conditions 
of July 8; in the resulting confusion, he hoped to refurbish his 
reputation as the guardian of the revolution, to resurrect the class 
truce, and to preserve the firm policies of the Second Coalition.
Since Kerensky intended to recreate the July settlement, his 
tactics paralleled those of that period. He had then acquired a marked 
advantage by attributing the disorders to German money and Bolshevik 
treason, by selectively regulating the scope and intensity of 
reprisals, and by extracting significant concessions from the alarmed
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and intimidated Star Chamber. His temporary gains— control over the 
previously fractious Left and the restraint of the Right— dissipated 
during the Second Coalition, for they had been based upon an ephemeral 
power vacuum. But the Minister-President, purblind to the causes of 
political imbalance, saw no reason to alter his previous methods. 
Acting rapidly to forestall untimely socialist interference,1^ he 
sought an advantageous accord with the Cadets at the same time that he 
moved against the "clique of adventurers" gathered about Kornilov.^5 
Kerensky chose a bold line, one that conceded little to past reverses 
or present difficulties. The inauguration of that strategy on 
August 26 marked the point at which state recovery became impossible.
While the Minister-President clung tenaciously to his program 
for several days, he encountered difficulties from the outset. The 
possession of extraordinary authority was essential to his plans; 
socialists could not be restrained unless they deferred to his lead in 
the liquidation of counterrevolution, and liberals would accede to his 
demands only if they could rely upon his protection.-*-6 Yet Kornilov's 
ascendancy had undermined his prestige, and in the very midst of the 
Komilovshchina he was forced to seek assurances of freedom of action 
from both the cabinet and the Petrograd Soviet. Although Kerensky 
devoted the evening of August 26 and the morning of August 27 to that 
end, the results were equivocal. A turbulent night session of the
l^Izvestiia, September 15, 1917, p. 3*
15VVP, August 29, 1917, p. 1.
l^B. Savinkov, K delu Kornilova (Paris, 1919), p. 29; see 
Kerensky's speech cited in Izvestiia, September 15, 1917, p. 3«
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ministerial council produced an abortive liberal revolt on the part of 
Kokoshkin and Iurenev,!? and the subsequent resolution that the 
Minister-President be invested with dictatorial powers appeared to be 
an expression of cabinet paralysis rather than a vote of confidence.
In fact, it was not clear on August 26 whether the Cadets had resigned 
in protest or simply placed their portfolios at Kerensky9s disposal.
By the morning of August 27 the regrouped ministers agreed to the 
latter interpretation. Yet it is entirely likely that Kerensky's 
decision to admit Nekrasov and Tereshchenko into a Triumvirate, 
ostensibly motivated by a desire to accumulate a "harmonious group" to 
deal with the present crisis,^9 was really an oblique commentary on the 
unreliability of his liberal colleagues.
The socialist response, if less strained, was also less 
comforting than that of the ministerial council. While Kerensky 
received general expressions of support from the TsIK on the morning
of August 27, it was evident even then that they would not accept a
subordinate role in the defense of the revolution.20 The formal 
Soviet resolution, passed in plenary session on the evening of 
August 27, verified that conclusion; Kerensky was encouraged to form 
a government able to resist Kornilov, but no reference was made to his 
request for dictatorial authority.21 Undeterred by the tepid socialist
l?Russkie Vedomosti, September 1, 1917, p. 4.
18Russkie Vedomosti, September 1, 1917, p. 4.
19lnterview with Nekrasov, Rech', August 30, 1917, p. 2.
20Russkie Vedomosti. September 1, 1917, p. 2.
21lzvestiia, August 28, 1917, p* 3-
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stand, the Minister-President chose to believe that he had been granted 
adequate latitude.22 But even Tsereteli, who later attempted to place 
a favorable interpretation on the matter, was forced to admit that the 
August 27 resolution was primarily distinguished by its ambiguity. ^
With his hands at least partially freed, Kerensky turned to the 
next phase of his program— the rehabilitation of the non-socialist 
forces in the eyes of the aroused populace. Of necessity, the military 
aspects of that problem claimed his immediate attention. As the Stavka 
was in revolt, the Right could not be distinguished from rebellion 
unless the army leadership was associated with the act of repression. 
The Minister-President waged that necessary campaign with dramatic 
flair. An eloquent public repudiation of Kornilov was followed on the 
night of August 2? by the appointment of Savinkov as Governor-General 
of the Petrograd Military District^ and an offer to General Alekseev 
of the post of Supreme Commander.25 While both reacted with visible 
ill grace— Alekseev initially refused to cooperate, assuming the lesser 
position of Chief of Staff on August 30 only in order to limit 
bloodshed^— their attitudes were of little importance. As Kerensky 
was convinced that the rebellion would collapse without aimed 
conflict,2? he was satisfied with passive compliance; a simple
22yyp. August 29, 1917, p. 1.
23lzvestiia, September 1, 1917, p. 1.
2%VP. August 29, 1917, p. 2.
25Novoe Vremia, October 4, 1917, p. 3*
26yyp, September 13, 1917, p. 2.
27lzvestiia, August 27, 1917, p. 6.
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adherence to the government cause was quite sufficient to demonstrate 
the basic reliability of the higher command. In this case, at least, 
the Minister-President was proven correct. The conspiratorial nature 
of the Kornilov revolt precluded a wide circle of accomplices, and the 
vast majority of officers, caught by surprise, did remain passive.
Under those circumstances, Kerensky was able to release to the press 
extended lists of prominent commanders who declared solidarity with 
the government.28 Thus, without seriously testing the mettle of the 
Officer Corps, he was able to develop an impressive argument for 
Kornilov1s "isolation from the rest of the active army and navy."29
Unfortunately, he was unable to demonstrate Kornilov's isolation 
from the Cadets. Their sympathies lay with the rebellious general, and 
so long as the revolt appeared viable party stalwarts such as Miliukov 
and Vasilii Maklakov pressed for governmental concessions.30 Kerensky 
was consistently frustrated in his efforts to moderate liberal 
hostility. His sharp condemnation of Kornilov on August 27, motivated 
in part by a desire to discourage the compromising behavior of the 
Cadets,31 provoked a barrage of vituperation that was especially 
focused upon his assumption of dictatorial powers. While the more 
blatant accusations of jealousy and Bonapartism were confined to 
hurriedly issued pamphlets, they were hinted at in a Rech8 editorial
28Russkie Vedomosti. August 29, 1917, p. 3; VVP, August 29,
1917, p. 1.
29VVP, August 29, 1917, p. 1.
30d . A. Chugaev, et al., eds., Revoliutsionnoe dvizhenie v Rossii 
v Avgust 1917; razgrom Komilovskogo miatezha (Moscow, 1959), p. **-52.
3lKerensky, Catastrophe. p. 323*
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of August 29. The Triumvirate, Rech1 charged bitterly, had adopted an 
"arrogant stance" that falsely equated "self-defense of the government" 
with "defense of the country." In its "obsession with phantoms," it 
lost sight of the fact that Kornilovism was the true source of national 
order.32 That broadside stopped short of outright identification with 
Kornilov and, strictly interpreted, remained within the bounds of 
legitimate political criticism. But it also provided additional proof, 
if any were needed, of the Cadet affinity with counterrevolution.
Liberal resistance slackened with the visible failure of the 
Komilovshchina. but even then extraordinary methods were required to 
produce cooperation. On the morning of August 30 V. T. Lebedev, an 
editor of Volia Naroda (The People1s Will), provided Kerensky with 
evidence that Miliukov had planned an editorial endorsement of Kornilov 
just prior to his defeat; armed with that incriminating information, 
the Minister-President demanded that the Cadets come to terms. V. D. 
Nabokov and M. M. Vinaver, representing their Central Committee, proved 
to be difficult negotiators. In response to threats of exposure, they 
agreed to participate in a new coalition and to remove Miliukov from 
all posts of party responsibility.33 But in exchange Kerensky was 
forced to dismiss Nekrasov, admit military experts into the projected 
cabinet, and treat Kornilov with consideration.34 The Minister- 
President 1 s counterstroke, bom of long brooding in Kornilov1 s
32Rech1, August 29, 1917, p. 1.
33A. Kerensky, Russia and History^  Turning Point (New York, 
1965), p. 407.
34Russkie Vedomosti, September 1, 1917, p. 4.
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disturbing shadow and nourished by a mistaken conception of the stamina 
of the Russian people, would have failed in any case. But if the 
possibility of success had existed, it surely would have foundered on 
the reefs of Cadet intransigence.
Yet until September 1 Kerensky thought that effective political 
stabilization was within reach. To external appearances, and within 
the limits of his mechanistic formula, his desired goals had been 
realized. Overt treason had teen confined to a snail area centered 
about the Stavka while the Right, albeit reluctantly, had rededicated 
itself to the techniques of compromise. The Minister-President was 
confident of his ability to translate those accomplishments into 
tangible advantages; his exposure of Kornilov had again demonstrated 
his value to the revolution and his mandate from the Soviet and the 
ministerial council, while somewhat tempered, offered a method for the 
exploitation of his anticipated popularity.35 Kerensky's optimism was 
evident in a conversation with Savinkov on August 30* In response to 
the former terrorist1s assertion that governmental provocation of the 
Kornilov revolt had destroyed the cohesion of the armed forces and 
undermined the revolution, he replied that nothing was further from 
the truth. Victory over counterrevolution, he insisted, had removed 
the last barriers to national unity. Freed of internal threats, the 
country could now present a common front to the external foe.36
The cabinet negotiations of August 30-31 reflected Kerensky's 
determination to dictate the future expression of that unity. While
35Those conclusions are implied in Kerensky, Russia, p. 405*
36savinkov, p. 29.
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he respected the niceties of coalition politics, the Minister-President 
refused to consider the presence within the government of potentially 
disruptive personalities; he intended to keep the Chernovs, Kokoshkins 
and Miliukovs of previous regimes at a safe distance. Kerensky 
approached A. A. Buryshkin, a Moscow industrialist, strictly because 
he represented commercial interests.37 But he offered sensitive 
positions only to those whom he could dominate or who had proven their 
reliability in past conflicts. In that respect, the conciliationist 
Cadets N. M. Kishkin, S. A. Smirnov, and V. A. Kartashev and the 
departmental functionaries M. V. Bernatskii and A. V. Liverovskii were 
included in the first catagory; the loyalists N. D. Avksent'ev, A. V. 
Peshekhonov, and V. A. Arkhangelskii qualified for the second.38 The 
military members of the projected cabinet were also known for their 
moderate views. Rear Admiral D. V. Verderevskii, the former commander 
of the Baltic fleet, and General A. I. Verkhovskii, Savinkov1s 
predecessor as the commander of the Petrograd Military District, had 
accepted the necessity of revolutionary reforms and were not expected 
to present difficulties.39 while Kerensky's efforts at governmental 
reconstruction were prematurely disrupted, they had advanced 
sufficiently to reveal his purpose. There was to be no deviation from 
the path of national regeneration. Under his unchallenged leadership, 
a third coalition would redeem the blighted promise of the second.
3?Rech', September 3. 1917, p° 1»
38Lists of considered ministers can be found in Russkie 
Vedomosti. September 1, 1917, p. 4, and Birahevye Vedomosti,
September 1, 1917, P- 3»
39a . Kerenskii, "Otchislenie Gen. Verkovskogo,n Izdaleka, 
pp. 193-19^; VVP, October 10, 1917, p. 2.
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Those plans were shattered on September 1, when the VTsIK placed 
Kerensky under its authority, forbade Cadet participation in the 
government, and announced that a Democratic Congress would preside over 
the reconstruction of the cabinet.^ Kerensky later claimed that the 
VTsIK resolution, which effectively voided his formula for state 
stabilization, was entirely unexpected.^1 Yet that event was only the 
logical sequel to his previous actions, for he had courted the wrath 
of the socialist forces from the outbreak of the Stavka revolt. The 
TsIK and VTsIK debates of August 30-31, which convincingly demonstrated 
that the Left regarded the party of Miliukov as the party of treason, 
provided clear warnings of approaching conflict. Already alarmed by 
Kerensky's laxity in the treatment of mutineers^ and his apparent 
reliance upon the counsel of Alekseev and Savinkov,^ they strenuously 
condemned his political overtures to the Cadets.^
Initially, the Minister-President sought to dampen socialist 
hostility through indirect methods. While Skobelev and Avksent1ev 
defended his tactics before the socialist l e a d ership,^3 he tried to 
kindle popular enthusiasm for the projected government by announcing 
that it would have a republican form.^6 But Kerensky was unable to
^QIzvestiia, September 3. 1917, p. 7*
^iKerensky, Russia, p. 410.
42izvestiia, August 31, 1917, p. 1.
^3PeIo Naroda, August 31, 1917, p. 1.
^Brizhevye Vedomosti. September 1, 1917, p. 3*
^5Kerensky, Russia, p. 408; VVP, September 2, 1917, p. 1. 
^Izvestiia, September 2, 1917, p. 2.
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discourage his critics. On the evening of August 31 Gots and Zenzinov, 
representing their Executive Committee, formally notified him that 
Cadet participation would provoke a SR boycott of the cabinet. Forced 
to issue a direct reply, Kerensky chose to defy his party. The head 
of a national government, he claimed, was not subject to the will of 
individual groups. Since the welfare of the country demanded the 
formation of a representative cabinet, the Cadet appointments would 
stand unchanged.^7 With the alternatives so starkly outlined, the 
VTsIK resolution of September 1 was virtually predetermined; the Left, 
naturally refusing to surrender its newly regained powers, chose 
instead to bridle Kerensky. Through that act, an intensified form of 
dual power came into being.
The VTsIK fiat immediately caused the Minister-President to 
alter his tactics. The issue had shifted from governmental strength 
to cabinet independence, and he abandoned the Cadets in order to defend 
that essential principle. Kerensky's counterattack, which spanned the 
first two days of September, proceeded on the assumption that the 
VTsIK would not hold to its original intent. Noting that the 
September 1 resolution revealed a certain disinclination to exercise 
a strenuous supervisory role over cabinet affairs,**^ Kerensky brought 
Verkhovskii and Verderevskii into the Triumvirate, which he renamed the 
Directory. While he justified that maneuver on the innocuous grounds 
of administrative efficiency,^9 it was really a preliminary step toward
^/Izvestiia, September 2, 1917, p. 3.
^SiEyestiia, September 3, 1917, p. 7.
fr9VVP, September 3, 1917, p. 1.
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an independently reconstructed cabinet.50 on September 2, the 
Minister-President opened cautious negotiations with the Moscow Trade- 
Industrialists;51 ironically, the party he tried to use against 
Miliukov in July was now enlisted in the struggle against the VTsIK. 
Kerensky suspended those activities on September 3 in the face of a 
new socialist assault, but they foreshadowed the course that he would 
follow until October. He was determined to preserve the national 
complexion of the Provisional Government; when the radical revolution 
faltered, it could then serve as a rallying point for moderates.
Kerensky's exercise in prudence was a week late. The basic 
thrust of his earlier maneuvers had escaped general notice in the 
turmoil of the Komilovshchina. but his persistent courtship of the 
Cadets provoked a re-evaluation of those activities. The first 
consequences of that increased scrutiny appeared in the September 3 
issue of Delo Naroda. Several editorials, penned by Chernov and 
unified by a common theme, placed Kerensky's role in the Kornilov 
affair in a disturbing perspective. The Minister-President's behavior, 
Chernov observed, had been very suspicious. The appointments of 
Savinkov and Alekseev to positions of authority, the consorting with 
traitorous Cadets, and the summoning of the Third Cavalry Corps to 
Petrograd might have a rational explanation, but he, personally, was 
unable to imagine what it could be. 52 in the inflamed atmosphere of 
September those insinuations, echoed and elaborated upon in the party
50Kerensky, Catastrophe, p. 322.
5lRech1, September 3. 1917. p. 3*
52pelo Naroda, September 3, 1917, pp. 1-2.
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presses and organisations of the Left, severely damaged Kerensky in 
the eyes of the radicalised p o p u l a c e .53 His political eclipse was 
startlingly rapid; by September 5, even the Moscow Soviet, previously 
a strong advocate of his policies, condemned his "vacillation" and 
"accommodation with counterrevolution."54
While the denigration of Kerensky's reputation brought his 
political effectiveness to a close, it did not automatically mean the 
abandonment of the February settlement. So long as the charges 
against him remained within the bounds set by the Moscow Soviet, his 
allies on the Left possessed the capability to moderate the impact of 
extremism. The accusations of weakness and incompetence directed 
against Kerensky could not be broadened to include the leaders of the 
Petrograd Soviet, for their performance during the Stavka revolt had 
been beyond reproach. The Bolsheviks played an important part in the 
defense of the revolution,55 but the entire Left recognized that their 
forces had been organized and directed to victory by Menshevik and 
SR chieftains.56 Furthermore, the VTsIK resolution of September 1 
represented a determined bid to secure that ascendancy. By renouncing 
the embarrassing relationship with Kerensky that had existed since 
July 6, assuring the continued isolation of the Cadets, and reducing
53Pelo Naroda. October 15, 1917, p* 1. Chernov1s inflammatory 
editorials were deliberately misleading, for he had participated in 
the cabinet decision that directed the Third Cavalry Corps to Petro­
grad. See Izvestiia, September 15, 1917, p. 4.
54d . A. Chugaev, et al., eds., Revoliutsionnoe dvizhenie v Rossii 
v Sentiabre 1917; obshchenatsional'nye krizis (Moscow, 1961), p. 144.
55lzvestiia, August 29, 1917, p. 6.
56izvestiia, September 2, 1917, p* 3*
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the powers of the compromised government, the traditional socialist 
leaders opened a valuable distance between themselves and the taint 
of Komilovism.
Unfortunately, those defenses proved inadequate against the full 
consequences of Kerensky’s actions. In the anarchic aftermath of the 
Komilovshchina. the tenuous distinctions that allowed the simultaneous 
waging of war and revolution were obliterated; by the first week of 
September the soldiers and workers of Petrograd were convinced that 
strong rule for any purpose meant counterrevolution. Seen in that 
harsh light, the Minister-President * s actions during the rebellion 
condemned him as decisively as his former Supreme Commander. The 
Stavka uprising, according to the radical interpretation, was preci­
pitated by a difference over means rather than ends. Whereas Kerensky 
wished to strangle the soviets through a gradual process of attrition, 
Kornilov wanted their suppression by force of arms.57 The counter­
revolutionary plot, then, extended at least to the beginning of the 
Second Coalition and perhaps even to the Government to Save the 
Revolution. Since Kerensky had been hand in glove with Kornilov until 
the last week of August, he could not be accused of either weakness or 
vacillation. That lesser charge applied to the socialist leadership 
that had allowed treason to develop.58
The importance of the radical critique did not lie in its impact 
upon the Provisional Government, for Kerensky’s disgrace had already 
determined the fate of that unfortunate institution. Rather, its
57See the discussions in Izvestiia, September 22, 1917, p. 4;
Delo Naroda, October 15, 1917, p. 1.
58chugaev, Sentiabre, p. 148.
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significance lay in its ruinous effect upon the prestige of the 
traditional socialist leadership and the unity of the revolutionary 
democracy. The veterans of the TsIK and the VTsIK, who had humbled 
Kerensky in order to assume command of the revolution, suddenly found 
the political ground cut from under their feet. The immediate result 
was the crippling of the SR and Menshevik parties and the disinte­
gration of the moderate bloc in the Petrograd Soviet. Kerensky's 
nominal party split into fragments, with an expanding left wing that 
sought his expulsion,59 a rapidly shrinking right wing that vainly 
tried to defend coalition,60 and a bewildered center incapable of 
determined action.61 The Mensheviks suffered a similar fate, for 
their Central Committee held diminishing authority over a radicalized 
following that was increasingly drawn either to L. Martov's Menshevik- 
Internationalists or to the Bolsheviks.62 But the major blow to the 
moderate leadership occurred in the Petrograd Soviet. On September 9
59Pelo Naroda, September 8, 1917, p. 1. Two leftist articles,
"The Problems of Power and the People1 s Assembly" and "Our differences
with the Bolsheviks in the State Duma" called Kerensky an "obstacle" 
to "the realization of the democratic revolution." The articles also 
attached a "dictatorial" label to the Provisional Government.
6QDelo Naroda, September 8, 1917, p. 1. V. Lunkevich, speaking
for the Right, inserted an article entitled "A Forced Answer." In it, 
he protested against the defamation of Kerensky, upheld the validity of 
coalition, and urged the right wing to close ranks against the extreme 
Left.
6lpelo Naroda. September 9, 1917, p. 1. Editorials expressing 
the confusion of the center revealed the impact of the radical 
critique. The predominant sentiment was "what are we to do?"
62The confusion afflicting the Mensheviks is brilliantly 
described in N. N. Sukhanov, The Russian Revolution, 1917; Eyewitness 
Account, trans. Joel Carmichael, 2 vols. (New York, 1962), II, 25k.
210
Tsereteli, Dan, Gots, Chernov, Skobelev, and Chkheidze were removed 
from the TsIK^3 and their places taken by a Bolshevik-dominated 
committee headed by L. D. Trotsky.
Those developments were decisive to the further course of the 
revolution. The deepening radicalism of the masses, which the 
Bolsheviks both inflamed and profited from, was incompatible with the 
notion of dual power or the aims of the February settlement; their 
slogan was "All Power To The Soviets," and their dominant sentiment 
was hostility to the Provisional Government and its works. The 
moderate socialists, confined to increasingly insecure party presidiums 
and their temporary stronghold in the VTsIK, were placed in a wholly 
untenable position. Desirous of regaining control over their alienated 
followers yet compromised by their relationship to a detested and 
obstinate regime, they were forced to pursue mutually exclusive 
policies. The ultimate results were the breakdown of their influence 
over the populace and the unrestrained intensification of the radical 
revolution. More immediately, the dissolution of the moderate forces 
assured in advance the Democratic Conference's failure to effect a 
meaningful reconstitution of the Provisional Government.
Yet the Democratic Conference convened on September 14, despite 
the fact that its 1,492 socialist delegates^ were presided over by a 
partially-repudiated leadership dedicated to the rejuvenation of a 
discredited regime. The proceedings reflected the disorganization and
63lzvestiia, September 10, 1917, p. 4.
6%)elo Naroda, September 27, 1917, p* 1.
65lzvestiia. September 20, 1917, p. 5*
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confusion that existed within the socialist ranks. On September 19, 
after five days of angry debate, the delegates agreed to coalition by 
a slender margin of seventy-eight votes. But that decision was 
effectively reversed by the adoption, by an enormous majority, of an 
amendment prohibiting a Cadet presence in the new cabinet.66 The 
VTsIK, rightly acknowledging that "within the democracy there exists 
no agreement, no unity of will,"6? proposed a way out of the impasse: 
the creation of a smaller Democratic Council, composed of 215 repre­
sentatives from the various party central committees, empowered to 
form a new government based on socialist principles.6® With the 
adoption of that resolution on September 20, the Democratic Conference
disbanded.69
On September 23, the Democratic Council imposed a ritualistic 
settlement on Kerensky. As an unavoidable concession to the principle 
of coalition, Cadets personally uninvolved with Komilovism were 
allowed into the cabinet. But the government was ordered to adopt an 
exclusively socialist platform. The terms, which were cast in 
unequivocal language, included: the convocation of an interallied 
conference for the revision of war aims; government-regulated prices 
for industrial products; increased taxation of the propertied classes; 
and immediate implementation of Chernov's land program. Also, the 
principle of national self-determination had to be recognized and the
66izVestiia. September 20, 1917, p. 6.
67lzvestiia, September 20, 1917, p. 7*
68iZVestija, September 21, 1917, p. 2.
69lzvestiia, September 21, 1917, p.
Officer Corps purged of Komilovist sympathizers. 7° Finally, the 
Democratic Council authorized the creation of a Preparliament, composed 
predominantly of socialists, to which the Provisional Government would 
be responsible.71 Predictably, no one was satisfied with the outcome. 
Dan, who read the final resolution to the assembled delegates, 
confessed that it was "unsuitable both in substance and in form."72 
Trotsky, speaking for the Bolshevik Party, condemned the Democratic 
Council for exceeding its authority in concluding an agreement with 
the proscribed Cadets, labeled the results an "incitement to civil 
war," and urged the creation of an all-socialist government.73 The 
most astute assessment came from the editors of Rech1. Speaking for 
the disenfranchised Right, they declared that the settlement was 
"wholly incompatible" with the establishment of state authority.7^
The results of the Democratic Conference and its sequel served only to 
emphasize the salient characteristics of the post-Kornilov period: 
that the government and its moderate allies were locked into a mutually 
destructive relationship, and that the vital forces of the country, at 
least for the present, lay on the extreme Left. If consolation could 
be drawn from the events from September 14 to September 25, it 
consisted in the fact that with the emergence of the Third Coalition a 
technical center of government again existed.
70jzvestiia, September 24, 1917, p. 4.
71Chugaev, Sentiabre, p. 236.
72izvestiia, September 24, 1917, p. 4.
73lzvestiia, September 24, 1917, p. 3*
74chugaev, Sentiabre, p. 256.
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The new cabinet, composed of Left liberals, Right socialists, 
and non-party loyalists, was similar to the one Kerensky had attempt®! 
to establish on August 31.75 The three Cadet ministers, N. M. Kishkin, 
A. V. Kartashev, and S. A. Smirnov, had broken with the majority in 
the Cadet Central Committee and were inclined to accept Kerensky's 
lead in policy d e c i s i o n s .76 The only notable socialist in the 
ministerial council, the Menshevik K. A. Gvozdev, was also isolated 
from the main currents of his party; a socialist equivalent of the 
conciliationist Cadets, he was firmly committed to the techniques of 
class compromise.77 Had that configuration appeared in May, when 
Kerensky's reputation was still intact and the possibilities for class 
compromise still existed, it would have contributed substantially to 
his mastery of the revolution. But as it was fortuitously produced in 
the backwash of the radical resurgence, it was a further indication of 
governmental weakness.
The cabinet declaration of September 25 offered evidence of 
Kerensky's determination to redeem that situation. He refused to
75yyp, September 28, 1917. p. 1. The membership of the cabinet 
was as follows: Kerensky, Minister-President and Supreme Commander; A. 
I. Verkhovskii, Minister of War; D. V. Verderevskii, Minister of Navy; 
A. M. Nikitin, Minister of Post and Telegraph and Minister of Interior; 
Tereshchenko, Minister of Foreign Affairs; S. N. Prokopovich, Minister 
of Food; M. N. Bernatskii, Minister of Finance; S. S. Salazkin,
Minister of Education; A. V. Liverovskii, Minister of Transportation;
A. I. Konovalov, Minister of Trade and Industry; N. M. Kishkin, 
Minister of Welfare; P. N. Maliantovich, Minister of Justice; K. A. 
Gvozdev, Minister of Labor; S. L. Maslov, Minister of Agriculture; A.
V. Kartashev, Minister of Confessions; S. A. Smirnov, State Controller;
S. N. Tret'iakov, Chairman of the Economic Council.
76m . Visniak, Dan9 proshlomu (New York, 195^). P» 312.
7?Chugaev, Sentiabre, p. 217.
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ascribe the new platform to the Democratic Council; the reversal of 
previous policies was attributed solely to the "national exhaustion" 
brought about by Kornilovist treachery. The Minister-President then 
proceeded to undermine the terms of the September 23 settlement. The 
government did pledge itself to the convocation of an interallied 
conference for the revision of war aims. But while "striving for 
peace," it would still defend the common allied cause. Thus, the 
emphasis was shifted from the attainment of an early democratic peace 
to that of war in union with the Allies. The army, the government 
proclamation continued, would follow the "democratic path." But its 
officers would be selected for their "technical ability to meet the 
problems of war" as well as for their devotion to the revolution.
Land committees were promised increased authority so long as their 
actions did not violate the "existing forms of land ownership." Tax 
reform was promised, yet no mention was made of a graduated income 
tax, and an increased property tax was referred to in deliberately 
vague terms. Finally, Kerensky renamed the Preparliament the 
Provisional Council of the Republic to emphasize its tentative nature 
and stated that it would be empowered only to "query the government, 
receive answers after a certain time, and deliberate on questions 
arising before it." Obviously, the Minister-President had reinter­
preted the decisions of the Democratic Council to his own satisfaction. 
If anyone remained in doubt that the cabinet was advancing a claim to 
independence, the conclusion of his declaration set those doubts to 
rest. The Provisional Government, Kerensky insisted, remained the
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"spokesman of the will of the revolutionary people."78
The Minister-President was able to extricate the government from 
the reluctant grip of the VTsIK, to issue a verbal challenge to left 
extremism, and to reaffirm a commitment to traditional national 
interests. But he could not invest the Third Coalition with meaningful 
authority. Kerensky's last regime, which endured precisely four weeks, 
met with severe reverses in every sphere of its activity: agrarian and 
urban disorders increased; its foreign policy collapsed; and its armies 
began to disintegrate. As Miliukov observed, the Third Coalition was 
a passive object at the mercy of forces beyond its control.79
The cabinet's weakness was especially evident in the conduct of 
military affairs, for it was wholly unable to arrest the decomposition 
of the armed forces in the aftermath of the Kornilovshchina.
Admittedly, Kerensky's official acts revealed an inflexible deter­
mination to raise the fighting capacity of the army. He extended the 
authority of front-line divisional commanders over their rear echelons 
in hopes of tightening lax discipline,80 reduced the ability of 
military committees to interfere with command decisions,®! and estab­
lished penal units to control recalcitrant soldiers.®2 He also ordered
?8VVP. September 28, 1917, p. 1.
79P. Milioukov, Ch. Seignobos, and L. Eisenmann, Histoire de 
Russie: reforms, reaction, revolutions. 3 vols. (Paris, 1933), HI,
1279.
80«stavka 25-26 Oktiabria 1917 g.," ARR. VII (1922), 283.
81VVP, October 21, 1917, p. 1.
82»stavka," p. 282.
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increased efforts for the apprehension of deserters,®3 reduced the 
scope of the democratically organized military courts,8^ and ordered 
the demobilization of particularly demoralized regiments.85 But the 
practical results of those measures were negligible. By early October 
the high command, estimating that over one fifth of the ten million
men under arms had deserted their posts,®6 harbored very serious doubts
that a respectable military force could be kept in the field.
Those anxieties, sharpened by the German capture of the Gulf of 
Riga on October 6,®® led to an extremely revealing episode: the 
forceful repudiation of Kerensky's policies by his chosen assistant, 
General Verkhovskii. The populist-orientated War Minister, who had 
rallied to the revolution in its earliest days, had supported the 
politics of moderation throughout the political upheavals of August 
and September. But on October 20, without prior consultation with the 
ministerial council,89 he reversed his position in testimony before a 
closed session of the Committees of Foreign Affairs and Defense of the 
Preparliament. In a move that startled the committee members, 
Verkhovskii announced his resignation and offered to speak plainly
83VVP. October 14, 1917, p. 2.
84yvP, October 21, 1917, p. 1.
85d. A. Chugaev, et al., eds*, Revoliutsionnoe dvizhenie v Rossii 
nakanune Oktiabr'skogo vooruzhennogo vosstaniia. 1-24 Oktiabria 1917 g* 
(Moscow, 19*32), p. 204.
86chugaev, Vosstanie. p. 224.
87v. Stankevich, Vospominaniia, 1914-1919 gg. (Berlin, 1920), 
p. 256.
88izvestiia, October 6 , 1917, p. 1.
89Kerenskii, "Otchislenie," p. 193*
about the plight of the army and the country. His revelations were 
uniformly alarming: the government could neither feed nor clothe 
sufficient troops to maintain the front; Bolshevism had made such 
inroads that the bulk of the soldiery was unreliable; and the present 
cabinet policy, rather than alleviating the situation, actually 
furthered the chances of a Bolshevik coup. The only possible solution 
Verkhovskii continued, was the negotiation, with the support of the 
Allies, of an immediate peace with Germany. That event would allow 
the rapid demobilization of the army and the formation, largely from 
the Officer Corps, of elite units able to contain anarchy. Finally, 
he called for the creation of a "strong personal power" to facilitate 
state recovery. In subsequent questioning, the War Minister admitted 
that his proposals meant abandonment of the revolution. "We must 
decide what we can afford and what we cannot afford," he insisted.
At the present, he added, the choices were between destruction and
survival.90
Kerensky, whose own alternatives had been reduced to the main­
tenance of appearances, was openly dismayed by Verkhovskii1s defection 
Fearful that extremists on either the Right or the Left would exploit 
the incident,91 he took immediate steps to reduce its impact. The 
Minister-President avoided an official decision on the matter by 
declining Verkhovskii's proferred resignation.92 instead, he
90chugaev, Vosstanie. pp. 224-225.
91V. Nabokov, "Vremennoe Pravitel'stvo," ARR, I (1922), 80.
92Kerenskii, "Otchislenie," p. 194.
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attributed the War Minister's "tactlessness" before the Preparliament 
to mental exhaustion,93 placed him on sick leave, 9** and "temporarily" 
replaced him with General A. A. Manikovskii.95 Apparently, Kerensky 
also tried to withhold Verkhovskii1s testimony from the public. On 
October 22 Skobelev and F, Znamenskii, the presiding officers of the 
joint committee meeting of October 20 and personal friends of the 
Minister-President, issued a curious declaration to the press. General 
Verkhovskii, they correctly stated, had not advocated a separate peace. 
But in claiming that he had condemned defeatism in any form, 96 they 
implied that he supported a continuance of the war. Kerensky's name 
was not associated with the misleading committee declaration. But its 
timing so closely coincided with the governmental closure of Obshchee 
Delo (The Common Cause).97 the conservative newspaper that had first 
published excerpts of the War Minister's s p e e c h , 9 8  that his involvement 
was strongly indicated. Unable to refute the accuracy of Verkhovskii's 
assertions, the embattled Minister-President evidently sought to 
counter them through obfuscation.
The Verkhovskii incident was preceded by a far more serious one: 
an Allied demarche, also provoked by Russia's military decomposition, 
that shattered the foreign policy of the Provisional Government.
93lzvestiia. October 21, 1917, p. 5*
9^»Stavka," p. 283-
95Nabokov, p .  8 3 -
96pelo Naroda, October 22, 1917, p. 2.
97Pelo Naroda. October 26, 1917, p* 2.
98Pelo Naroda. October 22, 1917, p. 2.
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Kerensky was aware that only victory on the battlefield would bring 
success in negotiations with the Allies,99 but it was a measure of his 
inexperience in international affairs that he failed to realize the 
full diplomatic consequences of military defeat.10° He had been given 
fair warning that Allied patience was exhausted; on September 26 the 
French, British, and Italian ambassadors lodged a formal protest 
against his toleration of anarchy and made further material aid de­
pendent upon the prompt restoration of civil and military authority. 101 
As their unprecedented action closely followed the Democratic Council's 
demand for aggressive peace initiatives, a seasoned statesman would 
have been forewarned of future complications in foreign policy. But 
Kerensky attached very little importance to the Allied remonstrance of 
September 26. According to Buchanan, the doyen of the Petrograd 
diplomatic corps, he treated the ambassadors "cavalierly" and dismissed 
them with a "Napoleonic touch."102
Convinced that Russia's membership in the Entente guaranteed a 
respectful consideration of its views,103 the Minister-President 
placed great emphasis on the significance of the impending interallied 
conference. There is no indication that Kerensky actually thought that 
the London meeting, scheduled for October 2$, would lead to a
99c. Nabokoff, Ordeal of a Diplomat (London, 1921), p. 142.
100a . Kerenskii, "Orientatsiia na Rossiu," Izdaleka, p. 140.
lOlChugaev, Sentiabre, pp. 236-237®
102sir George Buchanan, My Mission to Russia and Other Diplomatic 
Memories, 2 vols. (London, 1923), II, 193*
103a . Kerensky, The Crucifixion of Liberty, trans. G. Kerensky 
(Paris, 1936), pp. 359^0.
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negotiated peace with the Central Powers. He did expect Allied 
acknowledgement of the diplomatic principles of the Russian revolution. 
Failing that, he could at least establish Russian desires for "peace 
and the earliest return to peaceful cooperation among nations" in a 
"clear, explicit, and befitting m a n n e r . I n  either case, he felt, 
the benefits would be substantial. The government would demonstrate 
its devotion to the ideals of the revolution, socialist qualms about 
the nature of the war would be stilled, and the morale of the army 
would be strengthened.105
Characteristically, Kerensky intended to elicit Allied 
cooperation through the dual tactics of moral exhortation and political 
compromise. He actively solicited American support; if Wilsonian 
principles were joined to revolutionary idealism, the western European 
delegations would be put on the d e f e n s i v e . T h e  Minister-President 
intended to supplement his ideological offensive with a moderate 
political formula combining a technical condemnation of annexations 
with a clear recognition of national interests. Tereshchenko, his 
spokesman in the foreign ministry, outlined the government's approach 
in a speech before the Preparliament on October 16. The Russian 
delegation, he stated, would demand the "renunciation of foreign 
conquests and indemnities imposed on our enemies and a similar 
repudiation on the part of our enemies." Once that problem was 
resolved, "progress toward the self-determination of smaller nations"
ICfcvvp, October 8, 1917, p. 3-
105Kerensky, Crucifixion, p. 360.
106chugaev, Vosstanie. p. 200.
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could commence. At the same time, Tereshchenko continued, Russia 
(and by implication its Allies) would avoid a peace that would 
"humiliate her or undermine her vital interests."10? The thrust of 
Tereshchenko's speech was unmistakable. The Provisional Government 
sought a cosmetic agreement that would mask the substance of 
imperialism with the flavor of international socialism. It was 
admirably suited to a conference composed of Right socialists and Left 
liberals.
The pragmatic war cabinets of David Lloyd George and Georges 
Clemenceau lacked that political complexion, and they were disinclined 
to accept the dictates of an enfeebled ally. Their rebuff came without 
warning. On October 16 the British Chancellor of the Exchequer, Andrew 
Bonar Law, stated that the London Conference would confine itself 
strictly to methods of prosecuting the war. His Majesty's government, 
Bonar Law continued under questioning, had at no time addressed itself 
to the reconsideration of war aims or to the expectations held by the 
Kerensky regime. On October 18 Jules Cambon, the General Secretary 
of the French foreign ministry, completed the destruction of Kerensky's 
foreign policy initiative by issuing a similar statement.-^9 The 
Minister-President did not respond to the Allied demarche; unless he 
were willing to exploit it by seeking a separate peace, any comment 
would only magnify his defeat. But he undoubtedly had that incident in 
mind in 1920, when he declared: "In the times of its greatest
10?Rech', October 1?, 191?, p. 2.
108parliamentary Debates (Commons), LCVIII, col. 118?.
l°9New York Times, November 1, 191?, p. 3-
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difficulties, the Russian democracy had no true friends among the 
Great Powers of Europe. "HQ
The paralysis of the Third Coalition was as evident in internal 
as in military or diplomatic matters. To a certain extent, its 
ineffectiveness was the result of administrative decomposition; denied 
the cooperation of the soviets and most revolutionary factions, the 
Provisional Government was unable to maintain its machinery in large 
parts of the country. H I  Kerensky acknowledged the severity of the 
domestic crisis in a speech before the Preparliament on October ?. The 
state, he noted, lacked the present capability to "establish elementary 
law and order in Russia" or to "restore industrial production." Those 
essential tasks, he continued, could be undertaken only if a more 
popular body mobilized and directed the "energies and initiatives of 
the public. "H2 The Minister-President's appeal, which could have 
come only from desperation, was fruitless. The Preparliament, divided 
within itselfH3 and estranged from the radicalized populace by its 
affiliation with the Kerensky regime, H 4  was unable to render effective 
aid. Forced to rely upon dwindling resources, the government attempted 
to counter anarchy through the only means left at its disposal: the
use of military units detached from the front. H 5  But even that
HOKerenskii, "Orientatsiia," p. 141.
111a . Dem'ianov, "Moia sluzhba pri Vremennom Pravitel'stve," ARR, 
IV (1922), 119.
H2VVP, October 8, 1917, p. 3*
113Russkie Vedomosti, October 13, 1917, p. 4.
114Ru3skie Vedomosti, October 20, 1917, p. 3*
115Chugaev, Vosstanie. pp. 201-202.
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option was limited, for so few politically reliable soldiers could be 
spared that they were able only to conduct random patrols in especially 
disturbed areas.
Yet governmental passivity could not be wholly ascribed to 
external circumstances, for the cabinet displayed a narked aversion 
to measures that might alleviate popular discontent. That reluctance 
was particularly evident in the field of agrarian reform. In the four 
weeks of its tenure, the ministerial council succeeded only in reaching 
a general agreement on the principles governing land transference. 
Furthermore, those terms fell decidedly short of Chernov's proposals 
and the stipulations of the Democratic Council. According to S. L. 
Maslov's program, state lands were to fail under the jurisdiction of 
the land committees, bat private lands worked by the owner's tools 
were exempt. Thus, the capitalized estates of prerevolutionary Russia 
were to be preserved.While the Bolshevik uprising halted further 
consideration of the issue, there was no indication of additional 
concessions to socialist ideology. A similar trend was evident in 
other areas. Cabinet work on compulsory arbitration of labor disputes, 
an inheritance tax, and the establishment of state monopolies over 
specified consumer goods reached only preliminary s t a g e s .
In part, governmental apathy was a result of demoralization. The 
radical revolution had a corrosive effect upon those charged with its
H6"Stavka," p. 283.
H ?Delo Naroda, October 18, 191?, p. 1.
U BEkonoraisheskoe polozhenie Rossii nakanune velikoi Oktiabr1skoi 
sotsialisticheskoi revoliutsii, 2 vols. (Moscow, 1957), I, 311 •
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containment; Kerensky experienced periods of acute depression during 
October,H9 and the morale of the ministerial council was no better 
than his own.120 Evidently, there was a strong impulse to defer all 
responsibility to the Constituent Assembly, for the only bright spot 
in the otherwise dismal record of the Third Coalition was its rapid 
progress toward convocation of that long-awaited body.^21 Legislative 
timidity was also prompted by fear of another costly interregnum. 
Because many ministers felt that a new cabinet crisis would deliver 
the country into the hands of extremists, they hesitated to raise 
topics that would provoke severe internal dissension.122
Yet there was also a certain premeditation behind the govern­
ment's immobility. While Kerensky often fell prey to discouragement, 
he had not abandoned hope of a return to strong rule; anticipating a 
Bolshevik rising, he expected it to suffer the same fate, and to bear 
similar consequences as the one in July. The Minister-President 
revealed those convictions to Buchanan on October 12. While admitting 
that the currents of civil and military dissolution were presently 
beyond control, he expressed confidence that a radical uprising, which 
should materialize "within weeks," would permit a rapid restoration of 
state order. 123 Kerensky returned to the same theme on October 2k, 
the very day of the Bolshevik insurrection, in a conversation with
H9Kerensky, Russia, p. 1+28; Stankevich, p. 251.
120Dem'ianov, p. 119.
121WP, October 21, 1917, p. 3- 
122pelo Naroda, October 18, 1917, p. 1.
123Buchanan, II, 196.
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Stankevich. The Bolsheviks, he maintained, were playing into the 
hands of the government. This time, "The Chernovs would not be able 
to rescue the Kamenevs and the Zinovievs."124 Kerensky1s refusal to 
grant concessions to radical demands was influenced by those 
considerations. With a resurgence of the native optimism that had 
carried him through so many crises, he looked beyond an uprising to 
the reconstruction of the country's forces. The Provisional Govern­
ment, he felt, could best guide that process if it preserved its 
reputation as the mainspring of political moderation.125
On October 21 the event that Kerensky would have held a "special 
prayer meeting" to witness-^ finally materialized; the Bolshevik- 
controlled Petrograd Soviet openly defied the government by granting 
its Military Revolutionary Committee (VRK) formal authority over the 
capital's garrison.12? The VRK, a revival of the Soviet's anti- 
Kornilov Committee for the People's Struggle against Counterrevolution, 
had ostensibly been created on October 9 to protect Petrograd in the 
event of a German breakthrough on the Northern front.1^® But Kerensky, 
who rightly considered it an instrument of insurrection,129 recognized
12^Stankevich, p. 258. L. B. Kamenev and G. E. Zinoviev were 
prominent Bolsheviks.
125Kerenskii, "Politika," p. 424.
126fjabokov, p. 36.
12?lzvestiia, October 24, 1917, p. 5«
128d . A. Chugaev, ed., Petrogradskii Voenno-Revoliutsionnyi 
Komitet, dokumenty i materialy, 3 vols. (Moscow, 1966), I, 40-41.
129l . Trotsky, The History of the Russian Revolution, trans.
Max Eastman, 3 vols. (New York, 1932), III, 113*
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its bid to control the garrison as the prelude to an armed uprising.3-30 
He had already received assurances from Colonel G. P. Polkovnikov, the 
Commander of the Petrograd Military District, and General A. V. 
Cheremisov, the Coramander-in-Chief of the Northern front, that adequate 
defensive measures had been taken to suppress disorder.3-31 Armed with 
that encouraging information, he planned to launch an immediate 
pre-emptive attack against the VRK and its ruling spirit, the Bolshevik 
Party.
Unfortunately, the left wing of the cabinet did not share his 
views. The socialist ministers refused to countenance a major assault 
against the VRK simply on the basis of Bolshevik resolutions, and 
Polkovnikov's success on October 22 in expelling the VRK commissars 
from the garrison132 added force to their arguments. Kerensky later 
attributed the government's inactivity on October 22 to humanitarian 
motives. The VRK, he claimed, had deliberately been allowed time to 
"realize its mistake" and "reverse its stand.nl33 Actually, he had 
been immobilized by a cabinet majority frightened by the prospect of 
civil war and still unconvinced that a direct threat to the state 
existed.3-3̂  The ministerial council finally sanctioned limited 
measures against the Bolsheviks on the night of October 23; in response 
to Kerensky's repeated urgings, the Menshevik Minister of Justice,
130lzvestiia, October 25, 1917, p. 2.
13lKerensky, "Gatchina," p. 195.
132lzvestiia, October 25, 1917, p. 5*
133lzvestiia, October 25, 1917, p. 2.
13^Buchanan, II, 204; Vishniak, p. 313*
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Maliantovich, proposed the formation of a commission to investigate 
the VRK and authorised the closure of the Bolshevik newspapers Rabochie 
Put1 and Rabochii i Soldat.135 But those tentative steps were taken 
unwillingly, and the cabinet insisted that further action would have 
to be approved by the Preparliament. ̂-36
Kerensky appeared before the Preparliament at 11:00 a.m. on 
October 24 "firmly convinced" that he would gain permission for strong 
punitive measures against the Bolsheviks. ̂37 His timing was 
regrettable; as Stankevich recalled, the "streets were totally calm" 
that morning, with "no sign of any kind of uprising."138 The Minister- 
President1s speech reflected the apparent reality; unable to provide 
concrete proof of insurrection, he fell back on the same arguments 
that had proven so ineffective with the cabinet. He claimed that the 
abortive takeover of the garrison on October 22 and manifestos by Lenin 
and the VRK calling for resistance to the government were adequate 
proof of a matured conspiracy. A "technical" state of insurrection 
existed which threatened the convocation of the Constituent Assembly, 
encouraged a counterrevolutionary movement "perhaps even more serious 
than that of General Kornilov," and undermined the morale of the army. 
Kerensky concluded with a request for sufficient authority to direct 
the "immediate, final, and definite liquidation" of those groups
135lzvestiia, October 24, 1917, p. 7*
136Rech1, October 25, 1917, p. 2.
137Kerensky, Russia, p. 435*
138stankevich, p. 258.
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attempting to subvert the "free will of the Russian people."139
The Preparliament resolution, adopted that evening after bitter 
and prolonged debate, revealed a deep suspicion of Kerensky’s motives 
and an earnest desire to placate the restive populace. It admitted 
that the "developing revolutionary movement" was a threat to the 
Constituent Assembly and the precarious stability of the army and the 
country. Nevertheless, the resolution continued, discontent was 
partially justified by the government's "delay in carrying out urgent 
measures." Above all, the country required a decree on the transfer of 
land to the land committees and an immediate search for peace. The 
Preparliament did agree that steps should be taken to combat an 
outbreak of anarchy. To achieve that end, it proposed the formation 
of a Committee of Public Safety, composed of representatives from 
municipal governments and socialist parties, that would act in concert 
with the Provisional Government.Enraged and astonished by the 
resolution, Kerensky threatened resignation on the grounds that it 
virtually amounted to a vote of no confidence in the c a b i n e t . A s  
that maneuver failed to evoke a suitable response, he icily informed 
the Preparliament that the govertiment "had no need of admonitions or 
instructions" and would conduct the struggle against the Bolsheviks 
under its own auspices.1^2
139lzvestiia, October 25, 1917, p. 3*
140izvestiia, October 25, 1917, P*
l^lStankevich, p. 160; Kerensky, Catastrophe, p. 327.
1^2See F. I. Dan's recollections in R. Browder and A. Kerensky, 
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It is impossible to determine whether Kerensky’s acceptance of 
the Preparliament1s terms would have permitted the suppression of the 
Bolshevik uprising of October 24-25. But there can be little doubt 
that his refusal significantly undermined his position. During the 
three days that the Minister-President vainly sought authority for a 
pre-emptive attack, the Bolsheviks were able to mobilize and arm their 
Red Guards without serious interference. Because of Kerensky's self- 
imposed isolation from the Preparliament, they were also allowed to 
portray rebellion as a protective reaction to counterrevolution,^3 a 
fulfillment of Trotsky's pledge that reactionary assaults would be 
answered by a "ruthless counteroffensive carried out to the end."1^
Socialist protests against the VRK's "thoughtless adventure"^5 
did little to dispel that impression; the uprising was condemned on 
the grounds that it would provoke Black Hundred pogroms, jeopardize 
the Constituent Assembly, and open the front to the Germans. But 
neither the Mensheviks nor the SRs could actually bring themselves to
call for an active defense of Kerensky's unpopular regime.-^ On the
night of October 24 the TsIK, defying its Bolshevik members, mounted a 
tardy campaign to effect a rapprochement between the Provisional 
Government and the Petrograd populace. But in advancing land reform, 
an active peace policy, and the formation of a Committee of Public 
Safety as prerequisites for the re-establishment of governmental
l43chugaev, Komitet, I, 81.
I44izvestiia, October 18, 1917, p. 5*
I45lzvestiia, October 25, 1917, p. 1.
1^6pelo Naroda, October 26, 1917, p. 1; Izvestiia, October 24, 
1917, p. 1.
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integrity,1^7 they offered a solution that Kerensky had already 
rejected.
The failure of the socialist parties to equate rebellion with
treason probably determined the attitude of the troops charged with
the defense of the Provisional Government. Commissar Stankevich wryly
recalled a revealing incident that occurred on October 26. Upon
encountering a detachment of Cossacks near Tsarskoe Selo, he delivered
an impassioned plea for resistance to the Bolsheviks. After he
concluded, one of the soldiers shrugged his shoulders, spat, and with
a "malicious glance" loudly replied:
I don't know about that. In the beginning everything was clear, 
but now no one understands anything. Everyone talks and everyone 
is confused. One wants this, another wants that. Everyone has 
his program, his party. Everyone's muddled, no one is certain.
The devil take all orators.1^8
Kerensky also noted the close connection between leftist 
ambivalence and military demoralization. On the morning of October 2k 
he had "firm assurances" of armed backing from several Cossack 
regiments stationed within Petrograd, but by October 25 the major 
units earmarked for the defense of the capital had chosen a policy of 
neutrality.^9 Unable to counter the Bolshevik attack with the slender 
forces at his disposal, 150 he left for Pskov in search of aid.^1 The
1^7lzvestiia, October 26, 1917, p. 3»
148stankevich, p. 269.
1^9Kerensky, "Gatchina," pp. 198-199.
150lzvestiia. October 26, 1917, p. 3» Those forces consisted of 
a few Cossack detachments, perhaps 1,000 young cadets from military 
schools, and a showcase woman's battalion that had never seen action.
15lDelo Naroda, October 26, 1917, p. 1.
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capital passed under Bolshevik control within hours of his hurried
departure.152
Far more than Petrograd was lost on October 25, for the 
commanders of the Northern front showed a remarkable indifference to 
the plight of the government. In part, their attitude reflected 
Kerensky's failure to purge the Officer Corps of Komilovist sympa­
thizers. 153 But if Commissar Voitinskii's observations were accurate, 
General Cheremisov's refusal to follow Kerensky's orders^-5^ was based 
on more than personal animosity. His reaction was symptomatic of a 
general disaffection with the Provisional Government and expressed the 
feeling, prevalent among the Left as well as the Right,155 that the 
struggle against Bolshevism should be conducted by other principals 
and under other a u s p i c e s . 156
Thus, the Minister-President's policy of class mediation in an 
environment of class warfare yielded its ultimate consequences.
Having alienated every important political force in revolutionary 
Russia, he was nearly as isolated as Nicholas II had been eight months 
before. Since July, Kerensky had resisted enormous pressure in his
152izvestiia, October 26, 1917, p. 3- For detailed accounts of 
the actual course of the Bolshevik uprising, see: Eduard Burdzhalov, 
Vtoraia Russkaia revoliutsiia, 2 vols. (Moscow, 1967-71), I; R. V. 
Daniels, Red October, the Bolshevik Revolution of 1917 (New York,
1967), chapters 8 and 9-
153Pelo Naroda, October 23, 1917, p. 3»
Wstavka," p. 3(&.
155Pelo Naroda, October 28, 1917, p« 1.
156w. S. Woytinsky, Stormy Passage; a Personal History Through 
Two Russian Revolutions to Democracy and Freedom, 1905-1960 
(New York, 1961), p. 382.
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vain attempts to restore the vanished balance of the February revo­
lution. He succeeded only in hopelessly dividing the anti-Bolshevik 
forces at a time when their coordination was imperative.
Nevertheless, the confusion surrounding the Bolshevik coup 
permitted a final effort to regain Petrograd by storm. Still unaware 
that the socialist parties "had broken off relations with the govern­
ment, " Voitinskii persuaded General P. N. Krasnov to move elements of 
the Third Cavalry Corps to the Minister-President1s aid.157 Krasnov's 
“risky campaign"158 proved to be little more than a defiant gesture. 
With great difficulty, he did manage to move a small mixed force of 
Cossacks and artillary past Tsarskoe Selo on October 30.159 But he 
was hampered by the lack of infantry support, and after an inconclusive 
skirmish at the Pulkovo heights near Petrograd he withdrew to Gatchina, 
the historic stronghold of Paul 1.160 it was at that site, the 
hereditary estate of the last tsar to be deposed by a political coup, 
that Kerensky1s own deposition took place.
Yet as late as October 31 it appeared that something could be 
salvaged from the wreckage of the Provisional Government. The Petro­
grad SRs, on their own initiative, had attempted to dislodge the 
Bolsheviks on October 29; meeting with an unexpectedly sharp defeat, 
their newly-formed Committee of Salvation belatedly authorized active
157woytinsky, p. 371-
158Kerenskii, "Gatchina,“ p. 209.
159p. N. Krasnov, "Na vnutrennem fronte," ARR. I (1922), 177.
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support of Kerensky's efforts.161 As several members of the SR Central 
Committee, including Gots, Chernov, and Avksent'ev, were canvassing 
the front for additional forces, the Krasnov venture promised to gain 
renewed impetus.162 Kerensky certainly held that conviction; in a 
fresh display of energy, he ordered General Baranovskii to replace 
Cheremisov as Commander-in-Chief of the Northern front!63 and called a 
"war council" to determine future tactics.164 The Minister-President's 
decisions, reached after consultations with Krasnov, Savinkov, and 
Stankevich, were in keeping with the perceived opportunities. He chose 
to initiate armistice negotiations with the VRK in order to gain time 
for the mobilization of additional forces,165 and as a token of good 
faith to the Committee of Salvation, he proposed the formation of a new 
government drawn from the democratic organs of Petrograd.166 in the 
midst of civil war, Kerensky finally admitted the need for a drastic 
political shift to the Left.
Those concessions came too late, for the negotiations of 
November 1 led to the complete disintegration of the government forces.
P. E. Dybenko, the principal VRK representative at the Gatchina 
Conference, skillfully played on the Cossacks' awareness of their 
military isolation and won their approval for Kerensky's and Krasnov's
l6lpeio Naroda, November 2, 1917, p. 2.
162$tankevich, pp. 272-273*
163Woytinsky, p. 385*
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arrests.167 Forewarned of his peril, Kerensky escaped from Gatchina 
in a sailor's uniform and disappeared in the forests near L u g a . 1 6 8  His 
precipitant flight marked the formal end of the Russian Provisional 
Government.169
The denouement at Gatchina also reduced Kerensky's status to 
that of a state criminal and ended his effective participation in the 
political life of his country. During the Winter of 1917-1918, his 
withdrawal was almost total; apart from arranging publication of his 
testimony on the Kornilov affair,170 his sole public contribution was 
an open letter to Delo Naroda urging continued opposition to Bolshevik 
rule. But that episode further illustrated his political isolation, 
for the editors felt compelled to insert a covering article entitled 
"The Fate of Kerensky" that carefully dissociated him from the current 
activities of the SR party.171 The former Minister-President's attempt 
to gain entrance to the Constituent Assembly in January of 1918 
prompted an even sharper rebuff from his former associates. Zenzinov, 
Kerensky's contact with the SR Executive Committee, refused to provide 
the necessary credentials on the grounds that his appearance at the 
Tauride Palace, besides entailing a serious personal risk, would 
accomplish nothing of value.172 The message was clear; Kerensky's
I67chugaev, Komitet, I, 519*
l6%erenskii, "Gatchina," p. 223.
l69Delo Naroda, November 12, 1917, p. 4.
170p. Sorokin, Leaves from a Russian Diary (New York, 192*0, 
p. 143.
17lDelo Naroda, November 22, 1917, p. 1.
172Kerensky, Russia, p. 467.
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intrusion, by exacerbating old wounds, would hinder attempts to rebuild 
party unity.
Zenzinov was surely correct, for so long as the radical revo­
lution was in progress, Kerensky's participation in political events 
would only spread dissension in socialist ranks. Also, from a personal 
standpoint his enforced passivity had a beneficial effect. Sorokin, 
who met him in Moscow at the beginning of May, was struck by the extent 
of his recovery. The former head of state, Sorokin recalled, had lost 
all traces of nervousness and irritability. Improbably disguised by a 
beard, long hair, and "thick blue spectacles," he spoke in a "quiet and 
simple" manner that befitted a "teacher or a preacher. "-*-73 The mental 
and physical exhaustion of the October daysl74 had vanished, and 
Kerensky was capable of renewed endeavors.
A limited opportunity soon appeared, for the disastrous treaty 
of Brest-Litovsk, the dissolution of the Constituent Assembly, and the 
spreading Red terror produced a revival of interest in united 
cooperation among the opponents of Bolshevism. The most promising of 
those efforts, the Union of Regeneration, won Kerensky's full 
allegiance. His reaction was certainly understandable: in advocating 
a national coalition, the restoration of the German front, and the 
reconvocation of the Constituent Assembly, the Union adhered to the 
basic principles of the defunct Provisional Government.175 Because it
173Sorokin, p. 143.
174stankevich, p. 251.
175Telegram from the Quai d'Orsay to the Russian Embassy in 
Paris, the V. A. Maklakov Archive of the Russian Embassy in Paris, 
1917-1924, 4 boxes, collection of the Hoover Institute at Stanford 
University, box 1, accession no. 26003-927*
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promised an effective revival of nadpartiinost*, Kerensky quickly 
agreed to a proposal, probably extended by Sorokin and N. I. Astrov, 
to solicit material and diplomatic aid for the Union from the West.^ 6  
In late May of 1918, in his first trip beyond the boundaries of Russia, 
Kerensky departed from Murmansk for conferences with the Allies.1??
The new emissary's arrival in western Europe caused considerable alarm 
in Communist circles; in a telegraphic conversation with Stalin,
Trotsky described him as "one of the chief agents-provocateurs working 
on behalf of foreign Imperialism."178
Trotsky's anxieties were unfounded, for Kerensky's mission on 
behalf of the Union of Regeneration was singularly unsuccessful. To 
a certain extent, that was a reflection of his inexperience in the 
conduct of diplomatic affairs. Constantine Nabokov, the Russian Charge 
d'Affairs in London, noted that Kerensky comported himself as if he 
were a fully accredited ambassador of a stable government,179 and his 
telegrams to the Union of Regeneration do convey an exaggerated sense 
of importance.1®0 Thus, it is not surprising that the Allied govern­
ments , faced with Kerensky's brusque demands for Russian representation 
at future peace conferences and his insistence that they refrain from
l?6rhe Times (London), June 27, 1918, p. 7.
177Kerensky, Russia, p. 494.
178l . Trotskii, The Trotsky Papers. 1917-22, ed. Jan Meijer,
2 vols. (The Hague, 1964-71), I, 313-315-
179Nabokoff, Ordeal, p. 258.
180Telegram from Kerensky to Moscow by the Quai d'Orsay,
Maklakov Archive, box 1, accession no. 26003-937.
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interference in the internal politics of national r e g i m e s , 181 would 
react with deep misgivings.182 But his failure was due more to 
internal developments in Russia than to diplomatic maladroitness. The 
various anti-communist national fronts broke down in the heat of civil 
war, and as they gave way to dictatorships Kerensky's tenuous influence 
dwindled.183 Finally discouraged by Allied support of Admiral A. V. 
Kolchak,184 who forcibly dispersed the democratic Directorate at Omsk, 
Kerensky abandoned his diplomatic efforts in favor of journalistic 
ones. 185
Freed from the constraints of political responsibility, Kerensky 
reverted to the style of polemical advocacy so natural to him. As the 
editor of a succession of populist-orientated journals, of which the 
most notable was the Berlin-based Dni (Days). he defended interclass 
cooperation and Russian national interests throughout the civil 
war.186 Upon its conclusion, he established a reputation as an acute 
critic and informed observer of the Soviet Union. Through articles, 
memoirs, and association with emigre organizations, Kerensky remained 
an articulate spokesman of Russian democratic ideals and a leading 
advocate of political freedom until his death in 1970.
18lThe Times (London), October 33, 1918, p. 8.
182j(erenskii, "Mir soiuznikov v Rossii," Izdaleka, p. 121.
183Bureau d 1informations Baltique, no. 47, Maklakov Archive, 
box 1, accession no. 26003-937.
184Kerenskii, "Vse roalo," Izdaleka, p. 83.




Alexander Kerensky's political career, which extended from his 
election to the State Duma in 1912 to the Bolshevik seizure of power 
in October of 1917, covered a crucial phase in the history of his 
country. In turn, those years witnessed the enfeeblement and collapse 
of tsarism, the open struggle for power among the claimants to state 
leadership, and the emergence of the Bolshevik Party from relative 
obscurity to a position of dominance. In the process, the basic frame­
work was established for the future course of the nation. An active 
participant in those significant events, Kerensky had a growing, and 
at times decisive, influence upon their outcome. As could be expected, 
his activities were often dictated by ideological considerations; no 
less than other politically active figures, he attempted to shape 
developments according to personally held values and convictions.
While Kerensky's public impact was comparatively minor until the 
February revolution of 1917, his predilections were revealed by his 
political maneuvers while a deputy within the Fourth State Duma.
Indeed, without the perspectives gained by an examination of his Duma 
activities, it would be very difficult to discern the thrust of his 
policies during the revolution. Although he gained a radical 
reputation because of his determined opposition to tsarism, Kerensky
238
239
was a consistent advocate of interparty cooperation for the attainment 
of national and social objectives. The leader of a small populist 
party, the Tmidoviks, he actually occupied an amorphous area between 
socialism and liberalism. Fully dedicated to populist conceptions of 
social justice, he nonetheless wished to achieve them by adopting, as 
a transitional measure, a non-partisan attitude toward the major 
problems facing the country.
In part, Kerensky adhered to that approach because of a senti­
mental affinity with Russian liberalism. His formative years had been 
spent in privileged, professional surroundings and he was very much at 
ease with the jurists, physicians, and academicians who dominated the 
Cadet Party. But his solicitude for the moderate Right also had a 
programmatic basis. To his mind the value of liberalism, its 
irreplaceable contribution to the Russian political process, was its 
unswerving commitment to nationalistic ideals. With liberal partici­
pation, Kerensky felt, the social transformation of the state could 
proceed along populist lines without the sacrifice of its power or 
position in the international arena.^ That belief, more than any other 
factor, explains how Kerensky could be a moderate and, at the same 
time, a revolutionary. Above all, the future Minister-President was 
a nationalist, with an exalted sense of the special destiny of Russia. 
His fervent nationalism blended easily with a tendency, common to all 
populists, to idealize the people; as a result, his expectations 
regarding the future of his country were suffused with an emotional
iFor example, see Kerensky's speech in GD, session 5, meeting 20, 
February 15, 1917, col. 1359; A. Kerenskii, "Ocherednaia zadacha," 
Izdaleka, sbomik statei (Paris, 1922), p. 47.
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intensity that was almost mystical in nature. Since those feelings 
were accompanied by strong humanistic impulses, also derived from the 
populist tradition, he was naturally drawn to a course of action that 
furthered democratic, egalitarian aims while avoiding unnecessary 
political dislocation.
Kerensky's Duma colleagues, misled by the polemical, inter­
nationalist flavor that opposition to tsarism lent to his public state­
ments and political acts, were inadequately aware of his fundamental 
orientation. His hostility to the Central Powers and his encouragement 
in May of 1915 of special councils, composed of Duma members and 
tsarist officials, to facilitate the war effort were illuminating 
examples of his desire to reconcile national and revolutionary needs. 
Yet to socialist and non-socialist deputies alike, those superficially 
incongruous actions seemed more the product of a tempestuous 
disposition than of a well-defined, carefully considered policy.
Within the relatively stratified environment of the State Duma, 
Kerensky's attempts to create a broad, multi-party revolutionary move­
ment failed to arouse real enthusiasm even when he was taken seriously. 
Liberals, regardless of their own tendency to praise the virtues of 
nonpartisanship,2 were unwilling to immolate themselves in its service. 
Their hesitation was understandable, for they could scarcely be 
sympathetic to a form of moderation that exploited their patriotism 
while denying the validity of their political programs. Furthermore, 
the major populist party, the SRs, had boycotted the elections to the 
Fourth State Duma; as a result, most Left deputies were Marxists.
2v. Maklakov, Iz vospominanii (New York, 1954), p. 308.
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Kerensky's particular interpretation of nadpartiinost', which would 
have struck a responsive chord in many Right SRs, was alien to Marxist 
politicians like Chkheidze and Skobelev. They appreciated his 
oratorical gifts, his hostility to autocracy, and his obstructionist 
talents, but they viewed his anti-party arguments with a mixture of 
skepticism and puzzlement.3 Within the confines of the State Duma, 
Kerensky had a sustained effect only upon the Left-Center— individuals 
such as S. Znamenskii and Nekrasov, who vacillated between liberalism 
and radicalism.^ In sum, Kerensky's proposals appealed to a 
numerically insignificant portion of the Duma membership. If the 
revolution had not intervened, he would probably have remained an 
ineffectual advocate of politically sterile tactics.
But when the February revolution did occur, no one was better 
prepared than Kerensky to exploit its unique possibilities. Because 
of his recognized opposition to tsarism, which had recently been empha­
sized in a series of daring and dramatic Duma speeches, he possessed 
an immense following that was disposed to accept his will as a valid 
expression of revolutionary goals. That heightened popularity, 
combined with Kerensky's own enthusiasm and the confusion that affected 
the liberal and socialist leaders during the collapse of the old 
regime, permitted a drastic expansion of his influence.
He responded immediately with attempts to bridge the differences 
between the socialist and non-socialist parties. In all probability,
3n . N. Sukhanov, Zapiski o revoliutsii. 7 vols. (Berlin, 1922),
I, 63-68.
+̂5. I. Shidlovskii, Vospominaniia, 2 vols (Berlin, 1923),
II, 127.
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the State Duma and the Petrograd Soviet would have reached a temporary 
accommodation without Kerensky's intercession. Nevertheless, the 
Duma's promptness in accepting an active role in the transfer of power, 
the rapidity with which the vexing problem of the monarchy was solved, 
and much of the authority that the first Provisional Government 
possessed in the eyes of the revolutionary populace were due to his 
strenuous efforts. To his bitter disappointment, Kerensky failed to 
create a broad coalition of liberal and socialist forces. But in 
entering the cabinet as a self-proclaimed hostage of the democracy, he 
blunted the disruptive impact of dual power and laid the groundwork 
for a future multi-party alliance.
Most of Kerensky's efforts within the first cabinet were devoted 
to extending the precarious class truce that had been struck on 
March 2. Despite the initial flush of revolutionary enthusiasm that 
affected virtually the entire country, there can be little doubt that, 
left to themselves, the liberals in the government would have come into 
violent conflict with the Petrograd Soviet. As the negotiations 
between the Temporary Committee of the State Duma and the Soviet had 
revealed, each was deeply suspicious of the other. In fact, the 
emergence of the new regime under the anxious gaze of the TsIK 
signified an armed truce rather than a genuine agreement to fulfill 
common objectives.
Kerensky's attempts to moderate that dangerous situation assumed 
two forms. First of all, he tried to reassure the Right that the 
revolution would not rage out of control, that possibilities for 
coexistence were present, and that a Red terror was not in the offing.
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His cautious conduct of the governmental inquiry into the actions of 
tsarist officials, his appeals for discipline within the armed forces, 
and his speeches assuring professional and industrial organizations 
that their interests would be protected were examples of that tactic.
He also tried to diminish tensions by prompting timely governmental 
concessions to popular demands. Kerensky * s sponsoring of measures for 
land reform and his insistence that the language of diplomacy adapt 
itself to socialistic formulas expressed the second part of his 
approach. Thus, the basic pattern that Kerensky would follow through­
out the course of the February revolution was established at the very 
outset. Assuming that the nation was predisposed toward his methods, 
he intended to promote political cooperation through a combination of 
moral exhortation and cabinet maneuvers.
An unexpected consequence of Kerensky's mediative policy, his 
conflict with Miliukov over the expression of war aims, was probably 
the seminal event of the February revolution. Because of the Justice 
Minister's clumsy attempts in April to moderate the tone of Miliukov's 
diplomatic correspondence, the Allies assumed that Russia was prepared 
to surrender its claims to Constantinople and the Straits. As a 
direct result, succeeding cabinets were forced into an overly aggres­
sive stance toward the war in order to regain the diplomatic leverage 
necessary to the protection of Russia's vital interests.
Yet the controversy produced other ramifications as well. Since 
it evolved as a series of clashes within the cabinet as well as between 
the government and the Petrograd Soviet, it was accompanied by compro­
mises at almost every stage of its progress. Thus, quite fortuitously
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and somewhat paradoxically, the prolongation of the conflict between 
Kerensky and Miliukov over foreign policy reduced its severity and 
allowed a temporary resolution without a decisive break between 
liberals and socialists. Furthermore, because of Miliukov’s abrupt 
resignation (an event that Kerensky forced by cabinet maneuvers), the 
government occupied an ambiguous position. Partly rehabilitated in 
the eyes of the aroused populace, it nonetheless was incapable of 
maintaining order in the aftermath of the April Days. Under those 
difficult and unforeseen circumstances, and in response to Kerensky's 
repeated urgings, the Petrograd Soviet reluctantly agreed to socialist 
participation in a coalition cabinet.
Kerensky viewed the appearance of the First Coalition as a vital 
step toward the realization of his political program. The nation, he 
claimed, had finally marshalled its "living, creative forces" under a 
single banner.^ He was badly mistaken; although he headed a powerful 
voting bloc within the ministerial council, he had not forged a Union 
Sacrse able simultaneously to pursue Great Power objectives and bring 
an egalitarian social order in Russia. The Cadets, in particular, had 
no intention of passively accepting the role of a loyal opposition.
Led by Miliukov, whose defeat only stiffened his partisan attitude, 
they intended to bolster their deteriorating position within the revo­
lutionary state by parliamentary maneuvers or, failing that, by 
obstructionism. The leading socialist ministers within the cabinet 
also retained a pronounced class outlook; bound to the wills of their
5a . Kerensky, The Catastrophe; Kerensky's Own Story of the 
Russian Revolution (New York, 1927), p. 141.
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party organizations, they were obliged to resist the Cadet demand that 
social experimentation be exclusively conducted by the Constituent 
Assembly. The fundamental differences between the socialist and the 
non-socialist forces had not been erased on May 5« Because of 
political exigencies, dual power had simply been transferred from the 
public view to the ministerial council.
Thus, the First Coalition, which did enjoy popular confidence but 
was badly divided within itself, was ill equipped to withstand the 
serious strains that were inherent in a policy of national resurgence.
In retrospect, it is obvious that the cabinet should have adopted a 
policy of guarded military retrenchment and concentrated upon the swift 
convocation of the Constituent Assembly. But for a combination of 
reasons— a moral obligation to resist the Central Powers, revolutionary 
idealism, a belief that victory in battle would promote internal 
stabilization, and, above all, a desire to protect Russia's inter­
national standing— it chose instead to expend its strength upon tasks 
that were beyond its ability to accomplish. That rash decision, 
exemplified by the cabinet1s approval of a major military offensive 
directed by Kerensky, was decisive to the further course of the 
revolution.
The results were fatal to the political balance struck in 
February. Despite Kerensky's brilliant efforts to raise the fighting 
capacity of the Russian armies within the framework of democratic 
reforms, he succeeded only in establishing the cohesion necessary to 
strict revolutionary defensism. Furthermore, the shattering defeat of 
the midsummer offensive erased even those modest gains. In various 
ways, the efforts required to launch the ill-fated Russian offensive
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promoted the disintegration of the First Coalition in July. The 
Cadets, already antagonized by Chernov's agrarian proposals, were 
infuriated by Kerensky's tactical concessions to Ukrainian separatism. 
Convinced that their presence in the cabinet only provided the 
socialists with a front behind which to pursue strictly partisan 
policies, they resigned in protest and demanded the formation of a 
government that would uphold national interests. At the same time 
the Petrograd garrison, especially alarmed by the war ministry's 
efforts to activate its units and therefore increasingly inclined to 
the Bolshevik position, .joined the Petrograd workers in a series of 
bloody riots. Because the June offensive collapsed in the midst of 
civil disorder and governmental decomposition, the basis of interparty 
cooperation was destroyed.
Until July, Kerensky's impact upon the February revolution had 
generally been constructive in nature. While his patriotic sentiments 
contributed to the government's tendency to overreach itself, he had 
successfully promoted a considerable degree of interclass cooperation 
through cabinet manipulations; the first and second provisional 
regimes, imperfect though they were, owed much of their effectiveness 
to his political skills.
But after the July Days, the period of Kerensky1s beneficent 
influence came to an end. At the very moment the political Right, 
judging that the revolution had become a threat to the survival of the 
nation, withdrew all toleration for compromise, Kerensky decided to 
implement his version of nadpartiinost1. Taking advantage of a 
temporary political vacuum following his suppression of the July 
uprising, he supplanted Prince L'vov with the aid of the socialistic
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Star Chamber and assumed technical leadership of the government.
After unilaterally instituting vital populist reforms, he forced the 
creation of a Second Coalition and called upon the Right for aid in 
stabilizing the endangered country. That crucial decision, which 
relied upon a desperate and disenchanted group for the salvation of 
the state and the revolution, was the prelude to his political 
destruction.
The entire course of the Second Coalition demonstrated the 
futility of utilizing the Right as an agent of change and consolidation 
in an atmosphere of class conflict. The socialist leadership, 
weakened by the abortive radical uprising of July, uneasily stood 
behind Kerensky's efforts to reorganize the state and the army. But 
the liberal and monarchist forces demanded an unabashedly anti­
socialist policy. When Kerensky refused to compromise the revolution, 
they deserted him and, in their search for a strong national govern­
ment, rallied behind the new Supreme Commander, General Kornilov.
That dangerous process, which culminated in the ill-fated Kornilov 
revolt in late August, ended all possibilities for moderate rule. In 
the wake of Komilovist treason the radical revolution, checked in 
February, April, and July, regained its lost initiative.
By providing governmental sanction for a turn to the Right in 
July, Kerensky had inadvertently increased the impact of Right 
extremism. In his efforts to preserve the disciplinary gains of July 
and August in the immediate aftermath of the Stavka revolt, he 
alienated the Left, sundered the bonds between the traditional 
socialist leaders and their radicalized followers, and helped to 
increase the force of the radical revolution. From September to the
Bolshevik rising of October, his presence within the Provisional 
Government was actually an obstacle to the reconstitution of central 
authority. Discredited in the eyes of both the Right and the Left, 
Kerensky was unable to retard the disintegration of the army or check 
the spread of anarchy in the cities and the countryside. From its 
formation on September 25 until its overthrow a month later, Kerensky' 
Third Coalition was exposed to liquidation.
Yet, throughout the final weeks of provisional rule, Kerensky 
refused to abandon his moderate position. Persuaded that extremism 
was a transient phenomenon that would soon be rejected by the Russian 
people, he tried to preserve the government as the nucleus of a future 
national revival. His insistence upon the necessity of coalition 
policies in the midst of the radical resurgence was the final factor 
that propelled the Bolsheviks into power. Because neither the Right 
nor the Left was willing to come to the defense of a government that 
would not adopt a partisan stance, a coordinated defense against the 
Bolshevik coup of October 25 proved to be impossible. Although it 
resulted from a planned uprising instead of a spontaneous mass move­
ment, the "Red October" bore a startling resemblance to the February 
Days. As in the case of tsarism, Kerensky's regime was not overthrown 
by the application of overwhelming force. It suffered defeat because 
all major elements of Russian society refused to come to its aid.
Kerensky's fate, and that of the Provisional Government which he 
headed, provides an example of moderate policies producing immoderate 
results. By artificially extending the February balance beyond its 
term, he distorted the interplay of political forces within Russia, 
magnified the violence of their reactions, and facilitated the triumph
2^9
of the very party to which he had been most opposed» While Kerensky's 
decisions inflamed the class antagonisms that he wished to dampen, 
they were derived from impeccable motives <» The Minister-President 
acted sincerely, for the good of his native land and in conformity with 
nationalistic, democratic, and humanitarian principles. The funda­
mental cause of his defeat was not the unpopularity of his ideals; with 
the exception of continued Russian participation in the war, his 
aspirations were not incompatible with those of the majority of his 
countrymen. Nor did he fail through personal weakness or the lack of 
a strong party base. He demonstrated adequate firmness during the 
July Days and the Kornilov revolt, and until September the support of 
the traditional socialist leadership provided him with a sufficient 
hold on the Left. Rather, he was repudiated because he refused to 
reduce his expectations of what the revolution could accomplish.
In the first months of the revolution, Kerensky's doctrinal 
rigidity was not a handicap to interim rule. His policy of interparty 
mediation for the realization of national and populist aims was quite 
suited to a limited government operating during a limited span of time. 
But the difficult environment produced by the war and the revolution 
demanded that moderate policies be accompanied by moderate goals. The 
inordinate ambitions of the First Coalition, which brought the 
relationship between socialists and liberals to the breaking point and 
the state to the brink of disaster, reinforced the necessity for 
curtailed governmental activities. After July, Kerensky might have 
brought the country to a condition of relative stability only by 
choosing between statism and populism. It was no longer possible to 
preserve a strong state and wage the revolution.
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Since Kerensky could not disentangle his nationalistic and his 
populist ideals, he was unable to respond adequately to the changed 
situation. His populist belief in the patience and good will of the 
Russian masses precluded the conclusion that the class truce was 
permanently ruptured. Also, by persistently identifying liberalism 
with patriotism, he refused to accept the possibility that the Right 
would abandon the Provisional Government in a time of crisis. Unaware 
that the dynamics of the revolution had altered, he acted on the 
assumption that the situation could be stabilized by controlling the 
leadership of the major parties through political manipulations at the 
apex of the political structure. In the fervid environment of class 
warfare, that inadequate approach only intensified the difficulties 
facing the government and the country. In the final analysis Kerensky, 
and the cause of moderation in general, was discredited because he 
overestimated the restraint of a populace unused to political freedom 
and subjected to enormous pressures, and because he underestimated the 
insidious power of class interests. In trying to accomplish too 
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